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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to explore Finnish maritime personnel’s conceptions of 
safety management and its relationship with the concept of safety culture. In addition, 
the aim is to evaluate the impact of the ISM Code on the prevailing safety culture in the 
Finnish shipping business. A total of 94 interviewees and seven Finnish shipping 
companies were involved in this study. Thematic interviews were applied as the main 
research method for the study. The results were analysed qualitatively.
The results indicate that maritime safety culture can simultaneously demonstrate 
features of integration, differentiation and ambiguity. Basically, maritime personnel 
have a positive attitude towards safety management systems since they consider safety 
management beneficial and essential in general. However, the study also found 
considerable criticism among the interviewees. The interviewed maritime personnel did 
not criticise the ISM Code as such, yet they criticised the way the ISM Code has been 
applied in practise.
In order to understand the multiple perspectives of safety culture more 
comprehensively, multiple theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches are 
needed. This study indicates that safety culture and the impacts of the ISM Code should 
not be unambiguously studied solely quantitative methods or qualitative methods. By 
examining safety culture from several methodological and theoretical perspectives, one 
may gain a more versatile and holistic overview of safety culture.
Keyword: Maritime Safety, Safety Management, Safety Culture, the ISM Code
TIIVISTELMÄ
Tässä väitöskirjassa tarkastellaan suomalaisten merenkulkijoiden käsityksiä 
turvallisuusjohtamisesta ja sen suhdetta turvallisuuskulttuuriin. Lisäksi arvioidaan 
kansainvälisen merenkulun turvallisuusjohtamiskoodin (ISM-koodi) vaikutusta 
turvallisuuskulttuuriin suomalaisissa varustamoissa. Tutkimusta varten haastateltiin 94 
merenkulun piirissä toimivaa henkilöä. Tutkimukseen osallistui seitsemän suomalaista 
varustamoa. Pääasiallisena tutkimusmenetelmänä käytettiin teemahaastatteluja, joiden 
tulokset analysoitiin laadullisesti.
Tutkimus osoitti, että turvallisuuskulttuurissa voi esiintyä samanaikaisesti 
yhdenmukaisia, erityviä sekä monimerkityksisiä piirteitä. Lähtökohtaisesti 
haastateltavat suhtautuivat myönteisesti turvallisuusjohtamiseen ja  näkivät 
turvallisuusjohtamisjärjestelmät hyödyllisinä ja  jopa välttämättöminä. Kuitenkin, 
tutkimus paljasti myös voimakasta kritiikkiä turvallisuusjohtamista kohtaan. 
Varsinaisesti ISM-koodia ei kritisoitu mutta sen soveltamisesta käytäntöön ei oltu 
tyytyväisiä.
Tutkimus osoitti, että turvallisuuskulttuurin kokonaisvaltaisempi ymmärtäminen 
edellyttää useamman eri teoreettisen näkökulman ja  laajemman menetelmäsalkun 
hyödyntämistä. Turvallisuuskulttuurin ja ISM-koodin tutkimuksessa ei pidä tyytyä 
pelkästään määrällisiin menetelmiin tai pelkästään laadullisiin menetelmiin vaan näitä 
yhdistelemällä voidaan saavuttaa laajempi ymmärrys turvallisuuskulttuurista 
tutkimuksen kohteena.
Avainsanat: Merenkulun turvallisuus, Turvallisuusjohtaminen, Turvallisuuskulttuuri, 
ISM-koodi
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1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the Finnish maritime personnel’s conceptions of 
safety management and its relationship with the concept of safety culture. This thesis is 
a contribution to the geographical studies of organisation (see, for example, Del Casino 
et al. 2000; Audia, 2015; Müller, 2015) and the geographical studies of ships (see, for 
example, Hasty & Peters, 2012; Anim-Addo et al. 2014).
1.1 Background
Over twenty years has passed since the Ro-Ro ship Estonia capsized and sank 28th 
September 1994. Yet, the accident seems to resurface in the media near the anniversary 
days (Iltalehti 22.9.2014; Kaleva 27.9.2004; Savon Sanomat 28.9.2008; Tekniikka ja  
talous 28.9.2009) The accident caused a national trauma, particularly in the vessel’s flag 
state Estonia and in Finland and Sweden. Most of the passengers were from these 
countries and the most of the crew members were Estonian (JAIC, 1997).
The accident was investigated thoroughly by the Joint Accident Investigation 
Commission1 (JAIC, 1997). The accident investigation and related scientific studies 
revealed several problems within the safety culture of the maritime industry (Hänninen, 
2007; Kristiansen, 2005).
The accident of Estonia was not the first fatal accident drawing attention to inadequate 
maritime safety culture. The accident investigations of the Herald of Free Enterprise and 
the Scandinavian Star revealed fatal problems within the maritime safety culture as well 
(Department of Transport, 1987; Robinson, 1999; Kristiansen, 2005). In the 
investigations it was concluded that the shipping companies operated in a competitive 
manner and aimed to maximise their profits at the expense of safety. Safety culture 
deficiencies were found amongst the shipping company management as well as ship
[A "Joint Accident Investigation Commission" between Estonia, Finland and Sweden for the investigation 
o f the capsizing o f the passenger vessel MV ESTONIA on 28 September 1994 was set up on 29 
September 1994. The Commission consists o f three members from each state and was chaired by one of 
the members from Estonia, the flag state o f MV ESTONIA.
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crews. The accident investigations revealed that the management were not committed to 
safety and the crew members were not participative in relation to safety (Department of 
Transport, 1987; Robinson, 1999; Kristiansen, 2005; Gill & Wahner, 2012). According 
to Hänninen (2007), the shipping companies and the shipping industry were not capable 
of executing corrective measures due to the fact that the risk handling measures and the 
risk management systems were underdeveloped within the maritime industry 
(Hänninen, 2007; see also Gill & Wahner, 2012; Hystad & Bye, 2013)
As a reaction to these serious maritime accidents and other problems within safety 
culture, the IMO enacted the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of 
Ships and for Pollution Prevention (International Safety Management (ISM) Code) 
(Schröder-Hinrichs et al. 2013; Hystad & Bye, 2013; Xue et al. 2015). The ISM Code 
requires that the shipping company should implement a safety management system. 
There was strong belief that implementing a safety management system would result in 
a safety culture:
’’Indeed, the proper implementation o f  the ISM  Code 
should result in a safety culture.”(ISF, 2010)
The purpose of the ISM Code is to provide an international standard for the safe 
management and operation of ships and for pollution prevention. The ISM Code 
requires that “every Company should develop, implement and maintain a Safety 
Management System (SMS)” (IMO, 1993). The ISM Code is considered to be the first 
maritime regulatory instrument that determines specified responsibilities to a company 
and its management with regard to safety (Anderson, 2003; see also Schröder-Hinrichs 
et al.2015).
The ships that were visited during this study sailed mostly in the Baltic Sea area, with 
the exception of one, which sailed in the Red Sea during the visit. The geographical 
characteristics of the Baltic Sea pose several challenges to maritime safety. For 
example, according to Finnish maritime pilots, the navigational conditions are difficult 
in the Finnish waters, because the routes are narrow, and there are a lot of turns and 
dangerous rocks (Lappalainen et al. 2014b). At the northern part of the Baltic Sea, the
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navigational difficulties increase during the winter, because the sea can be ice-covered 
for several months (Valdez Banda et al. 2015). Because of the dense maritime traffic in 
the Baltic Sea, the area is recognized as one of the busiest vessel-operated areas in the 
world (Brunila & Storgard, 2012). Furthermore, the traffic is expected to increase in the 
future, especially due to the increase in maritime transport to and from the new Russian 
ports in Primorsk and Ust-Luga (Kujala et al. 2009; Brunila & Storgard, 2012). 
However, the shipping statistics of the Baltic Sea from the years 2009, 2010 and 2013 
have indicated some decrease in shipping activities (HELCOM, 2014).
It is expected that the growth of maritime oil transportation, in particular, will increase 
the risk of maritime accidents in the Baltic Sea (see for example Kujala et al. 2009; 
Zhang et al. 2015). Based on the traffic data gathered by the Automatic Identification 
System (AIS) and incident reports, the spatial distribution of probabilistic accidents has 
been evaluated, and potentially dangerous places, or so called hot spots, have been 
identified in various parts of the Baltic Sea (Marcjan & Cucma, 2010; Montewka et al. 
2010; Goerlandt & Kujala, 2011; Laine, 2015; Przywarty et al. 2015; Zhang et al. 
2015). Special attention has been paid to the risk of an oil accident by analysing the 
spatial distribution of traffic flows, accidents and incidents and oil spreads models 
(Lehikoinen et al. 2015). The dominating accident types are grounding and collision 
(Kujala et al. 2009; HELCOM, 2014). According to HELCOM2 statistics (HELCOM, 
2014) collisions (collisions and contacts) were the main type of accidents in 2013, 
accounting for 38% of the accidents in total, while groundings accounted for 29% of the 
accidents (see Figure1).
2 Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission - Helsinki Commission is the governing body o f the 
Convention on the Protection o f the Marine Environment o f the Baltic Sea Area, known as the Helsinki 
Convention.
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Figure 1. Types of accident in the Baltic Sea in 2013 (HELCOM, 2014)
Kujala, et al. (2009) found that most of the accidents that had occurred had happened in 
coastal areas or in ports (compare to Figure 2). The Spatial Distribution of Maritime 
Accidents 2004 -  2014 and near-misses 2013 - 2014 in the Southern Finland sea areas 
are presented in Figure 2 (Laine, 2015). Most of the near-misses had happened at the 
traffic separation areas where the traffic flows are congested (Laine, 2015).
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Figure 2. The spatial distribution of the accidents in the Southern Finland sea areas (Laine, 2015).
Several major maritime accidents have occurred while conducting this study. 
Insufficient compliance with the ISM Code has been connected to, for example, the 
accident of the Costa Concordia on 13 January 2012 and the accident of Ro-Ro ship 
Finnbirch on 1 November 2006 (Schroder-Hinrichs et al. 2012; Hansson & 
Nikolopoulos, 2012). According to Schroder-Hinrichs et al. (2012), it seems that a 
combination of human and organisational factors was present in the Costa Concordia 
accident. According to Hansson and Nikolopoulos (2012), the requirements of the ISM 
Code were violated by the ship owner of the Finnbirch. In addition, according to the 
Finnish Transport Safety Agency, deficiencies in the safety management or the ISM 
Code were linked to 31 accidents of Finnish ships during the period of 2002 -  2013 
(Trafi, 2013).
1.2 Implementation of the ISM code
The objective of the implementation of the ISM Code was to reduce the amount of 
maritime accidents by creating a safety culture in the maritime industry (Goulielmos & 
Gatzoli, 2013). Some studies have indicated that the implementation of the ISM Code 
has resulted in a decrease of maritime accidents (IMO, 2005; Knapp & Franses, 2009; 
Tzannatos & Kokotos, 2009) However, according to Bhattacharya (2012), these studies
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cannot be considered completely reliable. The efficacy of the ISM Code cannot be 
isolated from other contemporary changes that occurred after the implementation of the 
ISM Code. In addition, there is a lack of suitable accident data that would provide a 
reliable basis for an analysis (Mejia, 2001; Anderson, 2003; IMO, 2005; Bhattacharya 
2012; Ek et al. 2014). Various authors have indicated that the ISM Code has not reached 
its full potential (see for example: Schroder-Hinrichs et al. 2015) and serious maritime 
accidents still occur in spite of the implementation of the ISM Code (Goulielmos & 
Gatzoli, 2013).
In addition, past studies conducted to determine the impact of the ISM Code on the 
maritime safety culture and the compliance with the ISM Code have not produced 
conclusive results and the research has been limited (Bhattacharya, 2009; Lutzhoft et al. 
2011; Xue et al. 2015). Some studies have indicated that the operations of the majority 
of shipping companies have improved due to the implementation of the ISM Code 
(Anderson, 2003; IMO, 2005; Paris MoU, 2008). There are still, however, shipping 
companies that have serious inadequacies in their safety management (Paris MoU 
2008).
According to various studies, it seems that one major noncompliance with the ISM 
Code is related to incident reporting3 (Anderson, 2003; Ek & Akselsson, 2005; 
Bhattacharya, 2009; Oltedal & McArthur, 2011; Lappalainen et al. 2011). The major 
reason for incomplete reporting is claimed to be the prevailing “blame culture”4 in the 
maritime industry. Incident reporting has been considered the most significant indicator 
of an established safety culture (Anderson, 2003: Ek & Akselsson, 2005; Bhattacharya, 
2009; Oltedal & McArthur, 2011; Lappalainen et al. 2011).
3 Incident reporting entails a systematic way o f reporting incidents and near-miss occurrences 
at workplaces (Bhattacharya, 2009). The terminology concerning incidents is broad and there is a 
significant amount o f variation in the terms found in various literatures (Jones et al. 1999; Bhattacharya 
2009; Köhler, 2010). Altogether, there are approximately ten different terms that the IMO uses in its 
precepts and many o f these terms overlap (Vepsäläinen & Lappalainen, 2010). In this study, we consider 
that incident reporting procedures cover reports and analyses o f  non-conformities, accidents and 
hazardous situations as required by section 9 o f the ISM Code (IMO, 2010).
4 A blame culture is evolving from a fear o f  social sanctions for reporting (Sanne, 2008; Storgärd et al. 
2012).
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The efficacy of the ISM Code has not been investigated in Finland since this study, 
though according to the statistics of the Paris MoU (2008) Finnish ships have been 
successful in implementing the ISM Code. Based on the Port State Control statistics, 
there have been very few non-conformities on the Finnish ships (Paris MoU, 2008). 
Finland has been ranked as the best flag state by the Paris MoU in several years (Paris 
MoU, 2008).
Although the ISM Code has been in effect for twenty years since its establishment, the 
International Maritime Organisation still regards safety culture and safety management 
as highly topical issues (IMO, 2013). According to the IMO (2013), the effectiveness of 
the ISM Code should be kept under review.
“A further challenge is to identify and evaluate factors influencing safety culture 
and to turn them into practical and effective mechanisms for further developing a 
quality and safety culture throughout the maritime community." (IMO; 2013)
As stated above, various studies have shown that the objectives of the ISM Code have 
not been reached completely. Thus I concluded that this study should be composed.
1.3 Statement of purpose, research questions and research approach
The purpose of this study is to explore the Finnish maritime personnel’s conceptions of 
the maritime safety culture and its development. Secondly the purpose of this study is to 
evaluate the impact of the ISM Code on the prevailing safety culture. The research goal 
of this study is to analyse whether there has been progress in maritime safety culture in 
the opinion of the interviewed Finnish maritime personnel and investigate whether they 
have gained any benefit or encountered any deficiencies when utilising the safety 
management systems in day-to-day business and work. Finally, the thesis studies the 
opinions of the interviewees and whether they consider that the implementation of the 
ISM Code has changed the safety culture. The material consists of 94 interviews of 
people representing the Finnish maritime industry and observations on board.
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The research questions are:
1. What is the current situation of maritime safety culture from the point of view of 
management commitment, employee participation and continuous improvement 
in the Finnish shipping industry?
2. How do the personnel of Finnish shipping companies see safety management?
Do they consider it useful and beneficial and do they see any deficiencies in it?
3. Do the personnel of Finnish shipping companies feel like the ISM Code has 
changed the Safety Culture in the Finnish shipping companies?
The first research question is based on the findings of the accident investigations which 
revealed that the management were not committed and the crew members were not 
participative regarding safety and the industry had underdeveloped processes for the 
continuous improvement of safety (Department of Transport, 1987; Robinson, 1999; 
Kristiansen, 2005; Hänninen, 2007). It could be said that the safety culture was “poor”. 
The research approach to the first research question is to evaluate whether there has, in 
the opinion of the interviewees, been progress with regard to these three safety culture 
fundamentals.
The second research question is based on the assumption that the maritime personnel 
have a negative attitude towards safety management systems. This assumption is based 
on the premise that safety management has previously been considered to be, for 
example, burdensome bureaucracy and the requirements of safety management have 
been considered to indicate distrust in the competence and professional skills of the 
maritime personnel (Anderson,2003; Bhattacharya, 2009). Furthermore:
“the demand for written procedures is perceived by many seafarers as 
counteracting the use o f  common sense, experience, and professional 
knowledge epitomized in the concept o f  seamanship.” (Knudsen, 2009)
The research approach to the second research question is to investigate whether the 
interviewees have gained any benefit, help or support from the safety management 
systems in their daily work. Furthermore, it is investigated what kind of disadvantages 
and deficiencies they have faced while utilising the safety management systems in day- 
to-day business and work.
The third research question is based on the belief of the “founders” of the ISM Code 
that the implementation of the ISM Code should result in a safety culture. The research
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approach to the third research question is to survey the opinions of the interviewees if 
they consider that the implementation of the ISM Code has changed the safety culture. 
It has been suspected that the contribution of the ISM Code to the safety culture of the 
shipping industry has not been very strong. For example, Hänninen (2007) questioned 
the ISM Code as a remedy for the cultural defects that are related to the entire shipping 
industry.
This thesis is based on an extensive interview study which was carried out as a part of 
the METKU Research Project (Developing Maritime Safety Culture) during 2008 -  
2010. One of the aims of the research project was to evaluate the impacts of the ISM 
Code on the maritime safety culture in Finland. The research partners were Aalto 
University, University of Turku, Kymenlaakso University of Applied Sciences and 
Turku University of Applied Sciences. The METKU project was funded by the 
European Union, Regional Council of Päijät-Häme, the City of Kotka and private 
companies. The aim of the METKU project was to compose a holistic view of the 
development of maritime safety in Finland during the past decade. (Heijari, & 
Tapaninen, 2010).
Based on the METKU research project, the author has previously published a literature 
report regarding the recent studies on maritime safety management and the impacts of 
the ISM Code on maritime safety culture (Lappalainen, 2008). The report concluded 
that the three fundamentals of safety culture are management commitment, personnel 
empowerment and continuous improvement. During the METKU project, Lappalainen 
and Salmi (2009) published an interview report, in which the results of the interviews 
were compared to those three fundamentals. The interview results were then further 
analysed in two journal articles. The aim of the first article was to take a closer look at 
incident reporting in the Finnish shipping industry, study the reasons for poor incident 
reporting and suggest improvements to increase reporting (Lappalainen et al. 2011). The 
purpose of the second article was to evaluate the ISM Code in the light of four criteria 
for an effective maritime safety policy: 1) incentive and innovation effects, 2) 
enforcement, 3) acceptability and 4) effectiveness and appropriateness (Lappalainen et 
al. 2014a). The criteria were established by Kuronen and Tapaninen (2009).
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For this study, the results of the interviews are re-examined through applied qualitative 
content analysis and re-interpreted from a wider theoretical perspective.
1.4 Structure of the thesis
The structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapter two introduces the ISM Code and the 
reasons which led to its implementation. Chapter two begins with a short review of 
three fatal maritime accidents, in order to shed light on some of the problems within the 
maritime safety culture over two decades ago. Secondly, chapter two provides a brief 
description of the content and requirements of the ISM Code. The purpose of chapter 
three is to present the theory of safety culture and its relationship to organisational 
culture. After presenting the theory of safety culture, the previous studies regarding the 
ISM Code and maritime safety culture are reviewed. Based on the different perspectives 
for approaching safety culture, which are discussed in chapter three, the different 
methodological options are discussed and the chosen methodology is introduced in 
chapter four. Chapter five presents the key findings obtained from the interviews and 
observations. Chapter six analyses and interprets the findings in relation to the previous 
studies regarding the ISM Code and maritime safety culture. Chapter six is organised 
into the following sections based on the three research questions: the current situation of 
maritime safety culture, the maritime personnel’s conceptions on safety management 
and safety culture, and the impact of the ISM Code on the maritime safety culture. 
Chapter seven provides the conclusions of this thesis. Chapter seven starts with the 
theoretical reflections concluded from the findings of the study and proceeds with the 
methodological reflections and assessment of the reliability and validity of the findings 
of the study. Finally, the chapter provides recommendations for practitioners and 
recommendations for further research.
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2 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ISM CODE
2.1 Poor safety culture
The accident of the ferry Herald of Free Enterprise occurred 6 March 1987 in 
Zeebrugge in Belgium. The accident caused the death of 193 persons. The direct cause 
of the capsizing of the ferry was that it had left the harbour with its bow doors open. As 
the ferry increased its speed, the bow wave grew and eventually reached the freeboard 
and water began to enter the car deck causing the ferry to capsize within a few minutes. 
The accident of Herald of Free Enterprise was caused by a combination of different 
factors. The accident is best described as a combination of various sorts of omissions 
and negligence at all levels of the shipping organisation prior to the accident. There 
were no clear and unambiguous instructions concerning safety actions, which lead to 
ambiguity regarding roles and responsibilities. This was primarily seen to be the fault of 
the senior management. The management of the company had been indifferent towards 
the safety enhancing propositions that had come from the ships. The Herald of Free 
Enterprise’s sister ship Pride of Free Enterprise had sailed with its bow doors open in 
1983. After the incident, the master of the ship had proposed to the shipping company 
that such system should be introduced to the ships that would identify and indicate to 
the bridge by a warning light that the bow doors might be open. The shipping company 
turned down the proposition as unnecessary. The master of Herald of Free Enterprise 
had made complaints a couple of times about the deficiencies in the ship’s operations. 
According to the ship’s master, the constant personnel changes amongst the ship’s 
officers and changes in the ship’s routes and time schedule made it difficult to operate 
the ship in a safe manner. The master was afraid that the fluent operation of the ship had 
been endangered, since the ship had not been properly maintained and the safety 
inspections and safety drills had not been properly executed as the ship’s officers did 
not feel as if the ship was their own and they could not get a feel for the ship in such a 
limited time period. This deficiency was also disregarded by the shipping company. The 
company had been infected with gross negligence all the way up to the most senior 
management of the company. (Department of Transport, 1987).
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The fire accident on the car ferry Scandinavian Star occurred during the night of 6 April 
1990. The fire killed 158 people. The fire was supposedly deliberately set. However, 
during the accident investigation it became evident that the fire could have been 
restrained or even put out completely without any serious consequences if both the 
technical condition of the ship and the actions of the crew members had been 
appropriate. The accident investigation committee found several technical defects that 
had made it difficult to extinguish and restrain the fire and alarm and evacuate the 
passengers. Technical defects were discovered in the fire doors, sprinklers and alarms. 
The effective evacuation of the passengers was hindered by several factors. The 
emergency exits were quickly filled with smoke. The emergency exits had not been 
marked in Scandinavian languages. The routes to the emergency exits were hard to 
perceive in the labyrinthine ship, especially for those passengers who had not made 
themselves familiar with the ship beforehand. Some passengers had perished after 
straying into the wrong corridor. A successful evacuation would have required active 
guidance from the crew members (Robinson, 1999). The owner of the ship had only just 
been changed. The ship had undergone repairs and modifications, so that it would be 
suitable for route traffic between Norway and Denmark. Nevertheless, the repairs and 
modifications had not been completed before the ship started to operate on the new 
route. The crew had not been properly familiarized with the ship. In addition, the 
necessary safety training had not been arranged. The officers and crew members lacked 
the ship specific safety training and, because of that, the rescue operations and 
evacuation could not be organised (Robinson, 1999; Kristiansen, 2005). The final 
conclusion of the accident investigation committee was that neither the ship nor the 
crew were seaworthy. The shipping company had hastened the ship’s deployment on the 
new route and thus taken a risk with safety. (Robinson, 1999). The accident 
investigation suggested that before taking a ship in use, the officers and crew members 
must receive safety and emergency situation education and training, which were later 
included in the requirements of the ISM Code. (Robinson, 1999; Kristiansen, 2005).
The car ferry Estonia capsized and sank during a storm on 28 September 1994 on the 
route from Tallinn to Stockholm. 852 people died in the accident. Only 137 people were 
rescued (JAIC, 1997). The direct cause of the accident was the damage caused to the
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bow visor and its separation in the rough weather. As the visor separated from the rest 
of the ship it simultaneously pulled off the watertight ramp behind it, after which a great 
amount of water started to flood into the car deck. The effect was similar to the Herald 
of Free Enterprise case. Estonia lost its stability and began to list rapidly. The rapid 
tilting increased the flow rate of the water into the ship and the ship started to sink. 
There was very little time for the evacuation of the passengers. (JAIC, 1997).
Hänninen’s (2007) analysis of the accident of Estonia brought to daylight cultural 
defects that were related to the entire shipping sector. Based on the conclusions of the 
accident investigation committee, neither the shipping company that owned Estonia or 
the crew of Estonia were guilty of any mistakes or negligence (JAIC, 1997). The 
passengers and crew of Estonia were first and foremost victims of the problems in the 
social structures and culture that plague the entire shipping industry (industrial level 
disease; Hänninen, 2007). The processes that led to the accident were intertwined into 
the established practices, roles and ascendancies between the different operators in 
maritime traffic, such as ship owners, shipbuilders and the organisations that carry out 
maritime legislation. According to Hänninen (2007), the sinking of Estonia was a 
systemic accident, with which Hänninen means the lack of risk management systems 
and the undeveloped state of the culture, in which different deviations and warning 
signals and corrective measures were not seen to be in need of any special attention.
The accident investigations of Herald of Free Enterprise, Scandinavian Star and Estonia 
showed that there were serious deficiencies in maritime safety during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. The low safety level was seen to be caused by the lack of safety culture in 
the entire maritime industry sector. Safety culture deficiencies were found amongst the 
shipping company management as well as ship crews. The introduction of the ISM 
Code was expected to create a safety culture in maritime traffic.
Table 1 provides a summary of the major deficiencies revealed in the accident 
investigations. The management of the shipping companies were not committed, the 
crew members were not participative regarding safety and the measures for the
20  Jouni Lappalainen
continuous improvement were missing (Department of Transport, 1987; Robinson, 
1999; Kristiansen, 2005).
Table 1. Major deficiencies related to the maritime safety culture (Sources: Department of Transport, 1987; 
Robinson, 1999; Kristiansen, 2005; JAIC, 1997; Hänninen, 2007)
Problems within management
commitment_________________________
•  The shipping companies operated in a 
competitive manner and aimed to 
maximise their profits at the expense of 
safety
• The management of the shipping 
company had not set any safety coals 
or aims and had not assigned anyone to 
be responsible for the safety issues
• The shipping company was indifferent 
and sometimes even rejected the 
improvement suggestions that came 
from the ships
Problems within employee
participation______________________
•  The crew did not feel like the ship 
was their ”own” because of e.g. the 
high turnover rate of the officers
• The ship’s officers and crew had a 
narrow view of their own roles and 
responsibilities
• The officers and crew had limited 
skills and knowledge for 
emergencies (e.g. fire control and 
evacuation)
• The master and the management of 
the shipping company had not 
considered the ship’s inadequate 
seaworthiness in any way
• The seamen (ship’s officers and 
crew) were not active in making 
safety related initiatives or 
suggestions for improvement
Problems within continuous
improvement__________________________
• The information about the problems 
and dangerous situations improvement 
did not cumulate in the maritime 
sector. The maritime authorities did not 
receive enough information about 
problems and dangerous situations 
either
• Neither the shipping companies nor the 
maritime sector have usually utilised 
procedures that made it possible to 
learn from the problems and dangerous 
situations so that they could be 
prevented in the future
• The shipping companies did not have a 
procedure in use for the identification 
of risks and plans for emergency 
situations
•  The maritime sector accepted the 
dangerous situations and near miss -  
situations too easily. The risks were 
somewhat considered to be connected 
to the sector
2.2 The establishment of the ISM Code
Some time before the accident of Herald of Free Enterprise in 1986, the British 
Department of Transport had published guidelines on safety management (Department 
of Transport, 1987; Anderson, 1998). These recommendatory guidelines emphasized 
the meaning of good governance and the role of management in the safe operation of 
the ships. However, the shipping company that owned Herald of Free Enterprise had not 
followed these guidelines (Department of Transport, 1987). After the accident of Herald 
of Free Enterprise, national mandatory rules for safety management on passenger ships 
were rushed and the national rules came into force in 1988 (Goulielmos & Goulielmos, 
2005).
In 1989, following an initiative by Great Britain in the IMO, a resolution that preceded 
the ISM Code was adopted (IMO, 1989; Goulielmos & Goulielmos, 2005 (IMO 
Guidelines on Management for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution
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Prevention)). Resolution A.647 (16) was merely a recommendation at this stage, but its 
contents were largely the same as the contents of the ISM Code (Vepsäläinen & 
Lappalainen, 2010). Eventually, the ISM Code was adopted as mandatory in a 
resolution in 1993. By this resolution, the ISM Code was incorporated into the 
international SOLAS5 Convention, in which the Code generates the chapter IX. The 
ISM Code has been amended twice. The last time the ISM Code was amended was in 
December 2008, through the resolution of the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee 
(Vepsäläinen & Lappalainen, 2010).
Hastened by the accident of Estonia, the ISM Code was made compulsory on Ro-Ro 
passenger ships in the EU’s internal traffic by the Council Regulation from the 
beginning of July 1996 (Vepsäläinen & Lappalainen, 2010). The ISM Code came into 
force worldwide gradually in 1998-2002. From July 1998, the ISM Code had to be 
observed by all passenger ships, high speed craft, tankers and bulk carriers. Other ships 
came into the scope of the ISM Code from the beginning of July 2002 (Anderson, 
2003). The ISM Code was adopted in Finland through an amendment to the Finnish 
Maritime Code in 1995 (Finnish Maritime Code 674/1994, amendment 369/1995).
Currently, in the Finnish legislation, the provisions regarding the enforcement and 
application of the ISM Code are incorporated in the Act on Ships’ Crews and the Safety 
Management of Ships (Act 1687/2009). According to the Act, the Finnish Transport 
Safety Agency monitors that the Finnish companies operating ships that are within the 
scope of application of the ISM Regulation follow the provisions of the ISM Regulation 
(Regulation (EC) No 336/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council).
2.3 The objective and the requirements of the ISM Code
The main objective of the ISM Code was to create a maritime safety culture (Anderson, 
2003; Oltedal, 2011). It was believed that a safety culture could reduce the amount of 
accidents, which caused considerable damages (e.g. Anderson, 2003). According to 
Anderson (2003), the IMO adopted the concept of safety culture as a fundamental basis
5 The International Convention for the Safety o f  Life at Sea (SOLAS)
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of the ISM Code, which is manifested, for example, in the IMO’s guidelines for the 
implementation of the ISM Code by the administration:
“The application o f  the ISM  Code should support and encourage the 
development o f  a safety culture in shipping. Success factors for the 
development o f  a safety culture are, inter alia, commitment, values and 
beliefs” (IMO, 2010)
The benefits gained from the safety culture, which would be created based on the ISM 
Code and its application, were seen to result in safer ships and a cleaner marine 
environment (Anderson, 2003). According to Anderson (2003), one of the benefits of 
the ISM Code based safety culture would also be the shipping companies’ competitive 
advantage.
The IMO defines the nature of safety culture as follows:
”An organisation with a "safety culture" is one that gives appropriate 
priority to safety and realises that safety has to be managed like other 
areas o f  the business.” (IMO, 2014)
According to IMO (1993), in order to succeed in safety management the commitment of 
the top management is essential:
”The cornerstone o f  good safety management is commitment from the top. 
In matters o f  safety and pollution prevention it is the commitment, 
competence, attitudes and motivation o f  individuals at all levels that 
determines the end result. ” (IMO, 1993)
According to the IMO, safety culture can be achieved in maritime traffic by applying 
the following principles (IMO, 2014):
• Understanding that accidents are preventable through following 
correct procedures and establishing best practice
• Constantly thinking o f safety
• Seeking continuous improvement
The specific requirements of the ISM Code were created based on the principles 
described above. The ISM Code is based on very loosely written general principles and 
objectives, so that it could easily be applied in different kinds of shipping companies 
and ships that sail in highly varying conditions (IMO, 1993). The ISM Code could be
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considered to be the first maritime regulatory instrument that determines specified 
responsibilities to a company6 and its management with regard to safety (Anderson,
2003).
It is the responsibility of the company to develop, apply and maintain a safety 
management system (SMS). It is the responsibility of the company, by employing the 
safety management system, to ensure the safe operation of the ship and to create a safe 
working environment, to protect from all identified risks and to ensure the continuous 
improvement of the safety management skills of the personnel working on board and 
onshore. That includes emergency preparedness in the fields of both safety and 
environmental protection (IMO, 1993). In the amendment that came into force in July 
2010, further specifications were added to paragraph 1.2.2 concerning the identified 
risks. The shipping companies are now expected to perform systematic risk assessment, 
based on which appropriate safeguards to diminish or eliminate the risks must be 
devised. (IMO, 2008).
According to the ISM Code, the shipping companies must comply with regulations and 
other mandatory rules in their operations. The ISM Code also requires that the 
applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the IMO, administration 
(in Finland that is the Finnish Transport Safety Agency), classification societies and 
maritime industry organisations are taken into account (EC, No 336/2006). Examples of 
the mandatory rules include the provisions of the SOLAS Convention. The quality and 
safety management standards also require compliance with laws and regulations. This 
requirement is expressed very clearly in the ISM Code. It is the responsibility of the 
shipping company to develop and maintain a safety management system that includes 
the following sections (IMO, 1993):
• A shipping company’s safety and environmental protection programme 
(safety and environmental protection policy)
6 ’’Company means the owner o f the ship or any other organization or person such as the manager, or the 
bareboat charterer, who has assumed the responsibility for operation o f the ship from the shipowner and 
who, on assuming such responsibility, has agreed to take over all duties and responsibility imposed by the 
Code.” (IMO, 1993)
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• Instructions and procedures to ensure the safe operation o f  ships and 
environmental protection in compliance with relevant international and Flag 
State legislation (safety management system documentation)
• Defined levels o f  authority and lines o f  communication between shore and 
shipboard personnel and amongst them (roles and responsibilities)
• Procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities with the provisions 
o f this Code (deviations)
• Procedures to prepare for and respond to emergency situations
• Procedures for internal audits (ISM auditing) and management reviews 
(management reviews)
2.4 The enforcement of the ISM Code
The responsibility to verify the implementation of the ISM Code belongs to the national 
maritime administration (IMO, 2010). In Finland, the national maritime administration 
is the Finnish Transport Safety Agency Trafi (former Finnish Maritime Administration). 
Trafi, or a recognized organisation (RO) acting on behalf of Trafi, performs the audits 
of the ISM Code based safety management systems (external ISM audits). The purpose 
of the audits is the following:
1. The administration verifies in the audits that shipping companies and ships 
comply with the ISM Code
2. The purpose o f  the audits is to verify the effective functioning o f  the safety 
management system
3. In addition, the purpose o f  the audits is to support and encourage the shipping 
companies to achieve the objectives stated in paragraph 1.2.2 o f  the ISM  Code. 
(IMO, 2010)
Port State Control has a central role in controlling the implementation of the ISM Code. 
In Europe, the Port State Control system was agreed upon in the Paris Memorandum of 
Understanding on Port State Control (Paris MoU) in Paris in 1982. The parties that have 
signed the Paris MoU include, in addition to the maritime authorities of the coastal 
member states of the EU, also the maritime authorities of Russia, Canada, Norway, 
Iceland and Croatia. The aim of the Paris MoU was to create an international inspection 
and monitoring system, according to which the member states inspect ships in national 
ports in order to verify that they are in a condition approved by international standards 
and that international provisions are complied with. Ship inspections, rectifying 
deficiencies and ordering the detention of ships, if necessary, are the different actions
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the port states can perform if the deficiencies endanger the ship, the crew or the safety 
of the marine environment. During the Port State Control, the inspector makes sure that 
the ship’s safety management system is compliant with the requirements of the ISM 
Code. In addition to regular port state inspections, the members of the Paris MoU have 
organised concentrated inspection campaigns based on the ISM Code. The 
implementation of the ISM Code has been the topic of the concentrated inspection 
campaigns three times, in the years 1998, 2005 and 2007. (Paris MoU, 2008)
The aim of the inspections was to find out how well the requirements of the ISM Code 
are met on ships. During the first inspection in 1998, 1575 ships belonging within the 
scope of the ISM Code were inspected. In a little over 5 % of the ships, deficiencies of 
such seriousness were found that the ships were detained until the deficiencies were 
rectified on the ship (Paris MoU, 2008). In the concentrated inspection campaign 
organised in 2002, 3846 ships were inspected, during which time the share of detained 
ships was 4.2 %. In the autumn of 2007, the third concentrated inspection campaign was 
organized, the aim of which was to keep track of the progress of the application of the 
ISM Code. During the campaign of the year 2007, 5427 ships were inspected. 
According to the Paris MoU (2008), in approximately 20 % of the ships inspected 
during the campaign, some degree of deficiencies and defects in fulfilling the 
requirements of the ISM Code were found. ISM Code related deficiencies were found 
on 1031 ships. 176 ships were detained because of serious deficiencies relating to the 
ISM Code. According to the Paris MoU (2008), the safety management systems on the 
detained ships were poor. The effect of the ISM Code was in those cases found to be a 
dead letter, despite the fact that in many cases the documentation of the safety 
management system had swollen into a paper mountain.
Table 2 shows the amount of ships that were detained due to serious deviations from the 
ISM Code, and their relative share from all of the inspected ships in the concentrated 
inspection campaigns of the years 1998, 2002 and 2007 (Paris MoU, 2008).
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Table 2. Ships detained due to serious deviations from the ISM Code during the concentrated inspection campaigns.
Year Number of inspected Detained ships Percentage of detained
________________________ ships____________________________________________ ships________________
1998 1575 81 5.14 %
2002 3846 169 4.39 %
2007 5427 176 3.24 %
The share of the ships detained based on deviations related to the ISM Code has 
declined slightly with time. The safety management system based on the ISM code is 
slowly and gradually starting to work on ships. According to the Paris MoU (2008), the 
ships’ crews largely understand the requirements of safety management and apply them 
in practice. Nevertheless, in all three inspections campaigns ships were found in which 
safety management was not functional in practice, and therefore the crew and maritime 
environment were endangered. According to the Paris MoU, the owners of these ships 
were not committed to safety. In these shipping companies the safety aspects did not 
govern the safety management -  instead, competition and commercial pressure made 
the companies compromise the maintenance of the ships, neglect the emergency 
situation training of the crews and become indifferent to learning from mistakes and 
dangerous occurrences. In the inspections, big differences were found based on the 
different flag states and the classification society that had granted the ISM certificate, in 
which case the existence of the ISM certificate did not guarantee the actual 
implementation of safety management on the ship. Despite the obtaining of the ISM 
certificate, the ship had not fulfilled the requirements of the ISM Code in practice and 
thus there was still a lot to improve in the application of the ISM Code. The Paris MoU 
recommended that the maritime authorities of its member states constantly pay attention 
to safety management in their future port state inspections.
Finnish ships have done very well in international comparison. In the concentrated 
inspection campaign of the year 2007, no Finnish ships had to be detained. In addition, 
no ISM Code related deviations were found on Finnish ships during the inspection 
campaign. During the campaign, 37 Finnish ships were inspected in different port states 
of the Paris MoU. The Finns have done very well in regular port state control 
inspections also. The Paris MoU has ranked Finland as the safest flag state in 2005 and 
2007 (Paris MoU, 2008). During the recent years, Finland has not been as successful in
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the ranking. In the year 2014, Finland’s rank was 16. However, Finland’s total 
performance has remained at a high level: for example, the number of deficiencies has 
decreased, but the other member states of the Paris MoU have progressed even more 
(Trail, 2015)
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3 CONCEPT OF SAFETY CULTURE
3.1 Geographical studies on ships and organisation
This thesis is a contribution to the geographical studies of organisation (Del Casino et 
al. 2000; Audia, 2015; Müller, 2015) and the geographical studies of ships (see, for 
example, Hasty & Peters 2012; Anim-Addo et al. 2014). According to Audia (2015), 
organisational geography or geography of organisations studies the spatial features of 
organisational activities. Müller (2015) defines the geography of organisation as an 
interdisciplinary study of the spatial aspects of organisations and processes of 
organizing. Correspondingly, the geography of mobilities or geography of transport 
studies movements that take place over space (Rodrigue et al. 2009; Cresswell & 
Merriman, 2011; Anim-Addo et al. 2014). Geographies of ships, as a variety of 
geographical studies of mobilities, studies spaces, places, times and scales of the ships 
and the journeys they made possible (Anim-Addo et al. 2014).
According to Müller (2015), geography of organisations is interested in how 
organisations shape geography and, vice versa, how geography shapes organisations. 
Similarly, geography of ships is interested in how ships have affected geography and 
how geography has affected ships and shipping (Hasty & Peters, 2012). Shipping is a 
particular industry where particular organisational and geographical features are 
intertwined. Following Hasty and Peters (2012), the characteristics of organisation in 
shipping companies and on board ships are strongly influenced by geography i.e. 
distance, mobility, nationality etc. According to Yliskyla-Peuralahti and Gritsenko 
(2014), “there are multiple geographies in place where shipping is practised”. The 
shipping companies can be located in one country, their ships can be registered in 
another country, the crew members can represent multiple nationalities and the ships 
can operate to and from multiple locations all over the world (Berg et al. 2013; 
Bhattacharya & Tang, 2013; Walters & Bailey, 2013; Bhattacharya, Y. 2015; Yliskyla- 
Peuralahti & Gritsenko, 2014).
The safety regulations concerning shipping act at several geographical levels (Kuronen 
& Tapaninen, 2009; van Leeuwen, 2015). At the international level, the most important
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actor is the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). The major regulatory 
instrument regarding maritime safety is the International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS), which includes, for example, the requirements of the ISM Code. 
According to Stopford (cited in Kuronen & Tapaninen, 2009), worldwide regulations on 
maritime safety are needed in order to avoid a situation where each coastal state would 
have its own rules on issues like ship structure, manning etc. Maritime safety is also 
regulated at the regional level (Kuronen & Tapaninen, 2009; van Leeuwen, 2015). For 
example, compliance with the ISM Code was made compulsory on Ro-Ro passenger 
ships in the EU’s internal traffic by the Council Regulation from the beginning of July 
1996 (Vepsäläinen & Lappalainen, 2010). At the regional level, the most important 
regulation concerns the Port State Controls (see for example, Perepelkin et al. 2010; Fan 
et al. 2014; Rodriguez & Piniella, 2014; Cariou & Wolff, 2015; van Leeuwen, 2015). 
The international maritime safety regulation is implemented at the national level i.e. by 
the flag states and the port states (Kuronen & Tapaninen, 2009; Yliskylä-Peuralahti & 
Gritsenko, 2014). For example, pilotage is governed by national regulations (Kuronen 
& Tapaninen, 2009). Kunnaala and Lappalainen compared how pilotage organisations 
assess and measure quality, efficiency and safety and the prevailing safety practises 
concerning pilotage in Finland, Australia, Canada, and Western and Northern Europe 
(Kunnaala et al. 2013; Lappalainen et al. 2014b). These studies indicated that there are 
significant differences in pilotage organisations and their practices between countries.
Several studies have criticised the current multi-level maritime safety regime as being 
ineffective in ensuring that every ship complies with the international maritime 
regulations (Roe, 2009; Kuronen & Tapaninen, 2009; Fan et al. 2014; Rodriguez & 
Piniella, 2014; Cariou & Wolff, 2015). The current safety regime allows so called sub­
standard shipping because some flag states (so called Flag of Conveniences; FOC) 
permit foreign ships to be registered into their open registers which are more permissive 
regarding, for example, safety regulation and manning requirements (Bhattacharya & 
Tang, 2013; Fan et al. 2014; Rodriguez & Piniella, 2014; Cariou & Wolff, 2015). In 
addition, Bhattacharya and Tang (2013) claimed that the geographical distance between 
the ships and the regulators complicates the surveillance of the safety standards.
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According to Fan et al. (2014), the Port State Control Regime was established to fill the 
gaps in the enforcement of the maritime safety regime at the international and national 
levels (see also van Leeuwen, 2015). It is indicated that the Port State Control 
inspections have been effective in improving maritime safety by reducing deficiencies 
related to international safety standards (Cariou et al. 2008) and have hence reduced the 
probability of casualties (Knapp & Franses, 2007; Heij et al. 2011). According to Knapp 
et al. (2011), the Port State Control inspections have led to cost savings among the 
shipping industry. Based on the statistics collected within the Port State Control 
inspections, some studies have compared the performance of different flag states in 
terms of compliance with maritime safety standards (Corres & Pallis, 2008; Paris MoU, 
2008; Perepelkin et al. 2010). Finnish ships have been very successful in these 
comparisons (Corres & Pallis, 2008; Paris MoU, 2008).
One important reason for registering the ships in a flag of convenience is that the FOCs 
allow multinational crews, thus allowing the shipping companies to reduce their 
manning costs (Theotokas & Progoulaki, 2007; Bhattacharya & Tang, 2013; Fan et al.
2014) Several studies have shown that the nationality of the crew members plays a 
significant role in relation to safety (Horck, 2010; Baylon & Santos, 2011, Gron & 
Knudsen, 2011, Lu et al. 2012; Berg et al. 2013) and it has been claimed that 
multicultural crews are a risk for maritime safety (Martensson, 2006; Theotokas & 
Progoulaki, 2007). Communication problems based on, for example poor language 
skills are identified as one important risk factor (Sampson & Zhao, 2003; Pyne & 
Koester, 2005; Hetherington et al. 2006; Havold, 2007; Popescu et al. 2010).
Geography characterises the organisational structure of shipping. According to 
Goulielmos and Gatzoli (2012), shipping should be considered as “Management from a 
Distance”, which means that that the top management of the shipping company and its 
mobile “factories” and their crews are in different places (see also Bhattacharya & 
Tang, 2013). There is always a more or less long distance between the ship and the 
office. That distance poses a special challenge to safety management, which has been 
attempted to be taken into account in the ISM Code (IMO, 1993) by stating that the 
master should have an overriding authority and responsibility regarding safety on board.
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Despite this, several problems caused by the distance have been found. The “fact” is 
that the culture of a company is different than the culture of its ships (Grabowski et al. 
2007; Goulielmos & Gatzoli, 2012). According to Goulielmos and Gatzoli (2012) and 
Bhattacharya and Tang (2013), the geographical distance between the ship owner and 
the ships forms a concrete barrier in developing a strong safety culture based on the 
shipping company’s accepted goals and values. According to Goulielmos and Gatzoli 
(2012), the culture on the ship is defined by the master. Goulielmos and Gatzoli (2012) 
found that Greek masters were autocratic and they kept strict hierarchical order on­
board the ships, which could be a risk in a hazardous situation. On the other hand, Xue 
et al. (2015) revealed that that, in the Chinese ships they studied, the decision-making 
was centralised to the shore management and the shipmaster’s decision-making power 
was rather limited, which can compromise the requirements of the ISM Code. The 
shipmasters are obliged to work under strong commercial pressure (Goulielmos & 
Gatzoli, 2012) caused by the shore management e.g. ordering them to keep the sailing 
schedules (Xue at al. 2015).
Yogendra Bhattacharya (2015) found that the distance between the shipping owner and 
the ship’s personnel, as well as the fragmented organisational structure, cause the 
employee engagement levels among ship crews to be lower than in shore based 
industries. According to him (Bhattacharya, 2015), the personnel on-board have 
minimal to no contact with the ship owners because of the geographical and 
organisational distance, in which the owner, ships, ship operator and the ships’ 
personnel may each come from different countries. Bhattacharya (2015) found this 
problematic, because it is indicated that the employee engagement correlates with safety 
level.
In summary, while studying maritime safety culture, it is almost impossible to not take 
into account the geographical features that shape international shipping. Most of the 
previous studies regarding the assessment of maritime safety culture and/or the 
investigation of the impacts of the ISM Code have focused on a single country (see in 
detail Section 3.4). No comprehensive comparison between different countries and 
different nationalities was found. However, this study concentrates on the Finnish
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shipping business, in which the maritime safety culture and the efficacy of the ISM 
Code have not been studied at all. The focus is on Finnish owned ships and their Finnish 
personnel.
3.2 The origin of safety culture and safety management
The concept of culture in the organisational theory is derived from anthropology 
(Smircich, 1983) and from sociology (Antonsen, 2012). According to Smircich (1983), 
there is no broad consensus on the definition of the concept of culture (see also 
Antonsen, 2012). Antonsen (2012) sees “culture as the frames of reference through 
which information, symbols and behaviour are interpreted and the conventions for 
behaviour, interaction and communication are generated.” Respectively, the 
organisational culture can be defined as a background factor influencing the company’s 
operations, an organisational variable or a metaphor for conceptualizing the 
organisation (Smircich, 1983). Most definitions consider safety culture as a part of 
organisational culture, with a focus on safety (Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Cooper, 2000; 
Wiegmann et al. 2002; Richter & Koch, 2004; Reiman et al. 2008: Guldenmund, 2014). 
More thorough elaboration about the concept of culture and the concept of 
organisational culture can be found from Smircich (1982) and Antonsen (2012).
The origin of the concept of safety culture can be dated to the second half of the 1980s 
after several fatal accidents, for example the Chernobyl nuclear power station accident 
in 1986, the falling of the oil production platform Piper Alpha in 1988 and the disaster 
of the space shuttle Challenger in January of 1986 (Reiman & Oedewald, 2007; 
Guldenmund, 2010; Strauch, 2015; Warszawska & Kraslawski, 2015). In the field of 
shipping industry, safety culture emerged after the capsizing of Herald of Free 
Enterprise in March of 1987 (Goulielmos, 2001; Anderson, 2003; Gill & Wahner, 
2012). A breakdown in organisation safety culture was seen as the main contributor to 
these accidents (Gill & Wahner, 2012; Strauch, 2015; Warszawska & Kraslawski,
2015). As a response, the authorities soon began to demand proper safety culture, first 
in the field of nuclear power industry and after that in other safety critical fields 
(Reiman & Oedewald, 2007).
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The organisational culture theory emerged in the management literature, particularly in 
the USA, in the beginning of the 1980s (Barley & Kunda, 1992; Schein, 1992; Shafritz 
& Ott, 2002). Difficulties faced by the traditional US industry sector led to changes in 
the labour market (Barley & Kunda, 1992; Schein, 1992). As a response to these 
difficulties, the organisational culture theorists required that the personnel should be 
committed strongly to the shared values of a company (Peters & Waterman, 1982; 
Barley & Kunda, 1992; Schein, 1992; Guldenmund, 2010) in which their own wellbeing 
and the success of the employing company are not distinguished (Barley & Kunda, 
1992). This kind of commitment can be achieved by creating “a strong organisational 
culture” (Barley & Kunda, 1992).
Schein (1992) describes organisational culture theory as a multidisciplinary approach, 
which has been influenced by anthropology, sociology and psychology (see also 
Smircich, 1983; Schein, 1992; Guldenmund, 2010). An organisation has to be seen as 
socially constructed systems of meaning that are based on the cultural features of the 
organisations (Schein, 1992). The organisational culture theory assumes that an 
organisation has its own underlying structure, which is invisible and unconscious, yet 
influential, guiding the thinking, choices, decision making and actions of people 
(McAuley et al. 2007; Harisalo, 2008; Guldenmund, 2010). Despite the different and 
variable approaches to the concept of organisational culture, the most important thing 
about organisational theory is that organisational culture theory focuses on the non­
rational qualities occurring in the operations of an organisation and on the subjective, 
interpretive aspects of organisational behaviour (Smircich, 1983). According to 
Smircich (1983), similarly as in the case of culture, there is no broad consensus on the 
definition of the concept of organisational culture, and therefore it is not a surprise in 
the field of organisational theory, culture has also been defined in many different ways 
(see also Haukelid, 2008; Guldenmund, 2010). Moreover, like organisational culture, 
safety culture has numerous different definitions in literature (Reason, 1997; Wiegmann 
et al. 2002; Haukelid, 2008). Richter and Koch (2004) define safety culture as 
commonly learned meanings, experiences and interpretations of work and safety, which 
guide people’s perceptions about risks, accidents and accident prevention. Reiman et al. 
(2008), on the other hand, define safety culture as organisational culture in which safety
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related values and basic assumptions highlight safety and commitment. Reiman et al.
(2008) add that safety culture should not be examined separately from organisational 
culture, because such reviews might be limited to factors that are already known and are 
obviously linked to safety.
The structure of the organisational culture is usually described as a system with 
different levels, from the more superficial aspects to the deeper, most commonly 
divided into three levels (Schein, 1992; Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Reiman & 
Oedewald, 2002; Harisalo, 2008; McAuley et al. 2007; Guldenmund, 2010). 
Guldenmund (2010) proposes that the same three level framework should be applied to 
the conceptualisation of safety culture (see Table 3).
Table 3. Levels of Safety Culture (Applied from Guldenmund, 2010)
Levels of culture Visibility Examples
Surface level: Visible but not easy to Safety slogans (see Figure3)
artefacts or creations interpret Results o f the ISM Audits
Minutes o f  safety meetings
Intermediate level: visible and Relatively explicit and
consciously expressed values conscious
level
Company’s safety and 
environmental policy required 
by the ISM Code
Deepest level:
basic assumptions or core
values
Mainly implicit The beliefs on the concept o f 
seamanship (see for example 
Knudsen, 2009)
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Figure3. Safety first and no smoking texts painted on the superstructure of a tanker ship (2009)
The surface level of organisational culture includes, among other things, the visible 
behaviour and established behavioural norms. By observing the artefacts and creations, 
for example, visible behaviour can be described, but not the reasons behind the 
behaviour. At the intermediate level are the attitudes and perceptions that cannot be 
directly observed, but can be inferred from visible behaviour or can be accessed, for 
example, through interviews and questioning. At the deepest level are the core values or 
the basic assumptions that are difficult to recognize and assess. The choice of research 
method depends on the level to be studied. (Schein, 1992; Glendon & Stanton, 2000; 
Reiman & Oedewald, 2002; Guldenmund, 2010).
Organisational culture theory included a promise that if the prevailing cultural features 
of the organisation are taken into consideration, the productivity and financial 
performance of the company can be enhanced (Barley & Kunda, 1992). This promise 
has gone the furthest in the movement of total quality management (TQM) and Deming 
is considered to be the founding father of that movement (Hackman & Wageman, 1995; 
Shafritz & Ott, 2002; see also Guldenmund, 2010). According to Deming (1986), strong 
commitment to the company's culture supports the quality objectives and high 
productivity directly. Deming (1986) stated that the most important requirements for the 
company management are impregnable commitment to quality management and
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willingness to seek continuous improvement, learning and the development of 
operations.
Total quality management can be seen as an ideology that spread during the decades, 
starting from the mid-80s, from industrial companies to health care, public 
administration, organisations and the education sector (Hackman & Wageman, 1995). 
The principles of total quality management are implemented in several quality 
standards. The most common international standards are:
• ISO 9000 quality management standard
• ISO 14000 environmental management standard
• OHSAS 18001 occupational health and safety management standard
• ISO 28000 standard developed for dealing with security assurance in the 
supply chain in the transport and logistics sector
• ISO 31000 standard on risk management
• ISM Code, a compulsory maritime safety management standard.
According to Krause et al. (1999), the principles of total quality management that 
Deming represented were adopted in safety management as such. Guldenmund (2010) 
noticed that the TQM ideology in the arena of organisational safety culture has 
somewhat religious features considering the strong and uncritical belief that by adopting 
a particular safety related frame of reference and performing particular activities a total 
safety culture (TSC) can be achieved (see Geller, 1994). By summarizing different 
studies about safety management systems and safety culture, Wiegmann et al. (2002) 
have identified the following features that are common in a “good” safety culture (see 
also Reason, 1997; Collins & Gadd, 2002; Guldenmund, 2010):
• Organisational commitment,
• Management involvement,
• Employee empowerment,
• Reporting systems and
• Rewarding systems.
Organisational commitment means the commitment of the upper-level management to 
safety (Wiegmann et al. 2002). The commitment of the upper-level management is 
recognized as playing a critical role in safety management as well (Wiegmann et al.
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2002; Petersen, 1996; Roughton & Mercurio, 2002). A committed upper-level 
management identifies safety as a core value or a guiding principle of the organisation 
(Wiegmann et al. 2002). In practice, the upper-level management demonstrates its 
commitment by showing visible positive attitude towards safety, by actively promoting 
safety and by ensuring that the safety activities of the company have sufficient financial 
and other resources (Wiegmann et al. 2002).
By management involvement, Wiegmann et al. (2002) mean the role of the management 
in governing day to day operations. The management should encourage and lead with 
their own example and by communicating openly with the personnel about safety 
related issues. The management should be present and actively involved in, for 
example, safety trainings and seminars (Collins & Gadd, 2002). The management 
should be fully aware of the risks involved in everyday operations and be able to stay in 
touch with safety related issues (Wiegmann et al. 2002; Collins & Gadd, 2002).
Like in total quality management, one characteristic of a good safety culture is 
considered to be the personnel having the chance to participate and the delegation of 
responsibility regarding safety-related issues by the upper-level management. An 
organisation with good safety culture has to ensure that its personnel have a clear 
understanding about their role in promoting and enhancing safety. Employee 
empowerment to work actively in the field of safety improves the personnel’s attitudes 
and motivation towards safety (Wiegmann et al. 2002). The personnel must have an 
opportunity to participate in safety decisions and have the leverage to make safety 
related initiatives. The personnel should also be somehow rewarded for achieving safety 
goals (Wiegmann et al. 2002).
A rewarding system establishes how safe and unsafe behaviour is seen, how the 
behaviour is evaluated and what kind of rewards and penalties result from the 
evaluations (Wiegmann et al. 2002; Reason, 1997). Safe behaviour can be reinforced 
with a fair and equal reward system (Wiegmann et al. 2002; see also Eiff, 1999). Safety 
management should promote safe behaviour and correspondingly discourage or punish 
unsafe behaviour (Wiegmann et al. 2002).
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One of the keystones of safety culture is the reporting system, which provides the 
foundation for the establishment of the continuous improvement process. With the 
reporting system, it is possible to identify the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the 
organisations’ safety before an accident occurs (Wiegmann et al. 2002). According to 
Eiff (1999), an organisation must have a functioning ‘reporting culture’. A reporting 
culture is considered to indicate the organisation’s willingness and ability to proactively 
learn and adapt its operations based on incidents and near miss situations (Eiff, 1999). 
The personnel must be supported and encouraged, so that they feel comfortable 
reporting on incidents and near misses (Eiff, 1999). The necessary reactive measures 
and feedback based on the reports must be provided without delays (Wiegmann et al. 
2002).
The list of features of good safety culture by Wiegmann et al. (2002) does not explicitly 
include continuous improvement. Nevertheless, the reporting and rewarding systems 
can be seen as practical tools of continuous improvement. According to the 
classification of Wiegmann et al. (2002), management commitment has been divided 
into two different concepts, in contrast with the principles of total quality management. 
Management commitment in the model of Wiegmann et al. (2002) consists of both 
organisational commitment and management involvement.
The relationships between safety culture and safety management systems could be 
defined as follows: the features or fundamentals of good safety culture (management 
commitment, personnel empowerment and continuous improvement) are embodied in a 
safety management system (Guldenmund, 2010). Following Guldenmund (2010), if 
safety culture is considered as a religion (Guldenmund, 2010) the safety management 
system provides the guidelines for practicing that religion. Arguably, the features of 
good safety culture are implemented in the ISM Code as such, thus it can be stated that 
the religious stance towards safety culture is quite obvious in the discourse on the ISM 
Code (see chapter 3.3 Objective and requirements of the ISM Code).
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3.3 Major traditions in approaching organisational culture
The theories of organisational culture can be classified in several ways. Several authors 
have classified the theories into two main categories: functionalist and interpretive 
theories (Smircich, 1983; Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Harisalo, 2008). According to 
some authors, there are three major traditions (McAuley et al. 2007) or paradigms 
(Guldenmund, 2014) when it comes to approaching the concept of organisation culture: 
the functionalist, the interpretive and a third one, the postmodernist approach, called 
constructivism by Guldenmund (Schultz & Hatch, 1996; McAuley et al. 2007; Demers 
2007; Guldenmund, 2014).
The functional tradition is based on the belief that organisation culture is built into the 
organisation as a subsystem, like organisational structure, and its purpose is to advance 
the development of organizational goals and values as defined by the management of 
the organisation (McAuley et al. 2007; Guldenmund, 2010). The following common 
conceptions can be linked to functional safety culture theory:
• There is an ideal state that the organisation should aspire to (Reiman et al.
2008)
• The management has a great influence on enhancing safety (Richter & Koch,
2004)
• Top-down control (Richter & Koch, 2004)
• The culture can be changed and manipulated (Richter & Koch, 2004; Reiman et 
al. 2008)
• Safety culture enhances the organisation’s operating ability (Reiman et al.
2008)
• Adopting safety culture decreases human errors (Rothblum et al. 2002)
The functional theory implies that the culture exists on a continuum and that 
organisations can have either a good or a poor safety culture (Wiegmann et al. 2002; see 
also Pidgeon, 1998; Guldenmund, 2010; Lützhoft et al. 2011)
The functional theory is based on the idea that organisations can create and develop 
their own kind of culture that is rare and hard to copy and that works as the basis for 
their knowledge and enables their success (Smircich, 1983; Glendon & Stanton, 2000; 
Harisalo, 2008). According to Smircich, an organisation “has” a culture (Smircich,
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1983), which enables the organisation’s success by channelling its members’ thinking, 
behaviour and choices towards the desired direction (Schein, 1992; Harisalo, 2008; 
McAuley et al. 2007; Guldenmund, 2010). Organisational culture is a result of 
management and the maintenance and development of the organisational culture 
requires managing (Schein, 1992; Harisalo, 2008). If the management neglects its 
duties, the culture no longer supports the organisation’s operation and may thus, for 
example, endanger safety. People cease to strive to perform the necessary tasks and 
ignore the endeavours of the management. The initially strong culture becomes weak 
and the success of the organisation is compromised.
Interpretive approaches assume that organisational culture is a system of shared 
symbols and meanings (Smircich, 1983; Allaire & Fisirotu, 1984; McAuley et al. 2007) 
given to organizational phenomena by all members of an organisation (Glendon & 
Stanton, 2000; Reiman et al. 2007). Organisational culture serves as a media for all 
members of an organisation to interpret their collective identity, beliefs and behaviours 
(Glendon & Stanton, 2000).
The most prominent difference between the functional and interpretive theories is how 
much the management is considered to be able to control, change or manipulate the 
organisational culture. In the interpretive approach, culture is a factor in the organisation 
that people have to adapt to, and that is difficult, if not impossible to change. In that 
case, the management has limited power to mend and improve unwanted cultural factors 
or create a new culture to replace the old one (Harisalo, 2008). When the organisation 
“is” a culture (Smircich, 1983), the people conform and adapt to the prevailing culture 
without being able to change or improve the culture to their liking (see also Harisalo, 
2008). The management efforts to promote their objectives are prevented by the 
inflexible culture (Smircich, 1983; Harisalo, 2008). The culture develops slowly over 
time, even undetected. The people in the organisation have only a minor influence on 
the culture, which develops independently and evolutionarily (Harisalo, 2008).
Reiman et al. (2008) state that both the functional and interpretive approaches include a 
presumption that organisational culture can be influenced at least to some extent, but
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then again the organisation might be bound to its culture. Interpretive theories also 
accept the notion that the culture can be changed and it can happen either internally, 
through management, or come from outside the culture, i.e. through requirements 
imposed by authorities (such as the obligatory nature of the ISM Code) (Reiman et al. 
2008). Similarly, the functional theories include a notion that the culture affects the 
management more than the management affects the culture (Reiman et al. 2008). Schein 
(2001) also supports this viewpoint with his example, in which the recruitment of a new 
manager can fail if he is unable to adopt the basic assumptions of the old organisation or 
unable to change them (Schein, 2001).
The third approach is called postmodernism (Schultz & Hatch, 1996; McAuley et al. 
2007; Demers, 2007) or social constructivism (Guldenmund, 2014). The postmodern 
approaches challenge both functionalist and interpretive approaches in several ways 
(Schultz & Hatch, 1996; McAuley et al. 2007). For a start, according to McAuley et al. 
2007, both approaches look for unity and the homogenisation of the people in the 
organisation in order to create an efficient and effective organisation. According to 
Alvesson (2002), this viewpoint is based on the causal idea that creating the right 
organisational culture can be expected to induce considerable and important results and 
effects in the organisation, such as, loyalty, reliability, enhanced productivity and 
enhanced safety. This viewpoint of the ideal of a uniform culture is criticised also 
because it is narrowly based on the viewpoints and comprehension of the elite or 
management (Alvesson, 2002 Haukelid, 2008; Martin, 2007; see also Guldenmund, 
2014). It is assumed that the organisation and its employees have corresponding, even 
rational goals as long as they are understood correctly at all levels of the organisation. 
The perspectives of less powerful people are ignored (McAuley et al. 2007; Martin, 
2007). Alvesson (2002) calls the approach that aims for unified organisational culture 
“integration”. According to McAuley et al. (2007), this is a very top-down management 
view of cultural formation that underplays the diversity of cultural forms in an 
organisation.
According to Knights (2002), the postmodern approach in organisation theory is based 
on the ideas of Michel Foucault (see also Schultz & Hatch, 1998; McAuley et al. 2007).
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The postmodernists assume that an organisational culture is more often rather 
differentiated and fragmented than in harmony and based on sharing common values 
and norms (Haukelid, 2008; Schultz & Hatch. 1998; Knights, 2002; Guldenmund, 
2014). It is also important to bear in mind the power and politics related conflicts in the 
organisation (Alvesson, 2002; Haukelid, 2008; Antonsen, 2009a). Conflicts between 
different groups and subcultures can emerge based on the different goals and needs for 
working in the organisation and being a part of the organisation - in that case, the 
organisational culture is differentiated. Alvesson (2002) introduces, alongside with 
integrated culture and differentiated culture, also the concept of culture ambiguity. 
According to Alvesson (2002), cultural manifestations are rarely in a neat order, the 
order of the values varies and the cultural ideas are unsystematic and inconsistent. In 
cultural ambiguity, the manifestations of culture have different meanings. Cultural 
symbols are interpreted in ways that can be conflicting, incommensurable and 
irreconcilable (Richter & Koch, 2002). For example productivity can be understood and 
defined differently in different parts of the organisation and it can have a different time 
span depending on the viewpoint; short term -  long term (Alvesson, 2002). The 
organisational culture is also in a constant state of change (Haukelid, 2008; Reiman & 
Oedewald, 2002). New meanings are created for cultural manifestations and the people 
continuously give these meanings new and different interpretations depending on the 
current time, place and situation (Richter & Koch, 2002). The variation, fragmentation 
and inconsistencies in interpreting and understanding cultural manifestations have to be 
taken into account when studying the organisational culture (Alvesson, 2002).
Finally, postmodern perspectives reject the possibility of a “grand theory” of 
organisational culture (McAuley et al. 2007). According to Jeffcutt (1993; quoted in 
McAuley et al. 2007), both functionalist and interpretive approaches to culture “share a 
commitment to establishing a definitive understanding or last word on the nature of 
organisational reality through a process of closure that privileges particular readings and 
voices while suppressing and denying alternative articulations”. Instead of attempting to 
develop an universal law of organisational culture the postmodern approach attempts to 
understand the subjective nature of the world, meaning that all claims to knowledge are 
seen as contingent and temporary (McAuley et al. 2007). Particularly, the postmodern
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approach is focusing on lower level workers and seeks to give voice to those previously 
silenced (McAuley et al. 2007; Martin, 2007).
In safety culture conflicts, ambiguity and disintegration also occur in the values and 
basic assumptions that guide people’s actions regarding risks, accidents and prevention 
(Richter & Koch, 2004; see also Pidgeon, 1998 and Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000). 
According to Richter and Koch (2004), safety culture should be seen as a multiple 
configuration of integration, differentiation and ambiguity cultures, in which macro­
cultures, local cultures and subcultures overlap and interact (Richter & Koch, 2004; see 
also Alvesson, 2002 and Guldenmund, 2014).
According to Richter and Koch (2004), the functional approach has been predominant 
when defining safety culture (see also Guldenmund, 2010). This can be seen especially 
in the authorities’ requirements, which stress the functional approach to safety culture 
(Richter & Koch, 2004). Many scholars have also defined safety culture through the 
functional approach, basing their studies mainly on the assumption of a uniform culture 
(Richter & Koch, 2004). Studies utilising interpretive approaches are very rare in the 
area of safety culture and the studies addressing differentiation, fragmentation and 
power issues are almost absent (Richter & Koch, 2004; Martin, 2007; Antonsen, 2009a; 
Guldenmund, 2010). According to Antonsen (2009a), safety culture studies have relied 
on a harmony model of organisational life. Antonsen (2009a) argues that issues of 
culture and power are so intertwined that safety culture research should incorporate 
perspectives of power and conflict.
3.4 Impacts of the ISM Code on maritime safety culture
The impacts of the ISM Code have aroused the interest of researchers from their early 
days (Hahne et al. 2000; Mejia, 2001; Pun et al. 2003; see also Anderson, 2003; IMO,
2005). In the early days of the ISM Code, resistance to change regarding safety 
management was encountered amongst the shipping companies and the ships’ crews. In 
addition, lack of resources and time in implementation of safety system management 
and lack of education were found (Hahne et al. 2000; Pun et al. 2003; Anderson, 2003).
44 Jouni Lappalainen
In the early stage, the systems were made too burdensome and complex, in which case 
the adoption of the system was difficult and they were received as bureaucratic paper 
work (Anderson, 2003; IMO, 2005). Hahne et al. (2000) explained that the early 
resistance among the seafarers stemmed from repulsion to the obligatory establishment 
of safety culture. Anderson (2003) considers it understandable that the personnel saw 
this kind of a safety management system as objectionable.
In 2005, an expert group, established by the IMO, found quite a positive image 
regarding the application of the ISM Code (IMO, 2005). Based on the questionnaire 
study, which yielded approximately 3000 responses, the expert group concluded that the 
ISM Code was widely accepted and the requirements of the ISM Code were 
implemented well in the shipping companies and ships that the respondents represented. 
The study indicated several improvements in the area of maritime safety management: 
for example, the respondents were well informed about the safety and environmental 
protection policies of their shipping companies, their duties and responsibilities were 
clearly stated, they had easy access to the required documents and training and 
preparedness for emergency situation was improved (IMO, 2005). The expert group 
regarded their study as somewhat distorted because of the weakness in their research 
method. The participation in the study was done on a voluntary basis. Hence, the expert 
group estimated that the respondents to the study had been selected to consist of those 
who had a positive attitude towards safety management. However, also Lappalainen and 
Salmi (2009) and later Kongsvik et al. (2014) have concluded that the introduction of 
the ISM Code has had some positive influence on safety awareness and the ISM code 
has been a contributor in introducing a more systematic approach to safety management 
in shipping.
Nevertheless, several studies have indicated serious problems with the implementation 
of the ISM Code. As early as in the beginning of 2000s, Anderson (2003) and a group 
of experts (IMO, 2005) showed that the safety management systems were too 
burdensome and complex, which was seen as futile bureaucracy (Anderson, 2003; IMO, 
2005; see also Bhattacharya, 2009). According to Anderson (2003), in most cases the 
views of the ships’ crew were not taken into consideration while creating the contents of
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the documentation, and the education they received was not sufficient in the early stages 
of the ISM Code (Anderson, 2003; IMO, 2005). Later, these findings got support from 
Oltedal (2011), who found that the experience and expertise of the maritime personnel 
had not been utilised appropriately during the documentation work, which had induced 
inapplicable and incompatible system documentation, which did not reflect the ships’ 
real life operations (see also Knudsen, 2009; Batalden & Sydnes, 2014; Kongsvik et al.
2014). According to Antonsen (2009b), documentation that is incompatible is likely not 
followed in real life operations (see also Kongsvik et al. 2014). Furthermore, Batalden 
and Sydnes (2014) claimed that poor instructions, checklists, and procedures were not 
followed by the crew, which has contributed to some serious accidents.
In their recent study, Kongsvik et al. (2014) claimed that the excessive documentation 
and increased paperwork has led to a bureaucratic culture and displaced the common 
sense incorporated in good seamanship (see also Knudsen, 2009). This claim is in 
accordance with Knudsen’s (2009) and Antonsen’s (2009b) findings. They explained 
the maritime personnel’s reluctant attitudes towards working by formal and written 
rules with a concept of seamanship (Knudsen, 2009) and incompatibilities between the 
occupational culture of the seamen and the rule based safety management approaches 
(Antonsen, 2009b). According to Knudsen (2009), the seamen have an age-old belief 
that safety can be ensured only by seamanship that includes the professional touch and 
professional pride that develop only through extensive professional hands-on 
experience. The crew members often saw the requirements embodied in, for example, 
instructions as distrust towards their own competence and professional skills 
(Bhattacharya, 2009).
Incident reporting has been considered an important factor contributing to the sense of 
futile bureaucracy, because the reporting procedures were perceived as complicated and 
cumbersome (Lappalainen et al. 2011). Incident reporting has gained a great interest 
among the researcher of maritime safety culture (Anderson, 2003; Ek &Akselsson 
2005; Bhattacharya, 2009; Stade, 2010; Oltedal & McArthur, 2011; Lappalainen et al. 
2011). It can be claimed that the failure of incident reporting is the most significant
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deficiency in relation to the implementation of the ISM Code (Ek & Akselsson, 2005; 
Bhattacharya, 2009; Oltedal & McArthur, 2011; Lappalainen et al. 2011).
It is shown that the seamen make incident reports very seldom (Anderson, 2003; Oltedal 
& McArthur, 2011; Lappalainen et al. 2011). Reluctance to report incidents among the 
personnel was indicated by Anderson (2003), Bhattacharya (2009) Lappalainen (2011) 
and Oltedal and McArthur (2011). According to Bhattacharya (2009), a major reason 
for poor reporting is blame culture, a fear of social sanctions for reporting, that still 
exists within the maritime industry (see also Anderson 2003; Ek and Akselsson 2005). 
Other reasons for the low number of reports were that reporting takes too much time, 
the onshore organisation of the shipping company reacts to the reports too slowly and 
the onshore organisations do not give feedback on the reports (Anderson, 2003; Ek & 
Akselsson, 2005; Oltedal, 2011; see also Oltedal & McArthur, 2011). In turn, 
Gergoulis and Nikitakos (2013) claimed that the seafarers believe that near miss 
reporting is more an obligation due to regulatory framework than a commitment to 
safety. They concluded that an increase in the amount of reporting is not necessarily an 
increase in safety culture level on board a ship (Gergoulis and Nikitakos, 2013). Their 
view is in contrast with other authors’ views, in which it is claimed that safety culture is 
associated with a reporting culture, since a high reporting frequency is regarded as 
having a good safety culture (Anderson, 2003; Oltedal, 2011; see also Reason, 1997 and 
Wiegmann et al. 2002). Lappalainen et al. (2011) claimed that the reasons for the 
reluctance towards reporting seemed to originate from the maritime personnel’s 
approach to safety work, which differs from the way the ISM Code based safety 
management systems are functioning (cf. Knudsen, 2009 and Antonsen, 2009b).
According to Bhattacharya (2009), the requirements of the safety management system 
were not complied with in respect to other areas either. According to the representatives 
of the shipping companies, the neglects were primarily caused by the incompetence and 
ignorance of the crew members. Correspondingly, the crew members felt that the 
requirements of the safety management system were mostly unnecessary bureaucracy. 
The crew members often saw the requirements as distrust towards their own 
competence and professional skills (Bhattacharya, 2009). Although Bhattacharya’s
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(2009) study included only two oil tanker shipping companies, he felt that the study 
results were alarming when it comes to the success of the ISM Code, because oil tanker 
shipping companies are generally considered to be the most advanced in the field of 
safety management.
It is indicated that commonly the communication between shore and shipboard 
personnel has failed (Bhattacharya, 2009; Goulielmos & Gatzoli, 2012; Bhattacharya & 
Tang, 2013; Kongsvik et al. 2014). According to Bhattacharya (2009), the major barrier 
for communication between the management on-shore and the personnel on-board is the 
geographical distance. Kongsvik et al. (2014) showed that there is a low degree of 
dialogue between the sharp and the blunt end and that there are not many activities 
designed to directly address aspects of safety culture in the companies. Managers rarely 
visit the vessels and thus rarely meet the maritime personnel on board (Bhattacharya, 
2009; Kongsvik et al. 2014). As mentioned above, Goulielmos and Gatzoli call that 
management from a distance, which has led to major differences between the culture of 
company and the culture on-board (Grabowski et al. 2007; Bhattacharya, 2009; 
Goulielmos & Gatzoli, 2012). In addition, according to Bhattacharya (2009) the 
communication between the shore and ships is characterised by top-down control, in 
which the management gives orders to the ships, which diminish the employee 
participation in relation to safety management issues. In his later study, Bhattacharya 
(2012) indicated that the employee participation in the management of shipboard safety 
was largely absent in the maritime context.
In order to evaluate the previous studies, the following features should be taken into 
account. At first, most of the previous studies regarding the investigation of the impacts 
of the ISM Code on maritime safety culture have focused on a single country, for 
example, Sweden (Ek & Akselsson, 2005; Stade 2010; Ek et al. 2014), Norway 
(Antonsen, 2009b; Oltedal, 2011; Oltedal & McArthur, 2011: Kongsvik et al. 2014), 
USA (Grabowski et al. 2007), Greece (Theotokas & Progoulaki, 2007; Goulielmos & 
Gatzoli, 2012; Gergoulis & Nikitakos, 2013), Danish and Filipino crew members 
(Hansen et al. 2008; Knudsen, 2009; Gran & Knudsen, 2011) and China (Xue at al.
2015). No comprehensive comparison between different countries and different
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nationalities was found. Secondly, particularly the studies based on qualitative 
interviews exploring maritime safety culture have had rather restricted samples with a 
relatively low number of interviewees, shipping companies and different shipping 
sectors involved in the studies. For example, Ek and Akselsson (2005) studied safety 
culture on board six Swedish passenger ships, Bhattacharya (2009) studied two oil 
tanker shipping companies located in Europe, Stade (2010) interviewed 16 Swedish 
masters, DPAs and managers, Gergoulis & Nikitakos (2013) interviewed 39 people 
from four different shipping companies with tankers and bulk carriers of various sizes, 
Kongsvik et al. (2014) interviewed 35 persons among Norwegian maritime regulators 
and from two high-speed craft companies and Xue et al. (2015) interviewed the 
managers from two Chinese shipping companies and their personnel on-board four 
chemical tankers.
Third, the studies on the impacts of the ISM Code have been relatively few and the 
research methods have varied significantly. Some studies were based on questionnaires 
(Anderson, 2003, IMO, 2005; Ek & Akselsson, 2005; Theotokas & Progoulaki, 2007; 
Oltedal, 2011; Oltedal & McArthur, 2011) and some studies were based on interviews 
(Theotokas & Progoulaki, 2007; Bhattacharya, 2009; Stade 2010; Gergoulis & 
Nikitakos, 2013; Kongsvik et al. 2014; Xue et al. 2015) or document analysis 
(Goulielmos & Gatzoli, 2012). However, the findings of the studies correspond with 
each other and thus the findings can be considered to be, at the very least, indicative, 
while not exhaustive (see also, Bhattacharya, 2012; Xue et al. 2015). The previous 
studies have indicated very similar problems with the implementation of the ISM Code 
regardless of the country of origin or the shipping sector, for instance tanker or 
passenger shipping.
Fourth, Collins and Gadd (2002; see also Guldenmund, 2010) claimed that the safety 
culture research has tended to concentrate on the attitudes of employees, yet little 
research has been conducted to discover the management’s attitudes and commitment 
towards safety. That is the case with studies focused on the impacts of the ISM Code 
also. Only few studies have focused on evaluating the management’s commitment in the 
shipping industry. The literature review showed that the previous studies aiming to
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determine the efficacy of the ISM Code have focused mostly on investigating the 
attitudes of the ships’ crews (for example, Ek & Akselsson 2005; Bhattacharya 2009; 
Knudsen 2009; Gergoulis & Nikitakos, 2013). For example, Bhattacharya (2009) 
interviewed the management merely in order to find out their considerations on how 
well the ship’s crew complies with the requirements of the ISM Code on board.
Lastly, the functional approach has been predominant when defining and studying 
safety culture (Richter & Koch, 2004; Guldenmund 2010). That is the fact with regard 
to the ISM Code related studies also. The functional theory presumes that the culture 
can be changed and manipulated, the management is able to control and change the 
safety culture and that there is an ideal state that the organisation should aspire to 
(Richter & Koch, 2004; Reiman et al. 2008). These conceptions are represented strongly 
in the previous studies of the impacts of the ISM Code. The dogma behind the ISM 
Code has not been challenged at all, and the model of an ideal and integrated safety 
culture has been taken as granted, although several studies have indicated that safety 
culture is seemingly differentiated within a shipping company and there are differences 
between the shore-based management and the ships. Moreover, the previous studies 
have indicated that the implementation of the ISM Code has been successful only 
partially in entrenching the safety culture in shipping.
To sum up, the postmodern approach challenges both the functionalist and the 
interpretive approaches in several ways. Both of the latter approaches are seeking for a 
uniform and integrated culture, which is a very top-down management view of cultural 
formation that underplays the diversity of cultural forms in an organisation (Alvesson, 
2002: McAuley et al. 2007). An organisational culture is more often rather ambiguous 
and fragmented than in harmony and sharing common values and norms (Alvesson, 
2002; Haukelid, 2008; Richter & Koch, 2002). Alvesson (2002) states that the 
variations, fragmentations and inconsistencies in interpreting and understanding cultural 
manifestations have to be taken into account, while studying the organisational culture 
(Alvesson, 2002). Generally, the interpretive and postmodern approaches have not been 
taken into account in the previous studies regarding the ISM Code and maritime safety 
culture. Both Knudsen (2009) and Antonsen (2009a) provided an exception to that.
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They recognised that the maritime personnel have a different approach to safety culture. 
Understanding the multiple perspectives on safety culture requires multiple theoretical 
perspectives and methodological approaches. That is why this study is based on a 
dialogue between the leading approaches on organisational and safety culture.
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4 METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL MATERIALS
4.1 Methodological perspectives on organisational culture and safety culture
According to Guldenmund (2010; 2014), the choice of a paradigm determines which 
research methodology should be chosen in order to study safety culture. This is a 
question of ontology and epistemology (Guldenmund, 2010). Guldenmund (2010) 
complains that the paradigm and ontological and epistemological issues are seldom 
addressed explicitly in safety culture research. This is also the case with the studies 
regarding the impacts of the ISM Code. The researcher should make clear his/her 
premises by asking if there is a safety culture “out there” or is the outcome of the 
research more or less a construction of a particular researcher (Guldenmund, 2010).
When safety culture is viewed from a functionalist point of view, the analysis is based 
on the “modern” organisational analysis (Harisalo, 2008). The ontology of modern 
organisational analysis emphasizes a conception in which the organisations represent a 
reality that is independent of the people’s knowledge (reality is objective) (Harisalo, 
2008; Guldenmund, 2010). According to Guldenmund (2010), there is a safety culture 
“out there”, which is measurable by quantitative methods that include, for example, 
formal questionnaires and highly structured interviews or the statistical analysis of 
measured data on the production or business processes (McAuley et al. 2007; Harisalo, 
2008; Guldenmund, 2010). The emphasis of modern organisational analysis is on the 
organisations’ structures, processes and various repetitive practices that are independent 
of the subject. (McAuley et al. 2007; Harisalo, 2008; see also Guldenmund, 2010).
The interpretive perspective on safety culture can be seen to be based on the 
hermeneutic7 philosophy of science and Harisalo (2008) calls the related methodology 
symbolic-interpretive organisational analysis (see also McAuley et al. 2007). The
7 According to Gadamer (2004), the research process resembles a hermeneutic circle in which pre­
understanding and understanding alternate (Gadamer, 2004). In the beginning of a research, the 
researcher has some kind o f a preconception of the subject, based on which the study is channeled into 
research questions. Performing the research task produces information that is refined by interpretation 
into understanding in the form of answers to the research questions. Yet, during the research process such 
issues also emerge that cannot be properly explained based on the pre-understanding on the matter. 
Therefore it is required to go back to the theory, based on which new and more precise research questions 
can be formed.
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ontology of symbolic-interpretive organisational analysis focuses on the people’s 
subjective experiences and the meanings they give to the things they have experienced 
(McAuley et al. 2007; Harisalo, 2008; Guldenmund, 2010). According to symbolic- 
interpretive analysis, the organisation does not represent objective reality but is an 
interpretation that exists in people’s minds, a sort of a mental structure (Guldenmund, 
2010). Because their conceptions about the organisation are formed in people’s minds, 
it is important to research what kind of factors have collaborated and resulted in the 
forming and building of these conceptions in different situations and conditions 
(McAuley et al. 2007). The epistemology of symbolic-interpretive analysis requires the 
use of interpretive methods in order to identify interpretations and meanings. 
Hermeneutics or understanding is the most essential method in symbolic-interpretive 
analysis (Harisalo, 2008).
The postmodern perspective on organisational analysis challenges the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions of the functionalist and interpretive approaches (Schultz & 
Hatch, 1996; McAuley et al. 2007). Schultz and Hatch (1996) see postmodernism more 
like a critical movement than a consistent theory or a methodological framework. The 
ontology of postmodern organisational analysis emphasizes a conception in which the 
representation or the language constitutes reality (Fairhurst & Putnam, 2004; McAuley 
et al. 2007).
According to McAuley (2007) both the functionalist and interpretive perspectives of 
organisation culture are based on the positivist assumption that a researcher can 
neutrally interpret and represent the experiences and the meanings of the participants in 
a study (McAuley et al. 2007; see also Guldenmund, 2010). The epistemology of 
postmodern organisational analysis denies that a researcher could provide an accurate 
representation of the views of the participants in a research project (McAuley et al. 
2007) and states that the representation of the views cannot be objective and neutral 
(Martin, 2007). The representation of the research results reflects, more or less, the 
researcher’s political ideology or interests (Martin, 2007).
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The concept of “discourse” is introduced to refer to the subjective means by which 
people organize what they perceive (McAuley et al. 2007; Fairhurst & Putnam, 2004). 
McAuley et al. (2007) define discourses as“subjective, linguistically formed ways o f  
experiencing and acting and constituting phenomena that we take to be ‘out there’”. 
According to McAuley et al. (2007), the concept of discourse is based on Michel 
Foucault’s thoughts on how a dominant discourse is taken for granted by people and not 
challenged. The dominant discourse limits knowledge and practices by excluding 
alternatives (McAuley et al. 2007; Fairhurst & Putnam, 2004). The postmodernist 
organisational analysts criticise that the dominant discourse represents the views of the 
elite or top management and dictates what is appropriate and correct (McAuley et al. 
2007; Martin, 2007).
The postmodern organisational analysis attempts to challenge the dominant discourse 
by recognising that there are many different views to any situation (McAuley et al.
2007). The research should focus on different perspectives and focus on areas not 
usually studied and persons who are less powerful (Schultz & Hatch, 1996; McAuley et 
al. 2007: Martin, 2007). According to McAuley et al. (2007), the postmodern 
organisational analysis attempts to produce a new form of knowledge by crossing 
disciplinary boundaries. From the methodological point of view the postmodernists 
suggest “paradigm interplay” between different approaches to culture (Schultz & 
Hatch, 1996).
The following table (4) summarises the ontological and epistemological features of the 
different approaches to safety culture.
54 Jouni Lappalainen
Table 4.Methodological perspectives of safety culture (McAuley et al. 2007; Martin, 2007; Guldenmund, 2010) 
Safety Culture Ontology Epistemology Methodology
Functional approach Reality is objective; safety 
culture is based on empirically 
observable things: structures, 
processes and practical 
working methods
The features of safety culture 
can be measured and 
manipulated in order to solve 
problems and improve 
operations
Quantitative measurement: 
Statistical method, 
Questionnaire studies,
Inductive reasoning based on 
facts
Interpretive approach Reality is subjective: safety 
culture is based on people’s 
subjective experiences and the 
meanings they give to those 
experiences
The subjective experiences 
and the meanings can be 
interpreted and understood 
“objectively” by the 
researcher; researcher is 
assumed to be neutral
Qualitative studies,
Hermeneutics
Postmodern approach A representation constitutes 
reality: safety culture is 
created and determined by 
people’s subjective acts of 
perception.
The subjective nature of 
culture cannot be interpreted 
objectively and the 
researcher cannot be neutral
Research is always 
inaccurate and politically 
biased and a representation 
of one’ s interests
Discourse analysis
Paradigm Interplay
According to Guldenmund (2010), safety culture should be approached from several 
methodological perspectives, which is why safety culture should not be studied using 
only the quantitative methods of modern organisational analysis based on a positivist 
philosophy of science; but the symbolic-interpretive methods based on a hermeneutic 
philosophy of science are not sufficient by themselves either (Guldenmund, 2010). By 
examining safety culture from several methodological perspectives, one may gain a 
more versatile and holistic overview of the cultural factors at play (Guldenmund, 2010). 
By using several methodological perspectives, there is a better possibility to understand, 
for example, the ambiguities and conflicts (Richter & Koch, 2004).
Categorizing organisational theories by methodological perspective can be problematic. 
According to Harisalo (2008), different theories cannot necessarily be categorized into 
only one perspective (see also Demers, 2007). There can be significant contradictions 
and opposition between the theories categorized under the same perspective. They can 
also compete with each other in order to explain different phenomena (Guldenmund, 
2010).
Finnish Maritime personnel's conceptions on safety management and safety culture 55
The research of safety culture has mostly been based on a positivist philosophy of 
science. This is due to the fact that, in principle, safety culture is considered to be 
functional (Reiman et al. 2008). According to Reiman et al. (2008), safety culture has 
mostly been studied from a functional perspective by using quantitative research 
methods. Quantitative methods are used when you are trying to find out, for example, 
the level of safety culture or safety management or what is the level of safety 
performance in an organisation (Reiman, 2008; see also Pidgeon 1998).
Qualitative methods are applied in interpretation- oriented safety culture studies. 
(Reiman et al. 2008; Glendon & Stanton, 2000). By using qualitative methods, the aim 
is to find out what the safety culture is like or why the safety culture is what it is. 
Interpretive safety culture theory assumes that the basic assumptions and intermediate 
level, that is values and attitudes, can be studied mainly using qualitative methods. 
Qualitative methods include, for example, ethnography, thematic interviews and 
observations (Guldenmund, 2000; Glendon & Stanton, 2002).
Studies on safety culture that are based on approaches other than the functional 
approach are rare (Reiman et al. 2008; Martin, 2007; Antonsen, 2009a). Yet, safety 
culture research actually requires the combining of the different approaches.
In sum, the organisation culture can be approached from several methodological 
perspectives, which is why safety culture cannot be unambiguously studied with mere 
quantitative methods of modern organisational analysis based on positivist philosophy 
of science, but neither with mere symbolic-interpretive methods based on hermeneutic 
philosophy of science. By examining safety culture from several methodological 
perspectives one may gain a more versatile and holistic picture of cultural factors. By 
using several methodological perspectives, there is a better possibility to understand, for 
example, the ambiguities and conflicts. From the postmodern perspective, it is not a 
question of methodology, but rather a question of the viewpoint of the researcher. The 
postmodern perspective challenges the top-down management view of cultural 
formation. Instead, it suggests putting the focus on the perspectives of the less powerful 
people. Moreover, postmodern approach suggests paradigm interplay and the
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application of multiple methods. Nevertheless, this study is based on the qualitative 
approach, because it is seldom applied in the case of the ISM Code. The study seeks to 
apply paradigm interplay by providing a comprehensive comparison of the result with 
the results of previous studies. This study does not merely aim to assess how the 
features of good safety culture have been internalised ideally, but it seeks to understand 
the viewpoints of the interviewees on safety management and safety culture.
4.2 Chosen research methods
Interviews were applied as the major research method for this study. The interviews 
were done in two phases. The first round of interviews were done as open interviews or 
un-structured interviews (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2001; King, 2004; Firmin 2008) during 
the late autumn of 2007 and in the early spring of 2008. Open interviews are the most 
informal of all interview types. During the interviews, no pre-prepared questions were 
used but the research topic was dealt with through discussions. The topic of the 
discussion was the effect of the ISM Code on maritime safety and safety culture in 
general. The purpose of the interviews was to introduce the research topic to the 
shipping companies and to the authorities, create a preliminary survey on the viewpoints 
related to the research topic and to form agreements on the practical arrangements 
regarding the research. Performing the open interviews before the actual thematic 
interview round in the field fulfilled several purposes. The most significant advantage 
was the gaining of basic information about the Finnish practices relating to the ISM 
Code and maritime safety management both in shipping companies and in relation to 
the authorities’ actions. This guided the decision on the final research methods. 
Thematic interviews, which were directed at the ships’ crews and, on the authorities’ 
side, at the maritime inspectors performing ISM audits, were chosen as the most 
important research method.
The second interview round performed in the field was launched in August 2008 and 
ended in March 2009. The field interview study was based on a thematic interview 
method or semi-structured interview (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2001; King, 2004; Firmin,
2008), which can be placed somewhere in between questionnaire based interviews and 
open interviews (King, 2004; Firmin, 2008). Thematic interviews do not proceed
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according to detailed, pre-formed questions but more freely by focusing on certain pre­
planned themes. Those pre-planned themes were based on themes chosen on the basis 
of the literature research and open interviews, which were in relation to the 
requirements of the ISM Code and characteristics of good safety culture introduced in 
literature. The themes used in the interviews were the same for each interviewee, but the 
interviews proceeded flexibly between the themes and often in a random order. The 
interviews were very much like discussions and space was given to the interviewees’ 
free speech, so that the issues that the interviewees consider the most important would 
come up. Thus, the people’s interpretations and given meanings could be taken into 
consideration in the interviews. Not every issue was discussed with each interviewee in 
the same depth, but the aim was to discuss all the main themes of the research to the 
extent that the interviewee has something to add to the theme. (see Kvale, 1996; 
Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2001; Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka, 2006).
During the interviews, a form describing the main themes of the study and including 
helpful questions and key words related to the main themes was used. These questions 
could be used to launch a discussion (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2001; Mason, 2004; Eskola & 
Vastamäki, 2007). Notes about the interviews were written immediately on the applied 
interview form during the interviews. Up to 21 interviews were also recorded, provided 
that the interviewee granted permission and that the conditions of the interview allowed 
it. For example, recording was out of the question in the ships’ engine rooms or mess 
because of the noise in the environment. Afterwards, based on the recordings, details 
could be checked out and interview forms could be completed.
In addition to the researcher, a research assistant also took part in performing the 
interviews, in which case the use of recordings enhanced the usability of the 
information gathered by another person. Otherwise, the activities of the research 
assistant were focused on another study that was also directed at ships and their crews. 
The topic in this other research project was the data collected in connection with safety 
management and its possible usability as a maritime safety indicator. In this respect, the 
researchers practiced reciprocal cooperation to avoid overlapping visits on the same 
ships.
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From the point of view of this research, there are clear advantages that can be gained by 
using thematic interviews instead of structured interviews. In thematic interviews, the 
interviewees can better specify and explain the reasons for, for example, the deficiencies 
in maritime safety management found in earlier ISM Code related studies (King, 2004). 
Naturally, the safety management matters that are considered to be positive and 
successful are also brought up and explained in the interviews. This serves the safety 
culture analysis based on functional theory, the aim of which is to find out how well the 
requirements set by the ISM Code have been fulfilled. In addition, assuming that we 
want to analyse safety culture from an interpretive point of view, there are the 
interviewees’ personal interpretations and given meanings, based on which it is possible 
to gain information about possible cultural changes related to deeper constructions of 
culture (King, 2004).
The thematic interview method also has some weaknesses, which are related to the 
analysing of the gathered data and the interview situations. When the interviewees are 
using their own words, it can be difficult to interpret the answers for the purpose of data 
reduction. This topic will be further discussed in chapter 4.3 Qualitative analysis. The 
researcher’s pre-understanding, which can be biased, can affect the interviewer’s views 
on what he considers important enough to make notes of (King, 2004; Guldenmund, 
2010). Thus, the interview data may not describe the subject but the interviewer’s 
expectations. This problem was mitigated by recording the interviews. The fact that 
some of the interviews were done by the research assistant can also enhance the 
objectivity of the conclusions drawn based on the interview data. In addition, analysing 
the results of interview research is laborious and interviews take a lot of time (Hirsjärvi 
& Hurme, 2001; King, 2004).
While analysing interview results, you have to take into consideration that the 
interviewees may strive to give a better image of their actions than what the true 
situation is. The interviewees may try to give answers that are in line with expectations 
or socially acceptable. The interviewees may also understand the asked issue in a 
different way than the interviewer has meant (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2001; King, 2004). 
In this respect, efforts have been made to enhance the credibility of the results by asking
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different things from different stakeholder groups such as, shipping company 
management, ship’s crew and authorities. In addition, the conformity or possible 
contradictions in the issues discussed during the interviews can be compared to the 
results of the observations of ISM audits and safety drills.
Observations were another research method used in this study. By making systematic 
observations, it is possible to gain information on whether people actually act the way 
they say they do (Jorgensen, 1989; Adler & Adler, 1994; DeWalt et al. 2010). By 
observing practical operations it is possible to find out people’s appreciations, whether 
you can trust the people’s word and how they act in reality (Jorgensen, 1989). Scientific 
observation requires systematic observation (Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka, 2006; 
DeWalt et al. 2010).
Observations were conducted by taking part in the external ISM audits performed by the 
maritime inspectors and the internal ISM audits performed by the shipping company. In 
addition, observations were conducted by observing the safety drills that were 
performed during the ISM audits and during the researcher’s visits on board the ships. 
The themes used in the thematic interviews were also used as a basis for the 
observations so that the observation would be systematic. The field notes from the 
observations were written down in memos (Baker, 2006). Despite this, observations 
cannot be considered to be structured as such (DeWalt et al. 2010; Saaranen-Kauppinen 
& Puusniekka, 2006). The audits proceeded based on the plan made by the auditor (not 
the researcher) as the safety drills proceeded according to the plans made by the ship’s 
master or the mate responsible for the drill.
For this study, the observations were used to complement and support the interviews. 
With observations, it is possible to gain direct information about the action and 
behaviour of a person, groups or organisations (Jorgensen, 1989; DeWalt et al. 2010). 
Observations allow an access to the natural environment of the event that is the ships 
(Jorgensen, 1989; Adler & Adler; 1994). Observation as a method is suitable for, for 
example, studying interactions between people (the crew and the officers). Similarly, 
observations are suitable for studying the interactions between the person performing 
audits and the personnel of the audited ship. Through observations, you can study
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events that are changing quickly or are difficult to predict (Saaranen-Kauppinen & 
Puusniekka, 2006). In the safety drills on board, the situations change really fast and 
unforeseen occurrences come up often. It is actually the purpose of the drills to reveal 
new unforeseen issues, from which it is possible to learn.
The observations related to ISM audits were participant observations (Saaranen- 
Kauppinen & Puusniekka, 2006; DeWalt et al. 2010). The researcher had the 
opportunity to make questions related to safety management both to the auditor and the 
personnel of the audited ship. Correspondingly, the observation of safety drills was non­
participant observation (Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka, 2006; DeWalt et al. 2010). 
The researcher’s job was merely to observe and stay out of the way. Being allowed to 
take pictures of the safety drills, the researcher did not have to take notes on everything 
and was able to focus on observing the situation (see Saaranen-Kauppinen & 
Puusniekka, 2006; Baker, 2006). By using the photographs, it is possible to go back to 
the situation later, during which such things can come up that the researcher could not 
pay attention to as the situations progressed so rapidly. Using the photographs, it was 
also possible to complement the field notes (Baker, 2006).
The problem with observation can be the control effect, since the researcher can disturb 
with his presence or even change the observed situation (Saaranen-Kauppinen & 
Puusniekka, 2006; DeWalt et al. 2010). In this study, this is probably not a problem, 
since there already was a strong control effect in the audits and the safety drills related 
to the audits because of the outside auditor. Yet, the researcher cannot be a complete 
outsider. Observations are also subjective and selective. When observing, different 
people pay attention to different things. The researcher’s expectations may steer his 
attention. (Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka, 2006; DeWalt et al. 2010).
4.3 Qualitative content analysis
An adaptation of qualitative content analysis was chosen as the analysis method for this 
study (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Forman & Damschroder, 2008; Vaismoradi et al. 2013). 
The process of qualitative content analysis has been divided into phases in several ways 
(Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Forman & Damschroder, 2008; Vaismoradi et al. 2013). Forman
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and Damschroder (2008) propose that content analysis be divided into three phases: 
immersion, reduction, and interpretation. Respectively, the content analysis could be 
divided into a preparation phase, an organising phase and a reporting phase (Elo & 
Kyngas, 2008; Vaismoradi et al. 2013). A deductive approach to content analysis was 
applied in this study. The deductive approach is based on an earlier theory or model and 
the structure of analysis is operationalised on the basis of previous knowledge (see 
more, for example, Elo & Kyngas, 2008). In this study, the data collection was based on 
the method of thematic interviews. The themes or the key topics of the thematic 
interviews were formed on a theoretical basis, thus the division into themes was based 
on a certain frame of reference or theory (Eskola & Suoranta, 2008). In this study, the 
themes used in the thematic interviews were derived from the characteristics of “good” 
safety culture that were introduced in chapter 2 and the requirements of the ISM Code.
The stages of qualitative content analysis are described in the table below (Table 5).
Table 5. Phases of the Qualitative Content Analysis (Adapted from: Elo & Kyngas, 2008; Forman & Damschroder, 
2008; Vaismoradi et al. 2013).
Phases________________________________ Tasks___________________________________ Results________________________________
Immersion Transcription of the interview data Interview data collected in memos and
recordings
Reduction Data examination and combination Reduced data; findings
Interpretation Interpretation, triangulation Answers to the research questions and
conclusions
In the immersion phase, the interviews are transcribed and the transcripts are read 
through several times in order to obtain the sense of the whole (Forman & 
Damschroder, 2008; Vaismoradi et al. 2013). During this study, the notes were written 
simultaneously during the course of the interviews. Notes were written on the form that 
was used during the interviews. Because of the interview method, the topics did not 
come up in the same order as the themes in the question form. In addition, there was not 
enough time to write all of the answers under the right theme. Therefore, the notes had 
to be transcribed later. During the transcription, the notes were organized under the right 
themes and the recordings of those interviews that could be recorded were also listened 
to in order to complement the transcriptions. After that, the transcribed and thematically
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ordered interview data was transferred into an Excel worksheet, in which the data was 
organized into a matrix. The columns of the matrix comprised of interview themes and 
related detailed questions. The rows of the matrix consisted of the answers of each 
interviewed person.
The purpose of the matrix was to facilitate the examination of the data during the next 
phase of the content analysis, which was the reduction phase (Forman & Damschroder, 
2008). During the reduction phase, the results of the interviews were combined based on 
how uniform or divergent the answers were. In this stage, the original statements from 
the interviews had to be interpreted, so that the various statements given using different 
words could be combined into categories and integrative concepts. As a result of 
combining the data, reduced data was produced and then categorized based on the 
research themes.
The themes derived from theory were used in qualitative analysis while reducing the 
results of the interviews. There were two tasks in data reduction, the first of which was 
examining the data. The purpose of data examination was to separate the data that was 
relevant and important for the research task from raw data (Alasuutari, 1993; Forman & 
Damschroder, 2008). According to Alasuutari (1993), the identification of relevant and 
important data is based on the theoretical framework of the study, or in this case the 
themes derived from the theoretical framework of safety culture and safety management 
and the viewpoints obtained from the first-round interviews. The matrix developed to 
process the data was applied in the examination. In practice, the data examination was 
done by reading the interview data while searching for similarities and differences, 
among other things.
The reduced data provided a basis for the interpretation phase (Forman & Damschroder, 
2008). According to Braun & Clarke (2006), interpretation is an attempt to theorise the 
significance of the patterns and their broader meanings and implications, often in 
relation to previous literature. In the interpretation phase, you perform interpretation of 
meaning based on the reduced data, which is based on the safety culture theory and 
earlier studies regarding the effects of the ISM Code. The conclusions of the qualitative
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analysis are formed as a result of the interpretation of meaning (Alasuutari, 1993). 
According to Forman and Damschroder (2008), even though the analysis process is 
presented as a series of sequential phases, the analysis is an iterative process, in which 
the interpretation should occur concurrently with data collection, ordering and 
reduction.
In this study, both theoretical triangulation and data triangulation was used in order to 
facilitate the interpretation. In data triangulation, the data collected from the thematic 
interviews is compared with the results from the observation of audits and safety drills. 
Dividing the interview data by different answer groups allows comparison between the 
groups. The theoretical triangulation is based on the different perspectives of 
organisational culture theory. (Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka, 2006; Forman & 
Damschroder, 2008; Guldenmund, 2010)
4.4 Research material
The research material consists of 94 interviews of people (see Table 6) representing the 
Finnish maritime industry as well as observations on board (see Table 7).
The study focused on shipping companies and ships, which the ISM Code applies to 
(EC No 336/2006). Furthermore, the study was aimed at Finnish shipping companies, 
which operate using various types of cargo ships and passenger ships engaged in 
international voyages. These are the ship types covered by the Regulation Article 3 
paragraph 1a (EC No 336/2006).
The aim was to include all important shipping business areas in the study. The number 
of shipping companies and ships studied was limited by the timeframe of the study and 
the availability of shipping companies that were willing to participate in the study.
The target population was limited to the personnel and the management of the shipping 
companies that were involved in the study. The target group was extended to cover 
other maritime stakeholders such as maritime inspectors, pilots and accident 
investigators, who were dealing with ISM Code related issues in their daily work. Other
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important stakeholder groups in relation to the ISM Code are classification societies, 
nautical schools and academies, insurance companies and P&I Clubs. These groups 
were excluded from the study due to the timeframe of the study.
Even though shipping is highly international and the ships’ personnel are multinational 
and multicultural (see for example Berg et al. 2013) persons of nationalities other than 
Finnish were mostly excluded from the study due to the fact that the study was carried 
out as a part of the METKU Research Project, which was limited to study only the 
Finnish maritime industry. As an exception, two interviewed members of ship personnel 
were Estonian citizens, who had worked for the Finnish shipping companies for several 
years.
Approximately two thirds of the interviewees had such long careers as seafarers that 
they had been in their occupations before the ISM Code came into force. Several of the 
interviewees had also been involved in the forming of the ISM Code based safety 
management system, either in the shipping company or on board the ships.
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Table 6. The interviewees (2007 -  2009)
Active Seafarers
Masters 15
Deck officers 21
Engineering officers 10
Crew members 5
Hotel and catering staff 11
Subtotal 62
Management (DPA’s and top management)
Maritime working experience 10
No maritime working experience 4
Subtotal 14
Other interviewees
Pilots 4
FMA Maritime Inspectors 8
FMA* (other officers) 4
FAIB* 2
Subtotal 18
Total of Interviewees 94
Note: * participated into the preliminary open interviews
The crew members’ share of the interviewees was small. According to the Annual 
Statistics of Maritime Occupation (Trafi, 2010), crew members formed approximately 
half of the workers in maritime occupations during the years of the field study. Of the 
personnel working on decks, approximately half belong to the crew members group and 
half are officers. In the engine room, the amount is slightly less than half (Trafi, 2010). 
The number of persons working in different seafarer occupations in 2009 was 9 657 
persons (Trafi, 2010).
Crew members were slightly more difficult to get an interview from, since, in practice, 
interviewing them would have meant that they would have to be interviewed during 
their leisure time. In comparison, the officers could be, in most cases, interviewed while 
on the watch if the traffic situation allowed it so that safe navigation was not 
compromised. Interviewing the hotel and catering staff on the passenger ships would 
also have, in practice, required interviewing them during their free time. Otherwise they 
would have had to interrupt their duties. Only few such persons were interviewed.
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The interview group of the shipping companies’ management included the top 
management and safety management. Nearly all of the interviewees had maritime 
working experience. Four of the interviewees that represented the shipping company 
management had no maritime working experience in practice. Other interviewees 
representing the management had maritime working experience either as deck officers 
or as ship’s masters as well as experience applying the ISM code on board.
The maritime inspectors of the Finnish Maritime Administration (FMA) were 
responsible for conducting external ISM Audits in shipping companies and on vessels. 
The purpose of ISM Audits is to verify that safety management systems are compliant 
with the ISM Code in shipping companies and on vessels. In addition, they were 
responsible for carrying out the Port State Control inspections of foreign ships visiting 
Finnish ports.
All of the pilots and maritime inspectors who were interviewed had been active 
seafarers before their engagement in Finnpilot (Finnish State Pilotage Enterprise) or the 
FMA. The answers of the pilots were included in the deck officers’ results due to the 
small number of interviewees.
The other officials of the FMA and two maritime accident investigators of the Finnish 
Accident Investigation Board (FAIB) were interviewed during the preliminary 
interviews. The officials of the FMA and the FAIB provided useful background 
information about issues relating to the ISM Code. The officials of the FMA and the 
accident investigators of the FAIB were not interviewed using the semi-structured 
questionnaire (marked * in Table 6). These interviews were carried out as open 
discussions. The results of the interviews with representatives of public administration 
concern the entire maritime sector, not only the shipping companies involved in the 
research project.
There were seven shipping companies involved in the study and they widely represent 
the Finnish shipping business. The shipping companies involved in this study were 
Bore, Finnlines, Finstaship (currently Arctia Shipping), Kristina Cruises, Langh Ship,
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Neste Shipping and VG-Shipping. During the study, 16 ships were visited. These 
shipping companies represented all the important business areas, i.e. passenger vessels, 
cruising business and all types of cargo vessels. The ships were engaged in liner traffic, 
time charter and voyage charter. The ownership of the companies varied. Four 
companies were family-owned companies, while one was state-owned. Two companies 
were stock exchange companies. The size of the fleet and the personnel varied. The 
vessels that were visited sailed under the Finnish flag, except for one that sailed under 
the flag of Gibraltar.
Each one of the shipping companies supported the research project by allowing the 
examining of their safety management systems, by giving an access to their vessels, by 
giving permission to interview their management and personnel and by providing 
additional information concerning their safety management systems.
Bore was founded in 1897 and it is owned by the family company Rettig. At the time of 
the interviews, the Bore fleet sailed on the Baltic Sea and the North Sea. Bore was 
expanded through the acquisition of Rederi Ab Engship and Bror Husell Chartering 
companies in 2005-2006. At the time of the interviews, the company's fleet consisted of 
22 ships, which comprised of Ro-Ro vessels, general cargo vessels, car carrier vessels 
and a bulk vessel. Bore had approximately 500 employees, both seafarers and office 
staff. Today, Bore's ships sail under both the Finnish and the Dutch flag. Three vessels 
were visited during the study, which were the Ro-Ro ship Estraden, car carrier 
Autobaltic and bulk ship Belgard. All vessels were visited at port.
During the study period, Finnlines provided Ro-Ro and passenger services in the Baltic 
Sea and the North Sea. Finnlines was listed on the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki and 
Finnlines Ltd. was part of the Grimaldi Group, one of the world's largest shipping 
companies. The number of personnel employed by Finnlines was approximately 1,500 
people. Finnlines' safety management system was applied on 19 vessels. In addition, 
Finnlines had 30 vessels owned by other shipping companies assigned to it by a charter 
agreement. Three vessels that fly the Finnish flag were visited during the study. These 
were the Ro-Ro passenger ships Finnstar, Finnmaid and Finnhansa. Two vessels were
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visited during their voyage from Helsinki to Travemünde. One vessel was visited in its 
homeport in Helsinki.
At the time of the interviews, Finstaship (currently Actia Shipping) was a stated-owned 
shipping company which offered icebreaking and fairway services for general shipping 
needs, specialised offshore and marine construction services, as well as ship 
management and ferry services. The Finstaship fleet consisted of three multipurpose 
vessels, six icebreakers, several special ships for fairway maintenance and marine 
construction services and several vessels for ferry operations. Two vessels were visited, 
but the seafarers that were interviewed also included personnel from other vessels.
During the study period, Kristina Cruises was a family-owned shipping company, which 
was founded in 1985. Kristina Cruises operated with two passenger ships, m/s Kristina 
Brahe and m/s Kristina Regina. M/s Kristina Regina was operating all year round. In 
spring 2001, the renovated m/s Kristina Regina began a series of Mediterranean cruises. 
Summer destinations traditionally included several ports in the Baltic Sea, Norwegian 
fjords and cities in Northern Europe. During winter seasons 2001 -  2007, the ship sailed 
around the Canary Islands and East coast of Africa (Gambia, Cap Verde and Senegal). 
During the winter season 2008 -  2009 the ship sailed on the Red Sea. During the period 
of open water, m/s Kristina Brahe sailed in the Gulf of Finland, the Saimaa Canal, Lake 
Saimaa and Lake Kallavesi. The personnel of Kristina Cruises numbered approximately 
130 people. Both m/s Kristina Brahe and m/s Kristina Regina were visited during their 
sea voyages. Now Kristina Cruises has sold both ships and is operating only as a travel 
agency.
At the time of the interviews, Neste Shipping was a part of Neste Oil Company that was 
listed on the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki. The biggest shareholder in Neste Oil was the 
Finnish state. Neste Shipping transported around 40 million tons of crude oil, petroleum 
products, and chemicals annually, primarily on the Baltic, the North Sea, and the North 
Atlantic. Neste Shipping had more than 30 vessels in its fleet, with a total tonnage of 
over 1 million tons. All vessels were ice-reinforced and feature a double hull. Six 
tankers were fully owned and three 50 % owned by Neste Oil, while the others were 
chartered. Neste Oil used around one half its tonnages for its own needs, and offered the
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remainder in the international market to international oil companies and brokers. Neste 
Shipping employed around 510 people, approximately 430 of whom work at sea and 
around 80 in the office. Neste Oil transferred its ship management functions to OSM 
Ship Management Finland Ltd on April of 2014. The interviews were made in the 
office.
During the study period, Langh Ship was a family-owned Finnish cargo shipping 
company. The fleet consisted of five cargo ships specialised in container cargo and steel 
coil transportations. Langh Ship has developed a solution for transporting heavy steel 
coils. This solution was called the Cradle Tween Deck, where heavy coils can be loaded 
in several layers. The interviews were made in the office.
At the time of the interviews, VG-Shipping was a privately owned Ship Management 
company established in 1995. VG-Shipping operated and managed nine vessels. VG- 
Shipping owned and operated two dry cargo vessels and one ship specialised in heavy 
cargoes. The ships of VG-Shipping sailed under the flags of both Finland and Gibraltar. 
Two vessels, Mirva and Eeva, were visited during the study. Both of the vessels were 
engaged in dry cargo transportations.
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Table 7 presents the visited ships and the location and date of the interviews and 
observations.
Table 7. Visited Ships
Date Ship Owner Ship type Location/Route/ Sea 
area
Purpose
21.07.2008 M /V Estraden Bore Ro-Ro Cargo Ship Port of Turku Interviews
26.07.2008 M/S Mirva VG-Shipping Cargo Ship Port of Kotka Interviews
21.08.2008 M/S Kristina 
Brahe
Kristina Cruises Passenger ship Helsinki -  Kotka Observations; External audit 
by FMA and evacuation 
exercise
23.08.2008 M/S Kristina 
Brahe
Kristina Cruises Passenger ship Kotka - Helsinki Interviews and observations
22.10.2008 M/S Finnmaid Finnlines Ro-Ro Passenger 
Ship
Port of Helsinki Observations; Internal audit 
by company DPA and 
evacuation exercise
24.10.2008 M/S Finnhansa Finnlines Ro-Ro Passenger 
Ship
Port of Helsinki Observations; External audit 
by FMA and collision 
exercise
27.10. -
28.10.2008
M/S Finnmaid Finnlines Ro-Ro Passenger 
Ship
Helsinki -Travemünde Interviews and observations
29.10. -  
30.10.2008
M/S Finnstar Finnlines Ro-Ro Passenger 
Ship
Travemünde -Helsinki Interviews and observations
06.11.2008 M /V Auto 
Baltic
Bore Sto-Ro Car carrier Port of Kotka Interviews
10.11.2008 M/S Belgard Bore Bulk carrier Port of Kotka Interviews
13.12. -
20.12.2008
M/S Kristina 
Regina
Kristina Cruises Passenger ship Red Sea Interviews, observations and 
lifeboat exercise
12.02.2009 M/S Eeva VG-Shipping Bulk carrier Port of Kotka Interviews
11.03.2009 M SV Nordica Finnstaship Multipurpose
icebreaker
Port of Helsinki Interviews*
03.02.2009 M/S Urho Finnstaship Icebreaker Port of Helsinki Interviews*
14.10.2009 M /V Seagard 
* Research assistant
Bore Ro-Ro Container 
Vessel
Port of Hanko Observations; Internal audit 
by company DPA, fire drill
The ISM Code was introduced in the ships participating in the study at slightly different 
times. The ISM Code became compulsory on passenger ships in the beginning of July 
1996. On those ships, the formation of the necessary systems took place from 1994 to 
1995. On tankers and bulk ships, the system became compulsory in the year 1998. On 
those ships, the formation and implementation of the safety management system was 
carried out during the years 1996 and 1997. On the rest of the ships the year in which 
the ISM Code became compulsory, was 2002.
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The observations were made on board six ships (see Table 7 Visited Ships). M/S 
Kristina Regina and M/S Kristina Brahe were passenger ships and the observations 
were made during their voyages. M/S Finnhansa, M/S Finnmaid, M/S Finnstar were Ro­
Ro passenger ships. The observations on M/S Finnmaid and M/S Finnstar were made 
partly at port and partly during their voyages. M/V Seagard was a Ro-Ro cargo ship. 
The observations on M/S Finnhansa and M/V Seagard were made at port. Observations 
were conducted by taking part in three external ISM audits performed by the maritime 
inspectors of the Finnish Maritime Administration and two internal ISM audits 
performed by the DPAs of the shipping companies. During the voyages of M/S 
Finnmaid, M/S Finnstar and M/S Kristina Brahe, there were opportunities to make 
observations by visiting the engine rooms, the bridges and the mess rooms of the ships.
Both the external audits and the internal audits followed a similar manuscript. The 
audits proceeded based on the plan made by the auditor and the safety drills proceeded 
according to the plans made by the ship’s master or the mate responsible for the drill. 
The Audits started by an opening meeting. During the opening meeting, the ship’s 
documentation was scrutinised by the auditors. For example, the muster lists, records 
from the previous audits and incident reporting were checked during the opening 
meeting. After the opening meeting, the audits continued as a “grand tour” on the ships. 
Typically the auditors visited the bridge, the engine room and the cargo office. During 
the tour, the auditors interviewed the personnel on their duties. The audits ended with 
the safety drills. Finally, there was a closing session, during which the auditors and the 
master discussed the findings and particularly the nonconformities found during the 
audit. Finally, the auditors issued a safety management certificate to the ship.
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5 RESULTS OF THE STUDY
This chapter presents the key findings obtained from the interviews and observations. 
Chapter six analyses and interprets the findings in relation to the previous studies 
regarding the ISM Code and maritime safety culture. The results of the interviews are 
represented based on the personnel groups as follows: masters, deck officers, 
engineering officers, crew members, hotel and catering staff, management and maritime 
inspectors. Hence the different perspectives of each group could be shown separately. 
This enables comparison between groups and reveals how the groups see themselves in 
relation to safety culture and safety management.
The results could also be arranged and then analysed based on, for example, the 
different types of ships or the shipping companies. There were passenger ships, Ro-Ro 
passenger ships, Ro-Ro cargo ships, tankers and bulk carries involved in the study. Only 
a few interviewees brought up differences based on the different types of ships during 
the interviews. Those comments are included in their respective sections in the text. The 
analysis did not bring out significant differences between the shipping companies and 
the ship types and because of that, the results are represented based on the personnel 
groups.
The research themes that emerged during the observations were communication on­
board between the crew members and the officers, employee participation during the 
safety drills and how the personnel followed the safety documentation and incident 
reporting instructions. The results gained from the observations are included in their 
respective places in the following chapters.
5.1 In the beginning 
Masters
According to the masters that participated in the interviews, no actual education on the 
ISM Code or safety management was provided to them. They described that education 
on the requirements of the ISM Code was gathered through practical work as they had 
participated in the forming of the system from the ship’s point of view. Some masters
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had also participated in the writing of documents for the safety management system. 
Some of the masters had worked as practical experts, and in this expert role they had 
made comments on the documents written in the shipping company. Some of the 
interviewed masters told that they had educated themselves on the safety management 
system as they were preparing for the first audits that were internal audits. Later on, the 
external audits were performed by the maritime inspectors of the FMA. Based on those 
external audits, the ISM certificates were acquired.
Some masters said that they had received outside education from a classification society 
such as Lloyds. In addition, some masters remembered that they had received some sort 
of a course but they could not recall the name of the course or the provider of the 
course. In addition, FMA gave advice and instructions on the application of the ISM 
Code in the beginning. According to one master, there were no courses on the ISM 
Code and there still are not any for the people in maritime occupations.
One master summarized the atmosphere of the early phase as follows:
"at that time, it fe lt like safety management and the ISM  Code were new to all 
and the shipping companies, classification societies and authorities alike were 
seeking for the right way to apply it. And at that time, no one actually knew to 
yearn for education."
Those interviewees, who had participated in the forming of the system i.e. participated 
in the description of the procedures and documentation, felt that they were forming the 
system for themselves and their own use. According to them, that is the way that it 
should be and those who are to use the system and who have to live with it should also 
build the system. One of the respondents actually saw it as an obligation:
"you make yourself a tool, so you have to make it yourself."
The masters of one shipping company said that they acquired their first safety 
management system ready-made, by purchase. According to them, that system was 
originally made for a larger shipping company and it was not at all suitable for their 
operations. The purchased system included an unnecessarily large amount of documents 
and it was way too meticulous. The masters were later allowed to participate in the
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development of the next version of the system, after which it became, in their opinion, 
more rational as a whole and more useful.
Masters from two other shipping companies also saw that a purchased system was a bad 
solution. They thought that off-the-shelf systems include masses of material that, in the 
end, no one reads in practice. According to one master, the aim should be to form a 
reasonably sized system and “common seaman sense” should be used in forming the 
system. According to another master, the aim of the system was to be a simple, realistic 
documentation and it should only describe the actual functions and operations of the 
ship at that time.
According to the masters, the amount of documents in the system is not important, but 
the fact that the system is formed based on their own experiences and that they can 
participate in the development of the system themselves is important. In their opinion, 
the system would then be more likely to be applied in practice rather than left “dusting 
on the sh e lf’.
According to the masters, nowadays education on the safety management system is 
given during the orientation as a new person comes on board. Usually, the closest 
supervisor is responsible for the orientation of the person, but, in some cases, the mate 
that is responsible of the maintenance of the safety management system is responsible 
for the safety management system orientation.
Deck officers
Deck officers who had worked in the maritime sector during the introduction of the ISM 
Code said that they barely received any education on the ISM Code and safety 
management. One mate told that the files merely came into use and it was assumed that 
everyone would read them. Correspondingly, one mate told that he had participated in 
an ISM Code related course, but his experience in the course was poor. According to 
him, the lecturers had repeated the same issues from lecture to lecture.
The younger mates, who had entered into the maritime sector after the introduction of 
the ISM Code, said that they received safety management education already in school.
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According to the respondents, the ISM Code and safety management were referred to in 
several study subjects.
Several mates described that only practical work has taught them what safety 
management really is. This has come to pass through orientation from older employees 
and by practically performing the tasks they had studied from the safety management 
system. According to one respondent:
“at school you are still such a novice that you do not correctly understand 
the practical connections, to which the ISM  Code relates”
In addition, according to him, only the orientation on board and practical work can teach 
you proper safety management.
According to the mates, the shipping companies had not provided them with actual 
education during the employment. As they arrived to the ship as new employees, 
someone, usually a mate, had given them an orientation on the ship’s safety 
management system. But there had been no separate education provided by the shipping 
company.
For some of the younger seafarers, the ISM Code is, according to them, a self-evident 
tool among other tools, because it has been a part of their career since school.
Some of the mates told that they had been able to participate in the forming of the safety 
management system themselves and, according to them, other staff members could 
participate too. According to some of the interviewees, the involvement of staff 
members is important, because, in their opinion, that results in a rational and clear 
safety management system. This keeps the system ’’readable”. One mate was pleased 
that he had been able to have an influence on the description of his own tasks.
One mate told about a common early attitude. According to him, many people were 
wondering about the usefulness of the forming of a system in general:
”why do you have to put the simple things on paper, when we could have 
acted the same way as we have acted before”
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According to the mates, not all of them took part in the forming of the system. Some of 
the mates told that systems that were pre-made onshore were delivered to the ships, 
after which they were advised to familiarize themselves with systems.
Engineering officers
Several engineering officers, who took part in the interviews, had been involved in the 
forming of the safety management system in the introduction period of the ISM Code. 
The engineering officers highlighted the fact that the instructions of the safety 
management system should be written pragmatically and unnecessarily meticulous 
instructions should be avoided. One engineering officer summarized the idea as follows: 
it should include the “must be” not the “nice to be” features. Those who had participated 
in the writing said that the aim was to create as simple a description as possible on the 
existing practices - in other words, the aim was to write down things as they have been 
done in reality, because all that is written down must also be done.
Crew members
The crew members were not a part of the writing job or, as two of the interviewed crew 
members said, they do not remember being a part of the writing job.
The crew members did not recall receiving any actual ISM Code or safety management 
system education, but they did participate in all kinds of trainings, such as lifeboat 
training and fire drills.
Hotel and catering staff
On passenger ships, also the hotel and catering staff of the catering department were 
interviewed. In the safety management system, their responsibility is defined to be 
evacuating the passengers from the ship’s facilities during an emergency situation. 
Therefore everyone, who has been assigned a task in the ship’s alarm list, must have 
completed the STCW8 Basic Safety Training course. The company has offered many of
8 The International Convention on Standards o f Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers
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the respondents a Basic Safety Training course, since it became mandatory by STCW. 
In addition, the personnel from the catering department mentioned that they participate 
in safety trainings that are organized on ships regularly. From the viewpoint of their 
work, specifically those safety trainings are the most visible part of the ISM Code and 
safety management.
According to one respondent, the actual education regarding the introduction of the 
safety management system was scarce as they were merely advised to read the files. 
One respondent recalled that, at the early stage, there was an introductory lecture on the 
subject of safety management.
After the initialization period, their safety management education has depended on the 
weekly emergency trainings. The purpose of the weekly training is to create routines so 
that the personnel can act efficiently during an emergency situation. One of the 
respondents emphasized that safety management education has depended on lifeboat 
training only. Some of the personnel of the catering department said that education on 
safety management systems has been very cursory or it has not been issued at all.
Some of the respondents from the catering department criticized emergency training for 
not being developed further. In their opinion, new training methods could get the 
personnel more excited about training. Occasionally, training is considered forced, 
since, according to the respondent, there has been too much repetition of the old. 
Training should be renewed once in a while and made more versatile. In addition, the 
respondents wished for more thorough debriefings after the training, during which the 
course of the training and what should be learned from it could be reviewed in more 
detail.
According to the respondents from the catering department, new employees are briefed 
on safety management during their orientation. The orientation is given by their own 
supervisor or a so called safety mate.
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Management
The management representatives (DPA’s, CEO’s and other management) recalled that 
they had at some point participated in actual ISM Code related courses. Those courses 
were organized by classification societies both in Finland and abroad. In addition, 
several management representatives had taken part in safety seminars and conferences. 
Some had also received education on the ISM Code while studying to become captains.
According to management, the ISM Code based safety management systems were 
formed in the introduction phase in cooperation with the ships’ personnel, so that under 
the leadership of the DPA, the ships’ masters, mates and engineering officers had made 
documents or at least commented on them. One of the interviewed safety managers 
noted that the employees feel as if the system is their own if they get the opportunity to 
influence it by commenting on it or even writing parts of the system. According to the 
interviewed DPA’s, they wrote the systems for the most part on their own, without the 
help of outside consultants. Some of the respondents told that they received guidance 
and advice on applying the ISM Code from the FMA or a classification society. The 
writing of the system was mostly done expressly by the DPA’s.
According to the interviewed management representatives, in the early stage, the ISM 
Code and safety management faced opposition. They had been inquired whether the 
professional skills of the employees are no longer trusted, since the most simple things 
must be written on paper. According to one of the interviewees, this kind of opposition 
still exists and the ISM Code is considered to be pointless.
According to one DPA, in their shipping company, the ship’s personnel hardly took part 
in forming the safety management system. He told that the ship’s masters had 
participated, but other members of the personnel had not. The introduction of the system 
was completed rather quickly and, according to him, the whole safety management was 
considered to be very formal. The DPA told that the system turned out to be unpractical. 
The operation on the ship did not correspond with what had been promised in the 
manual. According to him, the instructions of the safety management system were not 
followed in practice, for example when changing work shifts or in waste oil handling. 
According to him, the instructions of the safety management system and practice are
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still not corresponding and, as such, the situation is still the same as it was right after the 
introduction of the ISM Code.
Maritime inspectors
Most of the maritime inspectors who took part in the interviews had worked on ships 
during the introduction of the ISM Code. They had become maritime inspectors only 
after the ISM Code had come to force. Usually they had worked as mates, first mates or 
masters during the introduction of the ISM Code. According to the respondents, hardly 
any orientation or education was given at that time. Some of the interviewees were told 
to just read the manuals. According to the respondents, the shipping companies should 
have been much more active in orientation during the initial phase. Some criticized the 
shipping companies for aiming only at fulfilling the requirements of the authorities, 
getting through the ISM audits and gaining the ISM Code required certificates for the 
ships. According to the respondents, nothing actually changed in practice.
One of the respondents had experience from a foreign shipping company, in which he 
had been provided a thorough orientation to safety management. His closest supervisor 
had been responsible for the orientation and had made sure that the employee carefully 
examined the instructions of the safety management system and had even made some 
questions about the safety management system to the interviewee.
Some maritime inspectors told that, in their shipping company of that time, someone 
from the onshore personnel had been responsible for building the system, for example, 
the company lawyer. They also told that, in the initial phase, the ship’s personnel did 
not participate in writing the system. In those cases, the system had become too 
complex and unpractical.
According to one inspector, it became hard to maintain the system, since the system 
included too many check lists and there had been too much paperwork. Another 
maritime inspector said that, in the initial phase, the ISM Code was considered an extra 
burden that only caused excess workload, especially during the introduction period of 
the system and, on the other hand, excess reporting during the application of the system. 
According to them, those are the reasons why the ISM Code faced so much opposition.
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According to one maritime inspector, the safety management systems should be made 
on one’s own so that the manuals are suited for one’s own needs. As a negative 
example, he mentioned that even today, you can run into shipping companies in which 
the safety management systems are made by a consultant, which means there is no 
relation between the system manuals and reality. The manual is not necessarily even 
linked to the shipping company in any way. According to him, this is absolutely the 
wrong approach.
5.2 Management commitment
The representatives of the personnel (masters, deck officers, engineering officers, crew 
members and hotel and catering staff) and the maritime inspectors were asked how the 
management supports the personnel in safety issues and how the management gives 
feedback and communicates about safety issues. In addition, they were asked whether 
there have been any contradictions in the manifestations of the company’s safety policy 
regarding goals, measures and values and the actual management practices.
The representatives of the management were asked about the company’s safety policies, 
safety goals and other aspects that contribute to the companies’ safety issues.
Masters
According to the interviewed masters, one of the most significant effects of the ISM 
Code has been that the company and its management have been assigned particular 
responsibilities for ensuring safety. According to the interviewees, the managements’ 
attitudes towards safety are continuously improving. According to some masters, safety 
has an important role in their company even because of the economic profitability. 
These attitudes are particularly visible in passenger shipping companies. According to 
one master, they must be able to present an image of safety to the customers i.e. the 
passengers. It would be even better if the image would be based on reality. According to 
some masters, the attitudes towards safety management in their company management 
are very positive and they support the application of the system.
Finnish Maritime personnel's conceptions on safety management and safety culture 81
The interviewed masters felt that well-reasoned investment suggestions aimed at 
improving safety can usually be easily accepted by the shipping companies. Some 
masters said that, in their company, they have invested in safety education accordingly. 
Especially work safety is invested in. The interviewed masters were of the opinion that 
true management commitment is best manifested in practical actions rather than in 
orations. In the interviewees’ opinion, the companies have to spend money in safety 
investments and in continuing education of the personnel.
One master said that he does not see conflicts between the company management’s 
actions and the promises they have given. In that sense, he describes his company as a 
responsible operator. Yet, since he has worked in the field for a long time, he has noted 
that, in some shipping companies, there are contradictions between talk and action. 
Especially in economically challenging times, he has heard that safety related expenses 
are easily cut back on.
According to some masters, some shipping companies might even go too far in their 
safety goals. They aim for something that cannot be achieved.
One interviewed master noted that the company management’s actions have not always 
been without contradiction. According to him, they write “beautiful statements” to the 
system and give the personnel speeches emphasizing safety, but those are not always 
realized in practice. He told that they have not always received the required resources or 
enough education.
“Money means: always think on the economic aspects”
According to another master, it is always easier to achieve changes in safety 
management if they only require the change of practices and updating the related 
instructions. Making safety improvements that require monetary investments is more 
difficult. For example, in you have to fix or update equipment, getting the funding from 
the company can be more difficult.
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“Management gives support well enough, but, in contrast money..."
The interviewed masters told that management commitment can be seen in how well 
they provide feedback and information when needed. According to some of the 
respondents, they continuously get information from “the office” of their shipping 
company. In some shipping companies, the management representatives visit the ships 
regularly to give feedback. For some masters it is important, that the company 
management understand seafaring.
On the contrary, some masters were disappointed in the management’s attitude towards 
safety, because the management has not given feedback related to safety and has not 
communicated actively. One master wished for more feedback and contribution from 
the office. He suspected that, with regard to safety management, an active person can be 
even considered difficult. According to him, things are in a bad state and sometimes the 
office may not respond to some issues at all.
Deck officers
According to some deck officers, their shipping companies provide enough support in 
safety matters. Some deck officers felt that their company takes safety issues seriously, 
which is manifested in, for example, the fact that money has been allocated to necessary 
investments. One deck officer highlighted that everything they have needed, they have 
been able to get through the shipping company.
In contrast, some deck officers experienced that the concrete support from management 
has been incomplete. According to one deck officer, the management talks about 
supporting safety management, but in practice, management has taken away the 
possibility to improve safety by reducing the budget and resources. According to 
another deck officer, their safety manager has been deprived of his influence in the 
organisation as he is not given the necessary economical resources. One deck officer 
noted that one person, i.e. the DPA alone, in a safety organisation is not enough to take 
care of all the issues related to safety management.
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One deck officer said that they had received a deviation remark from an external auditor 
due to of insufficient management commitment. According to him, the situation has not 
in fact improved after that either. Even afterwards, they did not receive more resources 
to manage safety issues, even though the safety management system documents were 
altered. According to the interviewee, this shows that the shipping company 
management is interested in safety management only to the extent that the audits are 
passed and the certificates are maintained. According to one deck officer, the company 
management cannot know and is incapable of observing the ships’ genuine needs 
regarding safety.
One respondent felt that the ships have neglected the development of safety 
management systems, since the ships don’t have the necessary human resources. In his 
opinion, for that reason, continuous improvement does not occur and no one is 
developing the ship’s system.
The interviewed deck officers told that they were rarely or never in direct contact with 
the onshore organisation. They also said that the top management of the shipping 
company is barely visible at all on the ships. According to the deck officers, 
communication regarding safety occurs with the safety organisation and especially with 
the DPA. Few deck officers were in contact with the onshore organisation themselves. 
According to them, the ship’s master and, in some cases, the chief mate take care of the 
safety related communication ashore.
According to one deck officer, there is no need for the company management to be 
visible on the ship as such. It is enough that the shipping company’s DPA is visible and 
active.
Many of the interviewed deck officers felt that their shipping company DPA’s operation 
was good. They told that the DPA provides them with instructions and feedback if 
necessary. Some deck officers told that the DPA has visited on board and talked to them 
and the DPA has been visible. According to one respondent, in ”the office”, safety is 
personified by the safety manager, who, according to him, keeps in contact excellently.
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One deck officer from another shipping company went on to tell that their DPA was 
visible and responsive and gathers information from the ships and passes it forward. 
One deck officer wished that the DPA would have enough support from the shipping 
company. Correspondingly, another respondent wished for strength to the DPA.
Respectively, another deck officer saw it as a deficiency that their management does not 
have an adequate profile on safety and does not visit the ships. In his opinion, the 
company management could, for example, organize annual safety events for its 
personnel. According to him:
“The cooperation between the ship and the office does not work as 
required in the safety manuals. Inside the ship the system works better 
than in the office. The management boards operate on board, but you 
don’t get any feedback from onshore. The channel o f  influence is rather 
direct phone calls.”
If the deck officers were asked about management commitment, they usually brought up 
the cooperation with the ship’s master themselves. Most of the deck officers thought 
that cooperation with the ship’s masters went well. The deck officers told that, inside 
the ships, communication works well with the ship’s captain.
“Working together with the masters is the best. You do teamwork. The 
close teamwork spirit exists also on the company’s other ships. 
Cooperation within the ship works well”
“Here we have a low threshold for contacting the master i f  needed. But it 
does not rule out that the master has the necessary authority. The master 
here is visible in contrast to cargo ships where the masters usually retreat 
to their own cabins”
“This ship has great masters. Changing the master does not have an 
influence on safety”
Engineering officers
According to some representatives of the engineering officers, their shipping company’s 
management is highly committed to safety. One respondent emphasized that:
”the company management stands behind the words”
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According to the respondent, this is manifested in the fact that suggestions of 
improvement that are aimed at improving safety have been approved. He also added that 
it should be noted that good supporting arguments are always required for new 
investments and acquisitions.
In contrast, according to one engineering officer, the management is committed only as 
long as it does not involve money. According to him, when things concern money, you 
can easily get walked over. Safety is an issue only for reasons of image. Nevertheless, 
the business goes ahead and safety is not priority number one.
The representatives of the engineering officers felt that safety issues are personified by 
the company’s safety manager (DPA). According to one respondent, the DPA operates 
as the management’s mouthpiece and, according to another respondent, their DPA is 
active, but the company management is not visible on the ships. In his opinion, it is not 
even necessary for the management to be visible, as long as the DPA has the necessary 
resources.
Crew members
The crew members that participated in the interviews said that their shipping companies 
invest in safety. They also get support from the top management. According to them, it 
is possible to be granted money for improvements and especially for well-reasoned 
investments. One crew member thought that the company invests in safety in non- 
financial ways as well. According to one respondent:
“the whole corporation is in favour o f  safety."
The crew members’ experience was that the shipping company’s top management is not 
visible on ships and it does not communicate about safety in a way in which the 
message is visible for the crew members. Instead, the safety issues are informed to the 
crew members through the ship’s master. According to some of the crew members, the 
masters communicate well on the safety issues and nowadays communication with the 
master is not stiff, but appropriate in a casual manner.
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Hotel and catering staff
According to some of the respondents working in the catering department, their 
shipping companies’ attitudes towards safety are good and proper. Those respondents 
said that in their shipping companies:
“money is not an issue when it is a matter o f safety.”
Some respondents mentioned that especially the shipping company’s DPA provides 
support and listens to thoughts and suggestions. According to one respondent, as a rule, 
all suggestions for improvements are accepted by the company.
In contrast, some respondents felt that sometimes suggestions for improvements are 
rejected based on too high expenses of the investment.
According to the members of the catering department, on the ships, the safety issues are 
usually handled with the masters and, in some cases, with the officers. In contrast, the 
shipping company management is not visible on ships.
The members of the catering department told that, on their ships, the masters listen to 
them when it comes to safety, and take the safety issues seriously. According to them, 
suggestions for improvements are also well received. Some respondents found the 
masters easy to approach. As a concrete example, everyone eats in the same space in the 
shared mess room, which makes it easy to bring up issues with the master. According to 
some respondents, you can get proper answers from other officers also. Most of the 
respondents saw that communication with the master and other officers is easy and 
people are not afraid to talk about anything.
Management
The group of management representatives included eight people working as safety 
managers (DPA) or in corresponding positions. Their answers establish how the 
company management working above them feels about safety management. Six of the 
respondents worked as CEO’s or in corresponding positions (top management) during
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the interviews, thus, they had the authority to make decisions concerning safety related 
economical investments and resources.
According to some safety managers, the company management above them takes safety 
issues seriously and the management’s attitudes have changed for better after the 
introduction of the ISM Code. In their opinion, the company management has made 
sure that safety work has enough financial support and human resources. One safety 
manager said that they have a safety concerned management that does not compromise 
on safety but at the same time tries to keep the safety expenses at a reasonable level. 
Another safety manager told the interviewer that you also have to provide good 
arguments for the safety investments to the shipping company management so that they 
approve the investment.
One respondent stated:
“My shipping company has realized that safety is a part o f  productivity 
and profitability. And an accident would simply cost too much”
According to the safety managers, the company management should be more visible 
and it should be heard promoting safety work on the ships. In some shipping companies, 
the top management makes regular visits to ships, during which one important topic is 
to discuss safety issue with the ship’s personnel. These visits are also made during the 
ISM audits on ships, which the respondents see as a manifestation on how seriously the 
management takes the audits and safety management in general. In some shipping 
companies the management’s visits are documented.
Some safety managers said that their shipping company organizes a ”crew meeting” one 
to two times per year, in which also safety and safety management issues are discussed. 
In these meetings the company top management communicates about safety.
According to some safety managers, their company’s management does not have 
onboard maritime experience. They feel that this somewhat impedes the safety work 
and is manifested in the fact that such a management is inclined to skimp on safety
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investments. According to one safety manager, his supervisor has a background in 
seafaring and thus he clearly understands the importance of safety.
According to one safety manager, their top management is more words than action. This 
is manifested in the fact that sometimes not even the most relevant improvements are 
carried out on the grounds of the lack of money. He also sees that there is a lack of 
human resources that impedes the proper fulfilling of the safety tasks.
The representatives of the top management assured that their companies take safety and 
environmental issues seriously. Some of them felt that safety oriented operations were 
an integral part of their business and that safety was a precondition for profitable 
business. The managers cited some practical examples of how they have supported and 
encouraged the maritime personnel in safe operation. According to them, the 
management can demonstrate their support by communication, by visiting onboard, by 
participating in ISM audits, by giving feedback and by reacting to any nonconformities 
and safety initiatives.
Maritime inspectors
The interviewed maritime inspectors described that, especially in the larger Finnish 
shipping companies that operate in international traffic, the attitude towards the ISM 
Code based safety management is positive. According to them, those shipping 
companies feel that they gain concrete benefits from the safety management system. 
One of these benefits can be, for example, economic benefit in the form of savings in 
repair costs as the service and maintenance of the ship is performed more 
systematically. According to one respondent, several shipping companies would keep 
the safety management system even if it would not be mandatory anymore. One 
maritime inspector even sees that the biggest changes have occurred in the shipping 
companies’ management, as the ISM Code has required that also the top management 
takes responsibility for safety. According to him, this is the case most of the time as 
well.
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Some maritime inspectors said that even though the economic factors are still crucial in 
shipping companies, sensible suggestions for the improvement of safety are well 
accepted in shipping companies. No conflicts regarding occurrences in which important 
safety investments have not been allocated money and resources have emerged during 
the audits the interviewees have performed.
In contrast, the interviewed maritime inspectors told that small shipping companies that 
operate in domestic traffic don’t really understand the meaning of the safety 
management system. According to the maritime inspectors, in these shipping 
companies, rather strong opposition towards the extra bureaucracy caused by the 
systems has occurred.
5.3 Employee participation 
Masters
The masters that participated in the interviews told the interviewer that nowadays the 
personnel are quite active when it comes to safety. According to them, the employees 
participate in, for example, trainings very well. Several personnel members also make 
safety related initiatives and suggestions for improvement. One master particularly 
praised the younger generation of seafarers, who have gained a basic knowledge of the 
ISM Code and safety management while studying the profession. In contrast, he stated 
that the older crew members have usually had a negative attitude towards the 
requirements of the ISM Code. They have felt that their skills and experience are not 
appreciated and their seamanship is not trusted.
The masters were of the opinion that the personnel are not afraid to come and talk about 
safety related issues and they are not bashful with the masters. According to some 
masters, nowadays the discussion with the crew members is straightforward. One 
master saw that straightforward discussion has had a great influence on how good the 
ship’s spirit and atmosphere are, which in turn has a direct effect on the personnel’s 
safety behaviour.
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Some masters commented on the beginning of their own seafarer careers, during which 
you barely dared to speak to the captain. One master told that, in the old times, if you 
were forced to confront the captain, it was because you were criticized or punished for 
some error. According to him, such behaviour rarely occurs anymore. According to 
another master, the fact that nowadays the ship’s personnel have common rooms has 
affected the current more open communication culture. For example, everyone eats in a 
common mess room.
Deck officers
According to the deck officers, the personnel motivations regarding safety are fine. 
They thought that this is manifested in, for example, how eagerly they participate in 
safety trainings. According to one deck officer, all crew members on his ship are eager 
to take part in drills. One deck officer told that, on his ship, the personnel are interested 
in safety. According to him, they find out about the issues independently and 
spontaneously and also inquire the officers or the master if needed. According to one 
deck officer, there is a constant hurry on the ships, but nevertheless, safety and safety 
management are taken seriously. According to him, the crew members’ attitudes are 
good as a whole.
One deck officer told that some members of the personnel are especially active. 
According to him, those are usually the same people that also participate in the trainings 
actively. He saw that the attitudes depend on the person and some people have a more 
progressive attitude.
One respondent felt that especially the older people have not been able to be persuaded 
to adopt a positive attitude towards continuous improvement. These people have such 
an approach that only when something gets broken they react. Also another deck officer 
saw that the older crew members had a somewhat worse attitude towards safety 
management. In addition, he saw that some people still do not completely understand 
the meaning of training. He suspected that this could also result from the fact that the 
drills are too repetitive. According to him, training motivation could possibly be 
improved by conducting drills that are diverse in content. He also suspected that many
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people have to participate in training during off-watch too often, which can in time 
become burdensome.
The deck officers commented on the ships’ atmosphere both from their own point of 
view as well as from their subordinate’s point of view. According to the deck officers, 
they have such masters that they themselves have the courage to discuss about safety 
matters with them and they are glad to do that. The deck officers told that they have not 
witnessed that other crew members are shy either, when it comes to discussing with the 
master and other officers. According to the deck officers, in todays’ ships there is 
definitely an atmosphere of open discussion. According to the respondents, the current 
members of personnel want to know things and are not afraid to ask their supervisors 
and masters about all things related to safety. According to one deck officer, this is 
influenced by the fact that nowadays needless hierarchy no longer exists among the 
personnel. According to another respondent, you cannot afford to have a strict 
hierarchy, since the number of personnel is rather small and in a small group you have 
to work as a team. One deck officer told that, also on their ship, the personnel form a 
rather small group, in which the communication works well. According to one 
respondent, communication is not a problem at least on Finnish ships in general.
According to one deck officer, a Finnish seaman wants to think with his own brain. 
Some kind of counselling is still required so that a mutual understanding can be 
achieved. According to him, it is important to find a mutual understanding on things 
rather than blindly follow orders. He then added that the chain of command from the 
master downward is still formed whenever necessary and in that sense the masters’ 
authority is not questioned.
Some deck officers felt that the exchange of safety related information between the 
different ships of the fleet of the shipping company does not work properly. According 
to them, more information should be exchanged about, for example, deviations, so that 
they would not end up reinventing the wheel. One respondent suspected that the 
personnel feel ashamed if something has happened on the ship and they do not want it 
to reach a wider knowledge. According to him, the outdated attitude and negative stand
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on declaring errors and learning from them hinders the everyday work. According to 
him, there is a possibility that something worse might happen.
In the opinion of one respondent, there is plenty of communication on board their ship. 
There is also communication from on board to shore, but, according to him, it seldom 
leads to any action. According to him, the feedback system does not function well. The 
respondent saw that the personnel have a positive attitude towards continuous 
improvement. The personnel would like to improve safety, but the shipping company 
management does not note it properly.
According to one respondent, the communication works well on board and on board 
they discuss issues that lead to improvements on the ship. Yet, reports are made only if 
the issues cannot be fixed through conversations and through the ship’s own actions. 
According to one deck officer, the ships’ personnel approve the requirements of the 
current safety management systems well, but the threshold for reporting is high, since it 
usually causes a lot of extra work. According to him, this is because the reporting 
practices are unnecessarily burdensome.
Engineering officers
The representatives of the engineering officers that took part in the interviews saw that 
no opposition regarding safety management appeared amongst the personnel. One 
engineering officer saw that the personnel take safety into consideration well, at least 
with regard to their own work. He told that this is manifested in, for example, how well 
the personal safety equipment is used nowadays. One engineering officer saw that, on 
his ship there is no grousing and the participation in trainings is well motivated and 
done responsibly. According to one engineering officer, the attitude towards continuous 
improvement is in shape and the goal is to fix the problems as they appear instead of 
fixing them only after something gets broken. Another engineering officer told that if 
something deviant is observed, they aim to fix it.
According to some engineering officers, young seafarers do not always notice and care 
about safety issues. One of them saw that this is because the young seafarers think that
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nothing can happen to them. Another respondent saw that the young seafarers have a 
wrong attitude as they enter into the seafaring occupation. According to him, they do 
not have a true motivation to become seafarers as they enter into the field and they enter 
the maritime school only because they happened to get in.
According to the engineering officers, the communications on the ships works well. 
They said that the members of the personnel are not afraid to speak up and talk about 
safety related issues. On the ships, the personnel are thanked if it is noticed that 
something good has been achieved.
One engineering officer told that, on the ship, you are in a small group that works 
together and spends free time together in the common mess room. According to him, no 
groupings are formed in the small group on board and the communication is open 
between everyone:
“You can also easily talk to the skipper as everyone eats in the common 
mess room “.
Crew members
According to the interviewed crew members, no wide opposition to safety management 
exists among them. The crew members said that, from their point of view, safety 
management mainly consist of the trainings. According to them, the participation in the 
trainings is quite commendable. In addition, according to them, the personnel are active 
enough, when it comes to safety issues. One respondent saw that the activity is 
manifested in the fact that initiatives are made on the ship whenever necessary. 
According to one crew member, the resistance to change has declined and the personnel 
take part, for example, by giving feedback. According to one crew member, some of the 
people on board are well involved, yet still some of the people oppose the ISM Code 
strongly.
According to the interviewed crew members, usually everyone dares to open their 
mouths and talk about safety issues on board. According to one respondent, they are not 
afraid to bring out problems and talk about them with their supervisors.
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According to the crew members, the communication with the shipping company is 
executed through the chief engineer or the ship’s master. There are practically no direct 
contacts with, for example, the DPA. One crew member told that recently the 
communication has begun to work with the shipping company also.
According to one respondent, some of the ship’s officers are indifferent to hear the 
problems of the personnel. Another respondent told that the communication on board 
the ship works, but for some reason the information does not go forward to the shipping 
company through the ship’s master or the chief engineer.
One crew member felt that the amount of personnel on board has decreased 
considerably and the ships sail with very small crews. According to him, the amount of 
personnel might be too small in the case of an emergency.
Hotel and catering staff
Some of the members of the catering department told that personnel attitudes towards 
safety are responsible and serious. According to one respondent, the personnel have 
everything under control and she feels safe altogether on board with her colleagues. 
According to another respondent, the members of the personnel perceive the meaning of 
safety and have a positive attitude towards, for example training. One respondent saw 
that the personnel on board are motivated, which, in his opinion, is manifested in, for 
example, participation in evacuation training.
According to some respondents of the catering department, the communication on board 
works well. They said that, on board, you can talk with supervisors and the master about 
anything, face to face. One respondent mentioned that he himself has the courage to talk 
to his supervisor and he feels that his subordinates have the courage to talk to him. He 
emphasized that he prefers that they come and speak to him especially about safety 
issues. Another respondent felt that on her ship you can safely discuss issues and, 
according to her, the personnel feel like you always dare to ask. One respondent said 
that on his ship, the discussion is open and it is possible to talk about anything with the
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company management also, whenever they visit the ship. According to one respondent, 
those who have been on board for a shorter time don’t yet have the courage to speak up.
According to one respondent, the hierarchy functions appropriately on board. He told 
that the master is always the master, even though in everyday life the work might be 
done quite informally. He told that the masters do not needlessly stress the hierarchy 
either. Some members of the catering department described that the master is often seen 
in the common mess room and he often comes to dine at the same table. According to 
them, this lowers the unnecessary barriers between supervisors and subordinates 
significantly.
According to one respondent, the human relations and communication work well on her 
ship. She told that everyone can even go and talk directly to ”the skipper ”. According 
to her, the master has authority that comes with professional skills but this sort of 
authority does not come by commanding - it comes from the masters being skilled. She 
compared this to her previous experience in another shipping company, in which she 
did not have the courage to speak directly to the master. According to her, that shipping 
company was strict, when it came to hierarchy.
According to one respondent, the problems of safety management do not exist in the 
ship’s inner communication or attitudes, but rather in between the ship and the office. 
Another respondent said that the ship sends messages ashore, but the problem might be 
in passing the message back. One respondent hoped that the shipping company would 
arrange more information exchange between the different ships of the company. 
According to him, better information exchange between ships would allow them to 
learn from each other.
One respondent brought up the amount of crew members on board. According to him, it 
is relied too much on that such a small personnel amount could operate during an 
emergency situation. In addition, he pointed out that crew turnover is high, which 
results in the fact that not all personnel have adopted “all the safety s tu ff’.
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Management
According to one management representative, the personnel attitudes have gotten better 
with time and the personnel take part in safety work better and better. He emphasized 
that especially the younger generation that has come on board after the introduction of 
the ISM Code is satisfied with safety management and, according to him, the younger 
generation also functions more systematically i.e. they follow the principles of safety 
management more conscientiously.
The safety managers said that the ships’ personnel rarely take direct contact with them 
in issues regarding safety. According to one safety manager, the members of personnel 
do not give enough feedback on safety issues. He says that this is manifested in, for 
example, the fact that deviations are not reported. He suspected that perhaps the 
employees are afraid that they would get the blame if they report issues. He added that 
the personnel are shy when it comes to giving feedback. According to him, the 
personnel apparently do not see the benefit of reporting and development, even though 
the system is created for them and for their own safety. According to him, initiative 
attitudes have decreased.
According to another safety manager, the members of personnel are also allowed to call 
or send e-mail when they know the respondent i.e., for example, the shipping 
company’s safety manager.
According to the management representatives, the ships’ personnel are not afraid to 
bring up the difficult topics as well. One respondent saw that the personnel have the will 
to communicate. Another respondent characterized the communication between the ship 
and the shipping company as open, but specified that the information mainly comes 
through the ships’ masters. According to him, the personnel are seldom in direct 
contact. Nevertheless, when he enters the ship, the personnel dare to talk to him freely. 
He emphasized that
“in order to know what is going on, you have to go on board.”
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According to one safety manager, safety might be too personified on the ships. If safety 
is a part of the employee’s job role, such as it is with the “safety mate”, the employee 
has initiative when it comes to safety. According to him, other employees unfortunately 
have less initiative on the matter.
One management representative saw that in their shipping company there are a lot of 
long term personnel who know the company’s policies and the company management 
well. According to him, for them it is easy to communicate with the company 
management and, correspondingly, it is easy for him to communicate in the direction of 
the personnel.
According to one safety manager, the personnel initiatives have decreased from the time 
when safety management was introduced. According to him, the personnel in their 
shipping company no longer make suggestions on improving safety and no longer 
report on deviations sufficiently.
According to one safety manager, the fact that the ships have a common mess room 
where everyone meets each other enhances the ships’ internal atmosphere of discussion.
Maritime inspectors
According to some maritime inspectors, the ships’ crews are starting to find the right 
attitude towards safety management. According to one respondent, safety management 
is in a good condition at “the grass-roots" level of shipping. According to another 
respondent, nowadays the crew knows what safety management means. According to 
some maritime inspectors, the introduction of the ISM Code is already so advanced that 
safety is considered a positive thing.
“The crew is positive towards safety management"
According to one respondent, nowadays safety management is considered to be normal 
operation. He sees that the familiarization with safety management by the personnel is 
better nowadays and the level of safety management has increased significantly since 
the early stages of the ISM Code. According to another respondent, in the beginning, 
the personnel had a negative attitude towards safety management, but nowadays many
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have realised that safety management brings benefits as the organisation and division of 
work are clearer and the roles and responsibilities are clearly described. One respondent 
told that the crew members are aware of their own tasks and roles. According to him, 
the crew participates well in trainings and they are motivated when they know their own 
job and role. One maritime inspector said that he had observed that the personnel 
attitudes depend on what kind of a safety management system has been created. 
According to him, documentation that is too complicated and, for example, an excessive 
amount of checklists can cause negative attitudes. He added that the attitudes are 
positive if the reporting has remained at a reasonable level.
According to one respondent, the personnel initiative did not necessarily come across 
during the introduction of the ISM Code but later the attitudes changed. He suspected 
that, in the beginning, the requirements of safety management were considered to be a 
nuisance forced on them by the authorities. Nowadays the perception is more positive, 
which, according to the respondent, is partly due to the fact that the training is more 
diverse. According to him, before the introduction of the ISM Code, not much attention 
was given to what is trained and why. This has changed with the introduction of the 
ISM Code. Compulsion has come along, so that all crew members have to take part in 
training. Earlier the contents of the trainings were not paid attention to and trainings 
were always done in the same formula, which, according to him, led to bad motivation.
According to one maritime inspector, nowadays the personnel take safety management 
seriously. He thinks that the accident of the Estonia contributed to the fact that 
nowadays the personnel act more thoughtfully and take safety more seriously.
According to one maritime inspector, the shipping industry has traditionally been very 
hierarchic. He thinks that nowadays hierarchy does not exist, which can be seen in the 
fact that communication is open and easy. He told that the master can talk directly to the 
crew and vice versa. This is due to, for example, everyone sitting in the same mess 
room. According to some maritime inspectors, nowadays the personnel dare to speak 
up. For example, everyone dares to speak to anyone in the common mess room. They 
consider openness to be the present-day way.
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According to one maritime inspector, the personnel communicate poorly about safety. 
He thinks that very few of the members of the personnel know, for example, how to 
bring about change. He sees that the share of the crew members and also the share of the 
officers that have a good level of knowledge remains quite small. According to him, 
there should be more courage to talk about things. According to another maritime 
inspector, the personnel are not willing to put things on paper and, on the other hand, 
their message does not reach the “office”. One maritime inspector claimed that the 
personnel are not active to discuss about safety and make initiatives if their former 
messages have not been noted by the shipping company. According to him, in good 
shipping companies the office personnel visit the ships regularly and during those visits 
they discuss with the crew, which makes the personnel more active when it comes to 
safety.
According to one maritime inspector, the personnel attitudes have changed a lot, since 
nowadays the personnel’s views on safety are better heard. According to him, the 
experienced seafarers were superseded earlier and their opinions were not heard during 
the construction of the first systems. Now that the seafarers have been allowed to 
participate in the developing and correcting of the safety management system, their 
attitudes have become significantly more positive and they are more willing to take a 
stand on safety issues than before.
Observations
Communication on-board was observed by focusing on how the personnel 
communicated with each other and with their superiors. The interviews indicated that 
the atmosphere on board the ships is open and easy for communication and non- 
hierarchical among the personnel. This indication got support from the observations 
done while the researcher visited the ships. It was often noted that the personnel 
approached the master and other officers by discussing informally. It was apparent that 
the shared mess room for coffee and lunch breaks facilitated the launching of those 
informal discussions. The personnel kept company with each other despite their rank. 
Also the ship masters often launched informal discussions during breaks.
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In addition, the indication of a non-hierarchical atmosphere on the ships was supported 
by the fact that the masters and the officers took part in the daily operations when 
necessary. On one passenger ship, for instance, the master was observed participating in 
carrying the passengers’ luggage. However, he was dressed in a crew member’s t-shirt 
and thus the passengers did not distinguish him from the other crew members. This 
occurrence might be the most extreme encountered example of a contemporary non- 
hierarchical organisation. Nevertheless, the personnel of that particular ship assured that 
the ship master has the necessary authority and respect.
The issue of open communication emerged also during the audits. The auditors asked 
the personnel whether they have any problems or concerns they would like to discuss 
about. It was noted that the personnel were encouraged to discuss freely with the 
auditors, yet they did not dare to highlight problems and faults to the auditors. In 
addition, the observations indicated that the personnel were active in making safety 
proposals and questions to the auditors and those representatives of management who 
participated in the audits on behalf of the company.
During the audits, special attention was paid to the safety drills. Every audit session 
ended with a safety drill. There was a collision exercise on M/S Finnhansa. The 
exercises on M/S Finnmaid, M/S Finnstar and M/S Kristina Brahe were focused on the 
evacuation of the passengers of the ship in case of an emergency. During the audit on 
M/V Seagard, the crew exercised firefighting. In addition, there was an evacuation 
exercise for passenger and a lifeboat exercises for the ship’s crew on M/S Kristina 
Regina. The evacuation exercise was obligatory for all passengers. The purpose of the 
lifeboat exercise was to practise lowering the lifeboats into the water (see Figure 4, 
lowering the lifeboats on M/S Kristina Regina), test their functioning and practise their 
manoeuvring (see Figure 5, The crew of Kristina Regina testing the functioning of the 
lifeboats at the Red Sea). There was also a lifeboat exercise on M/S Kristina Brahe, 
which included the lowering and testing of the functioning of the lifeboats.
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Figure 4. Lowering the lifeboats on M/S Kristina Regina (14.12.2008)
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Figure 5.The crew of Kristina Regina testing the functioning of the lifeboats at the Red Sea (14.12.2008).
The observations of the safety drills supported the indications of the interviews that the 
personnel participated in the drills actively. It was found that the personnel participated 
noticeably actively and were devoted to the drills. All of the crew members were 
involved in the drills. Each crew member had a predefined role and responsibilities in 
case of an emergency. The observations indicated that each crew member was familiar 
with their responsibilities. It was found, for example, during the lifeboat exercises that 
each crew member had their own specific duties.
5.4 Benefits of the ISM Code 
Masters
According to some masters that have been in the field for several decades, safety culture 
has clearly improved, so that nowadays the operation on the bridge is more team work 
and is based on a mutual trust between the personnel. According to them, professional 
skills are respected more on board. This makes it possible that even a young mate can 
intervene in, for instance, the master’s mistakes or doings without being afraid. Some of 
them told that at the time when they came to the industry, such behaviour was 
unthinkable. One master told that when he started, the only time the captain had 
something to say was when he criticized or punished someone for making a mistake.
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Another master had experience of situations with his own earlier masters, in which the 
masters had berated the mate’s professional skills in public.
According to one master, the maritime field is so old and conservative that it has taken a 
long time to weed out the needless hierarchy and the work is still partially unfinished. 
For some time he had worked on board a ship that had a foreign master. On that ship, 
the hierarchy was strict and they did not have the courage to question the master’s 
actions even if the master had taken risks.
Some masters told the interviewer that in the old times, people admired the experienced 
seafarers, who did dangerous things without safety equipment. They told that at the 
time, taking risks was acceptable and as a result accidents did happen. According to 
them, nowadays this kind of unnecessary risk-taking is not generally accepted. 
According to one respondent, occupational safety and health activities have weeded out 
this kind of behaviour.
One master saw that the introduction of the ISM Code did not cause major changes on 
those ships that were already “good". According to him, the ISM Code has made those, 
who invest less in safety, take care of things even a little, which has enhanced the 
overall safety.
According to some masters, the introduction of the ISM Code and the related safety 
management systems have brought a new kind of “safety thinking" on board. 
According to one master, the ISM Code is one of the few regulatory reforms that has 
actually brought added value to safe travelling. One master noted that nowadays the 
personnel are much more conscious and they, for example, take the training more 
seriously. According to him, the trainings are no longer considered futile and the 
personnel do not “skip" them. Another master saw that the personnel’s enhanced 
“safety attitude" can be seen in, for example, participation in trainings. According to 
one master,
“nowadays the personnel act more professionally and they have a better 
basic knowledge and a better safety awareness".
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Some masters felt that the practices have been standardized and work has become more 
organized on different ships with the ISM Code. The ISM Code based safety 
management has brought systematization and orderliness to the training and 
familiarising of new personnel. According to one master, in the past for example 
lifeboat training was amateurish and unprofessional and arranged sporadically, but 
nowadays they are held regularly and they have a premeditated content. According to 
some masters, the systematic operation and standardisation of practices has succeeded 
due to the introduction of checklists. In their opinion, the checklists have brought 
systematisation and safety to routines, as things are no longer done from memory. 
According to some masters, the standardisation of practices makes it easier for people to 
move from one ship to another. According to one master, the systematisation is 
manifested in the clarification of the division of work and roles. He sees that this has 
enhanced the ship’s inner cooperation with time. According to him,
“a culture o f  cooperation is developing on the ships. ”
According to some masters, the most significant benefit is that the up-to-date 
procedures can easily be found if necessary.
Some masters saw that the responsibility that the ISM Code imposes onto the company 
and the company management is one of the most significant improvements when it 
comes to safety. According to one master, the ISM Code “forces” the company to also 
take care of safety, and the company has to express its own determination regarding 
safety. Another master sees that, through the safety management system, the ship’s 
personnel can affect the company management. One master told that the safety 
management system improves the flow of information between the ship and the 
shipping company. According to him, nowadays the information goes as far as to the 
shipping company’s top management. According to one master, it is a good thing that 
the shipping company also has to bear legal responsibility and not just the ship’s master.
Some masters told that investments on safety have been done in their shipping 
company. One master said that the shipping company “invests in” safety. According to
Finnish Maritime personnel's conceptions on safety management and safety culture 105
another master, their company has invested in safety equipment and training especially 
during the recent years. One master told that "safety thinking" has increased in their 
shipping company with the ISM Code. According to him, safety thinking is at a very 
high value in the shipping company management.
Some masters mentioned incident reporting and learning from them as one of the 
benefits of safety management. Some masters saw that with the ISM Code the company 
has to intervene and correct the possible safety deviations as they are recorded into the 
system. According to one master, now everyone has a chance to bring up deficiencies 
and make suggestions for improvements and get them to the attention of the company 
through incident reporting.
According to some masters, regular audits are useful, because with them, an outsider 
comes on board and looks at the ship and its operations with new eyes. According to 
one master, the internal and external audits actually monitor that the safety management 
systems function correctly.
Deck officers
According to the mates, one positive effect of the ISM Code in general is that the issues 
are now documented and they can be easily found. According to them, it is a good thing 
that there is only one “tool" in which you can find answers to all practical problems and 
you have a place where you can check out the unclear issues if necessary. According to 
one respondent, the answers can be easily found as long as the system does not include 
any vague “nonsense ". According to one respondent, the system includes all the things 
that you have to and need to pay attention to. Another respondent said it is a good thing 
that you do not have to ”come up with” the right way to do things yourself, being able 
to simply check out the right procedure from the system. One deck officer told that you 
can also spread the procedures that have been proven to be good through the system into 
other ships also. According to another deck officer, with the safety management system 
it is possible to ensure that the developed good practices are maintained on the ship 
even though the personnel changes.
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According to the deck officers, safety management systems have unified the procedures 
between ships and even between shipping companies. The respondents think that this 
makes it easier to orientate new employees and for personnel to transfer from one ship 
to another. According to them, it is easier to rationalize things to new employees, when 
you can rely on the safety management manual during the orientation or guidance. 
With the system, it is possible to give guidance on the company’s way of actions in 
different situations to a new employee. According to one deck officer,
“safety management has clarified operations, which has made it easier to 
learn the job as the job no longer is merely the arcane science o f  old sea 
dogs”.
According to some deck officers, the safety management systems have clarified the 
roles on board as the responsibilities are defined in the system. Based on that it is 
known which tasks belong to whom and thus there are no dangerous shadow sectors left 
when it comes to safety.
Some deck officers felt that the most significant benefit of the ISM Code is that, as a 
result, the shipping companies are also required to commit to safety. According to the 
respondents, the system includes the company’s aspiration regarding, for example, 
environmental policy or alcohol policy. According to one respondent, it is easier to 
operate and communicate in between the ship and the “office”, when also the “office” 
has the responsibility to take care of safety. According to one respondent,
“the problems w on’t disappear themselves, but the company has to take 
care o f  them for real. ”
According to some deck officers, people who work on ships actually think about safety. 
They see that nowadays the ISM Code is an essential part of seafaring and its existence 
is no longer questioned. One respondent told that especially those who have come to the 
maritime field after the introduction of the ISM Code, consider it a natural part of their
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job. According to one respondent, safety management is a fundamental prerequisite for 
contemporary seafaring.
Some interviewees said directly that maritime safety has improved. They saw that the 
amount of accidents has declined because of the introduction of the ISM Code. Some 
respondents reported that especially the amount of accidents and injuries has declined. 
One respondent felt that working on ships is safer now as accidents occur less.
Engineering officers
According to some engineering officers, safety culture has improved as the division of 
responsibilities and roles have clarified both on the ship and between the ship and the 
shipping company. According to them, it is a good thing that the ISM Code requires the 
companies to coordinate safety. One respondent sees that it’s a good thing that at least 
someone tries to improve safety from the company’s side. Another engineering officer 
said that, because of the system, you know who to contact and you can be sure that the 
company has to take a stand on the matter. According to one respondent, the system 
helps the communication between the ship and the shipping company. One respondent 
said that the system has clearly accelerated the reaction time of the “land side ".
According to some engineering officers, it is easier to familiarise new employees, when 
you can hand them “the ship’s user manual". According to one engineering officer, the 
safety management system is clear and comprehensive and due to that a new employee 
or someone who has changed ships does not become uncertain but knows the order in 
which things must be done.
According to one engineering officer, with the safety management system, they have 
had to prepare for special occasions beforehand, for example for black outs or 
collisions. The checklists he has prepared for such situations have been useful. 
According to another respondent, prior training for emergencies and other special 
occasions has been a significant improvement brought on by the safety management 
system.
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Crew members
According to some crew members, the safety management system has provided clearer 
guidelines that are easier to adopt. According to them, the thinner the manual the better 
the system, because that means it only includes the relevant issues.
According to some crew members, a sense of safety and risks has come to the ships and 
the shipping company due to the ISM Code.
Hotel and catering staff
According to some respondents from the catering department, the systems are already 
quite comprehensive and they have become clearer with time. According to some, there 
are still improvements needed, but on the other hand, the interviewees see that it is the 
sole purpose of the safety management system to find the improvement needs and to fix 
things. According to one respondent, it is a benefit that the system has been in a 
constant development. Another respondent said that improvements can be made while 
learning from mistakes. One respondent said that things have been improved, since, for 
example, mistakes have been discussed after the training.
The interviewees told that the ISM Code has brought systematization to the field and 
clarity to operations. According to one respondent, one of the good features of the safety 
management system is that the information is easily available.
“You can create your own thinking and framework for your job around 
it. ”
According to some members of the catering department, responsibilities have also 
become clearer with the ISM Code as everyone knows who does what. One respondent 
sees that due to the clarification of responsibilities it is now possible to trust and rely on 
other people, which creates a feeling of safety for her. According to some respondents, 
it increases the feeling of safety when you know what must be done in various 
exceptional situations and the actions have also been trained together. One respondent 
told that he knows her own duties and know how to react as required by the situation, 
for example during an emergency. She wishes that she then accordingly knows how to
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act correctly in the case of a real life situation. According to one respondent, you can 
pretty much rely on the fact that neither you nor anyone else comes up with “your own 
stuff" during an emergency, but relies on training and the procedure presented in the 
manual and applies them. According to him, it is a good thing that there is one common 
model.
Some respondents noted that safety management has improved communication both on 
board and also in the whole shipping company. According to them, now you know who 
to contact if it is necessary. Some respondents saw that improvements have come with 
the system as the system forces the company to take a stand on safety matters. 
According to one respondent, nowadays on the ship and in the shipping company, the 
deficiencies are corrected significantly better as the company has taken more 
responsibility.
One respondent mentioned that if you want the system to be useful
“it must be read".
One respondent said that the ISM Code has unified the procedures everywhere, also in 
other shipping companies and internationally. He thinks that it is a good thing that 
everyone needs to meet the basic requirements and everyone is controlled in the audits 
and inspections based on the same principles. Hence, the safety of the whole industry is 
enhanced.
Management
According to some respondents, the ISM Code can be seen as a successful solution for 
the most part. One respondent stated that if you maintain the safety management system 
well, you ensure the most important thing i.e. safety. Another respondent stated that 
today, you could not get by without a system like that. According to him, if it did not 
exist yet, it should be invented. According to some safety managers, nowadays people 
identify risks better and "safety thinking" has been introduced on board due to the ISM 
Code.
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According to some respondents, the ISM Code forms a great “backbone " and, on that 
basis, the procedures can be further developed and improved. One respondent told that 
the safety management system offers the basis, from which you start the improvements. 
He sees that the system helps to identify the current state, which makes it easier to go 
further by improving the procedures.
The management representatives saw that the safety management system has improved 
the communication between the office and the ship. According to one respondent, the 
cooperation between the shipping company management and the ship has gotten visibly 
closer. He thinks that, for example, through the internal ISM audits it is possible to get 
better contact with the ships. Another respondent felt that the audits enable continuous 
discussion regarding the ship’s safety level. One respondent stated that the shipping 
company cannot avoid responsibility, thus, for example, problems and deficiencies that 
come up in the audits have to be mended.
According to one safety manager, regular meetings between the ships and the shipping 
company and the fact that information is exchanged between ships have improved 
communication, among other things. One respondent saw that deviation reports are a 
good way to know what is happening on the ship.
Some respondents felt that nowadays training is more organized and regular, due to 
which the actual readiness state for emergencies is better. The respondents think that the 
systematization can be seen in other operations also, such as service and maintenance. 
According to one respondent, the systematization is also seen in the audits due to the 
fact that in the audits the ship’s issues are scrutinized more carefully. According to one 
respondent, the safety management has brought systematization and standardized the 
procedures, which has made it possible to learn from other ships and made it easier to 
give guidelines to the ships.
The management representatives think that the fact that important issues have been 
documented is a clear improvement. According to one respondent, with the written 
instructions it is possible to trace and, if necessary, prove that such a procedure has been
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instructed. One respondent thought that it is excellent that all the necessary instructions 
can be found in a single document. He notes that it is also good that the important 
occurrences are written down, for example, the completed trainings are documented. 
One respondent stated that documentation makes the issues possible to trace.
Some respondents saw that safety management has improved the shipping companies’ 
profitability. According to them, they have managed to achieve savings by avoiding 
accidents and, on the other hand, they have succeeded in maintaining the schedules 
better. One respondent told that due to safety management, such accidents that could 
have caused major costs have been able to be prevented. According to another 
respondent, safety actions bring savings and clear economic benefits. According to one 
respondent, the costs caused by the ISM Code have been very small compared to the 
benefits gained due to the systems.
According to some respondents, you can guarantee the continuity of operations with the 
safety management system, since history data of the ship’s usage and problems is 
gathered in the system that can also be used by the members of new personnel during 
personnel changes.
Maritime inspectors
According to some maritime inspectors,
“safety culture has gradually developed in shipping " 
due to the safety management system. They think that positive development cannot 
happen overnight, but during the years, some clear improvement has happened. One 
respondent sees that there has been a “change in attitude " to the right direction amongst 
seafarers. Another respondent feels that the introduction of the ISM Code has affected 
the situation, so that
“safety issues have been acknowledged and the issues are continuously 
addressed for example during training and audits ".
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According to one respondent, the maritime personnel’s “thinking” have improved. He 
thinks that
“the gang knows what each o f them must do ”.
One maritime inspector stated that the ISM Code has
“forced to think about possible dangerous situations and threats”.
According to one respondent, you can see a change in attitude in maritime personnel, as 
they see that all of them have important duties regarding safety and they know those 
duties well and can act in the required manner. The respondent sees that this is 
manifested as the personnel’s professional pride.
Some maritime inspectors told that the ISM Code has had the strongest influence in 
improving safety in the average shipping companies, in which, for example, the duties 
and roles were clarified and orientation was enhanced. The good shipping companies 
already had corresponding safety management systems before the introduction of the 
ISM Code. According to the respondent, the good shipping companies have not made 
much progress and the worst shipping companies unfortunately are still inferior.
The maritime inspectors who inspect both Finnish ships in the ISM audits and foreign 
ships in port state control reported that the ISM Code is applied well in the Finnish 
ships and there are not that many poor ships among the Finnish ships. Instead, they felt 
that there are great differences among the Baltic Sea countries regarding how well the 
ISM Code is applied. In addition, they said that amongst the foreign ships they also 
found very poor ships, in which both the system was executed poorly and also all the 
other things were handled in a bad way.
According to some maritime inspectors, safety management has clarified the operations 
as everyone knows their own duties in different situations. One respondent mentioned 
that nowadays the personnel know their duties better and, with the safety management 
system, their training regarding their own area of responsibility and duties is better and 
more thorough. One respondent said that the documentation of the safety management
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system has clarified the functions and made it easier to monitor the operation. 
According to him, the operations nowadays are easily traceable.
Some maritime inspectors had noted that the ISM audits are considered useful on the 
ships. One inspector told that the ships’ personnel often bring up defects that they want 
to have corrected during inspections. He thinks that the personnel have the courage to 
report the problems and defects as well. Another inspector said that the ships’ personnel 
might even wait for the outside auditor so they could bring up the issues. According to 
one respondent, the external audits motivate the personnel, since usually the course of 
trainings is inspected during the audits. He thinks that the personnel respect the outside 
views on improving the training, because actual real life situations, in which you could 
test your skills hardly ever come your way.
Observations
The responsibilities of the personnel were also considered during the audits. The 
personnel were asked about, for example, their responsibilities with regard to the safety 
management system and whether they were familiar with the requirements in relation to 
their own duties. They were also asked to show where they can find the relevant 
documents regarding the tasks they were responsible for. It was noted that the auditees 
were not ashamed if they did not know the correct answers to the questions of the 
auditors. However, the observations supported the indication of the interviews that the 
personnel knew their duties and knew how to react as is required by a particular 
situation. The observations also supported the indication that responsibilities were 
clarified with the implementation of safety management systems.
5.5 Deficiencies of the ISM Code 
Masters
The interviewed masters said that quite often the documentation of the safety 
management system is written too complicated and detailed. According to them, this 
has led to the fact that you don’t want to follow the system’s requirements in practice.
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One master said that the system might appear good on paper but is actually so far from 
the practical operation that applying it can even be impossible.
According to some masters, the shipping companies provide updates and additions to 
the system too often. One master called this “over documentation”. One master said that 
previously the safety management system manual was short and concise. He sees that 
the current manual has grown to be too thick as they have not stuck to the requirements 
of the authorities. He thinks that the shipping company aims to exceed the requirements, 
which has led to issues with excess meticulousness and an irrationally large number of 
manuals. According to one master, the excess documentation may result from the 
onshore personnel’s need to emphasize their own importance by creating new 
instructions, even though the instructions might not be necessary in practice. One 
master wished that the development of the safety management system would come from 
the ship and would not be dictated by the office.
According to some masters,
“there is a risk that people from the office hide behind the ISM  Code and
do not take real responsibilities for their actions. ”
These masters assumed that this is caused by the fact that the shipping company aims to 
create precise documentation on the procedures in case that something happens. In that 
case, the shipping company would be able to prove that the instructions were not 
followed on the ship. According to one master, in that case the basic purpose of the 
safety management system is to protect the shipping company from the seafarers. He 
suspected that if you create detailed instructions on everything, you can always find 
some instruction that has been omitted. In that case, you can blame the seafarer for the 
damage. According to one master, the shipping company opts out from responsibility if 
the manual has not been followed. He thinks that the shipping companies aim to limit 
their responsibility by creating excess documentation.
One master wondered why the issues have to be written up and documented so 
meticulously and why education and professional skills brought on by experience are
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not trusted. Another master suspected that the seafarers’ ability to solve problems 
disappears when practically every operation has meticulous instructions. He sees that 
the systems have become so detailed that it is not possible to follow them verbatim, in 
which case infringements of the rules are inevitable.
According to the masters, the safety management system requires too much paper work, 
because they see that they often have to use unnecessary checklists and fill out different 
notifications and reports. One master saw that all paper work in the form of checklists, 
notifications and deviation reports takes time away from safe navigation and sufficient 
rest time.
“The whole increase o f  bureaucracy has jeopardized safety. This is a 
safety risk. Maritime safety does not improve by adding files on the 
bridge. ”
“The bureaucracy is irritating after all. However, it has been forced to 
adapt to it nonetheless”
The interviewed masters saw that there are too many inspections. According to one
master, the ship is under some inspection almost daily, as it operates in many ports in
the Baltic Sea. Another master said that the same issues are gone through and the same
trainings are performed to please the inspector in both the ISM audits and in port state
control inspections. The inspections of the different authorities are overlapping as they
often inspect the same issues. The inspections take up a lot of time from the masters
during port calls, which are busy anyways. According to the masters, also the
interpretation of rules varies greatly between different countries. One master said that
even inside the EU, there is no uniform policy. According to one master, especially on
passenger ships and tankers the amount of inspections is excessive, which decreases the
motivation for safety management.
“When there are a lot o f  inspections and they are considered futile, you 
are tempted to merely sign for the issues on paper and not actually do 
them. The forms are filled up merely because they have to be filled; you 
merely go from where the fence is lowest and take shortcuts ifpossible.”
According to one master, in their shipping company they have not yet reached uniform 
procedures between the different ships owned by the company. He thinks that the
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routines differ too much even between sister ships. He sees that the “office” should be 
more active in passing information on good practices from one ship to another. 
According to another respondent, the ships and also the shipping companies should 
exchange safety related information better “so that we could learn from each other." 
He sees that you should not compete when it comes to safety, because if an injury or an 
accident occurs to someone, it would harm the whole industry.
Some masters criticized the ISPS Code9 strongly. According to one master: “The ISPS 
is just absurd -  damn!" According to another respondent, there are too many separate 
branches in safety and security, for example when the ISM Code and the ISPS Code 
both require their own systems and audits. One master felt that there are too many 
systems in use, which causes inflation in the attitudes towards each system. He sees that 
this can lead to indifference and to situations in which, for example, the ISM Code is 
applied poorly, thus leading to the benefits of the ISM Code being diminished. 
According to one respondent, all security and safety related issues have increased in 
number, which has increased the work pressure as the shipping companies have not 
allocated more resources on the ship.
Deck officers
According to the interviewed deck officers, the problem with the safety management 
system is excessive documentation. The deck officers said that the systems include too 
many issues that are not needed in practical work or the systems have grown too 
detailed. According to one respondent, excessive details can turn the personnel into 
mere checklist fillers without the ability to identify and notice actual safety problems. 
Another respondent said that the systems have been inflated with excess details so that 
the users cannot easily find the relevant information and the systems also impede the 
maritime personnel’s initiative.
9 The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) is a comprehensive set o f  measures 
to enhance the security o f ships and port facilities, developed in response to the perceived threats to ships 
and port facilities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States. The ISPS Code is implemented 
through chapter XI-2 Special measures to enhance maritime security in the International Convention for 
the Safety o f Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974. The Code has two parts, one mandatory and one 
recommendatory.
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One respondent stated that excessive documentation occurs, when the people in the 
shipping company or on the ship want to make themselves important, in which case 
unnecessary additions to the system are made. Another respondent even said that often 
the company wants to wash their hands of the matter with excessive documentation, as 
they are not willing to take responsibility for their own operation. He sees that this is a 
way for the company to watch their own back in a case of a possible accident situation.
Some deck officers felt that safety management has become too bureaucratic with the 
increased paper work, reporting and inspections. Some deck officers said that the 
bureaucracy has increased also because there are so many audits and inspections done 
on the ships that concentrate on going through the same issues.
According to some deck officers, there are far too few people for the developing of the 
safety management system and for continuous improvement. One deck officer said that 
the workdays are long as it is and the schedules are so tight that there is no time left for 
development work. Another respondent said that the working hours are spent precisely 
in operational tasks, in which case there is not enough working time left for fixing and 
developing the safety management system.
Engineering officers
According to some engineering officers, the ISM Code has increased bureaucracy 
significantly. One respondent said that this is manifested in constant changes to the 
system, which you do not have enough time to absorb. Another respondent said that the 
bureaucracy is manifested in too meticulous instructions. He sees that the “office” 
might be watching its own back with excessive documentation, which he calls 
information overload. According to one respondent, the safety management has been 
rendered unpractical bureaucracy, in which you concentrate on filling up checklists 
instead of actually taking care of safety. One respondent stated that due to safety 
management, people are nit-picking over the small things and, at the same time, 
concealing the bigger “mistakes”.
“there is a risk o f  pettifogging”
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Crew members
According to some crew members,
“safety management is extravagant “riffling” o f  papers that slows the 
working. ”
They think that the systems are made too meticulous, which leaves no room for the use 
of you own brain and seamanship.
Hotel and catering staff
One member of the catering department said that the office personnel often create 
instructions that are far from practice. He thinks that it is not always rational to do 
things the way that the office’s instructions require. According to another respondent, 
their system includes even such instructions that are practically impossible to be carried 
out in the way they are written.
Management
According to the management, safety management causes a lot of bureaucracy. They 
think that the system is taxing, slow and difficult to handle, which diminishes its 
potential benefits. According to one respondent, the system causes excessive paper 
work both in the office and on the ships. He sees that there are not enough personnel 
resources in either end, so that the maintaining of the system and all reporting could be 
done without interference to the actual work.
According to some respondents, the descriptions of the procedures and division of 
duties in the safety management systems has gone too far and become too detailed, 
which in practice even hinders the independent thinking on board. They see that there is 
a danger that the system is followed too schematically and thus you do not know how to 
react correctly to changing situations, which increases the risk of maritime accidents.
One respondent said that one problem that increases the bureaucracy of safety 
management is overlapping inspections, as the same issues are inspected, for example, 
in the ISM audits made by the flag states and in port state control. Another respondent
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saw that the monitoring of the application of the ISM Code and the inspections are 
ineffective. He pointed it out that there are ships in operation that have been issued, for 
instance, several notifications in port state control and they have even been detained, but 
yet they have not been able to get the ships out of operation. He wondered why the ISM 
certificate is not taken away from such ships altogether. According to another 
management representative, the inspections are not done consistently. In some ports 
they are performed really diligently and in other ports the same issue is not considered a 
deficiency.
One respondent said that safety management systems include a lot of things that are 
self-evident and he sees that they are not relevant with regard to safety. According to 
him, this disrupts the ships’ masters’ concentration and overburdens them with 
unnecessary reporting.
One respondent said that the enthusiasm regarding safety management has declined 
recently. He sees that it no longer raises passion in anyone. Topics regarding safety 
management have been left out from the public debate in the maritime field. For 
example, seminars are no longer arranged on the issue.
Maritime inspectors
According to some maritime inspectors, safety management burdens the users 
somewhat too much, since it includes so much filling out papers and report writing.
Some maritime inspectors saw that the ISM Code itself has no deficiencies, but there 
are still great defects in applying the systems. One respondent said that this is 
manifested in, for example, the fact that the safety management systems are not actively 
developed. He thinks that the different reports should be utilized better in learning and 
the development of the systems. According to another inspector, in some shipping 
companies the development has stopped after the completion of the first version of the 
system. One maritime inspector thought that even they, i.e. the authorities, do not 
sufficiently support the safety management system related development work that is 
done in the shipping companies. Another maritime inspector stated that a good indicator
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of the functionality of the safety management system is how actively the manual is 
updated. During the inspections, ships have come up in which the safety management 
system has not been further developed and the manuals have not been updated. He 
noted that, on these kinds of ships, you often detect other safety management related 
defects also.
”I f  the papers are in a mess, lots o f  other things are in a mess too.”
According to one maritime inspector, one reason for the problems is the inconsistency 
in interpreting the ISM Code both in the shipping companies and amongst the 
authorities.
Some maritime inspectors felt that during the introduction of the ISM Code the systems 
ended up too taxing and detailed, in which case they became quite ”on paper only”-like 
and too far from the practice. The ISM audits they have performed have proven that the 
smaller the file, into which they have compressed the system, the better they have found 
the core of safe operation. According to one respondent, some shipping companies still 
have overly burdensome systems, the updating of which is difficult, and unfortunately 
the systems often include outdated facts which, according to him, can lead to 
unnecessary deviations. According to one respondent,
“i f  a system is too complicated, the users do not bother to familiarize 
themselves with it and the essential things are left undone. ”
One problem was said to be the fact that the shipping company’s system might be 
copied from another shipping company and thus, the system may include issues that are 
not complied with or the system requirements are considered to be too overwhelming to 
be followed.
One maritime inspector said that safety related information does not flow correctly. He 
considered it to be a specific problem that proper communication does not always exist 
between the shipping companies and the authorities. He thinks that everyone should
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strive toward a situation, in which everyone would feel like they are on the same side, 
enhancing safety and developing safety management. He wished that there would not be 
any confrontations between the shipping companies, the ships and the authorities.
According to some maritime inspectors, there still are shipping companies that 
deliberately operate against the rules. The maritime inspectors reported that during port 
state controls they have faced ships, regarding which there are suspicions that the 
"company policy” of the shipping company owning the inspected ship is to operate 
outside the rules. During the inspections, it has come up that the watch rules and rest 
time rules are regularly breached. Nevertheless, according to the respondents, these are 
fortunately only individual cases.
Observations
The earlier observation that the auditors paid a special attention to the currency (being 
up to date) of the documentation was verified during the audit. Some non-conformities 
regarding the documentation were detected by the auditors. It was found, for example, 
that the documentation did not correspond with the daily operations. It was also found 
that sometimes the checklists were not filled in properly. It seemed that people trusted 
that they could perform their duties by heart. The auditees claimed that the checklists 
had proven to be useless. Sometimes the checklists were completed afterwards, for 
example, during the watch on the bridge. It was also revealed during the audits that the 
documents were sometimes not updated with the new versions, which generated several 
non-conformities within the company.
5.6 Incident reporting
In order to evaluate how the measures aimed at continuous improvement have 
developed in the shipping companies, the interviewees were asked how the incidents 
have been reported and analysed in their shipping companies. Reporting and 
investigating incidents are considered to be an integral component of continuous 
improvement in the safety management system (IMO, 2008b). Most of the interviewees
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started to discuss the incident reporting spontaneously during the interviews and the 
issue was handled with almost all of the interviewees.
Masters
The interviewed masters said that the threshold for reporting non-conformities, 
accidents and hazardous situations (incidents) is still unnecessarily high. They said that 
the personnel still have a negative attitude towards reporting. According to some 
masters, reporting has been clearly neglected. The masters noted that very few reports 
are made, only a few in a year. One master said that the neglects of reporting have come 
up in other contexts. For example, during one occupational safety and health inspection 
events had come up, from which incident reports should have been made at the time. 
According to some masters, the personnel are reluctant to write reports, even though 
they gladly discuss the events in the suitable contexts. Some masters said that the 
reasons behind poor reporting include, among other things, the fact that it is laborious to 
put things on paper and the electronic reporting system is stiff.
According to some masters, it is more difficult for people to report on human errors 
than on technical defects. One master said that nearly all reported incidents are related 
to technical difficulties. Another master saw it as a problem that sometimes the actual 
reasons behind the error are not revealed. He gave an example, in which the reason 
behind a black out was reported to be a technical defect, even though the actual reason 
had been the fatigue of the engine ratings.
The masters said that it is not always necessary to write incident reports on every little 
thing, but also those things should be dealt with together with the ship’s personnel. 
According to one master, only the events that have wider importance should be brought 
to general knowledge through reporting.
According to one master, the fact that the little things are not reported distorts the 
situation, when you are unable to assess the “overall risk”.
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Deck officers
According to some deck officers, the reaction towards the completed incident reports is 
poor. One respondent saw that the feedback on the reports comes too slowly and the 
corrective measures take too long time. One deck officer said that you do not get 
feedback on incident reports. He feels that the reports end up in some kind of a “black 
hole”. According to the respondents, the shipping company’s unresponsiveness towards 
the completed incident reports impairs the personnel’s already weak motivation for 
making reports.
According to some deck officers, incident reporting has been made too formal. One 
respondent said that their reporting system is stiff, due to which many neglect the 
reporting. There is not enough reporting and analysing. Some wishes have been 
expressed regarding what kind of things could be learned from the incidents of different 
ships.
Engineering officers
Some of the engineering officers said that it is their responsibility to make reports 
regarding machinery, firefighting and fire protection equipment. One engineering 
officer said that feedback and corrective actions related to the incident reports have 
sometimes been neglected or delayed.
Crew members
The crew members admitted that they had never made an actual incident report. 
According to them, usually the ship’s master or the chief engineer makes the reports. 
Yet, they stated that if something deviant had happened, the issues related to it had been 
discussed. As far as they know, no actual incident reports are made based on those 
cases, but the cases are discussed and resolved on the ship.
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Management Representatives
The management complained that still too few deviations are reported. One safety 
manager wished that the incidents would be established and reported more boldly and 
more often. One safety manager said that shortly before the interview, he had given a 
notification to a ship, because they had not reported on a minor accident. According to 
him, incident reporting is continuously neglected. Some safety managers said that the 
ship crews still do not understand the meaning of incident reporting or recognize what 
should be reported. One safety manager wished that the ships would understand that the 
reporting is for the ship personnel’s own good, since safety can be enhanced by 
reporting.
Some safety managers wished that the authorities that monitor the ISM Code would 
monitor incident reporting more strictly. They think that the authorities should also 
study completed incident reports and, based on that, make recommendations and 
instructions on improving safety for the use of all seafarers.
Maritime inspectors
According to the maritime inspectors incidents are reported very poorly. One maritime 
inspector stated that specifically in this matter the ISM Code has failed.
Some maritime inspectors said that the personnel do not lack the actual courage to write 
reports. According to them, the reports are, in most cases, omitted because of other 
reasons than the fear of punishment. The respondents suspected that the personnel do 
not bother to report near miss situations or minor deviations if no damage has been 
caused or if the matter is not relevant to others, in their opinion. According to some 
respondents, the personnel are reluctant to make written reports, even though the 
incidents can be otherwise openly discussed on the ship or they can be discussed 
verbally with the shipping company’s safety manager. According to one maritime 
inspector, people report on technical defects more often and more easily than human 
errors.
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According to some maritime inspectors, maritime personnel are reluctant to report their 
own mistakes and reports can easily be omitted if the issue does not come up in a 
different context. Some respondents felt that some members of the personnel still have 
the idea that everything is fine if nothing is reported. Some respondents think that 
secrecy still occurs in situations in which outsiders have not been there to witness the 
problems.
The maritime inspectors said that sometimes they have given a notice to a ship if no 
incidents have been reported on the ship for a couple of years. The maritime inspectors 
themselves have worked on board and, based on that, they know that it is almost 
impossible that nothing had happened on the ship for a couple of years. They suspected 
that the near miss situations are probably dealt with on the ship, even though they are 
not reported.
Observations
The observations provided an ideal opportunity to investigate the functioning of the 
incident reporting in practise. It was noted during the observation that particularly the 
external auditors paid special attention to the incident reporting process. They were 
interested in ensuring that the process had been implemented and was functioning on­
board. The auditors checked that the reported incidents were handled duly and 
corrective measures were carried out. The masters of the vessels were asked about the 
number of reported incidents per year during the audit. The average number of reported 
incidents and near-misses varied greatly depending on the vessel. Typically, the number 
of written reports was low; just a few reports per year and per vessel. On some vessels, 
only one to three cases were reported per vessel per year. In some vessels, the reported 
number was as much as 20 -  30 incidents per year per vessel.
The observations confirmed that the reporting of incidents were evidently neglected. For 
example, during an audit on one ship, an occurrence was found in the logbook, which 
should have been reported to the company as an incident.
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The auditees and the auditors discussed incident reporting several times during the 
course of the audits. The auditees stated that the majority of the reported incidents were 
related to technical failures. Human errors and near-misses were reported very seldom, 
although it is a known fact that human errors represent the majority of incidents and it 
was admitted by the auditees that near-misses are not rare. Nevertheless, the 
observations revealed that the auditors did not consider the small amount of reported 
incidents to constitute any non-conformity.
However, while discussing the incident reporting with the auditees during the audit, it 
was found that the personnel seemingly understood the purpose of incident reporting, 
although they admitted to the auditors that they had made reports very seldom. In fact, 
they were not ashamed of their poor reporting activity.
5.7 Interviewee’s proposals for the improvements of the ISM Code
According to the respondents, the ISM Code hardly requires any changes. They think 
that the Code is good as it is, because it gives the shipping companies high degree of 
freedom in applying it. No amendments regarding the ISM Code itself were suggested 
during the interviews. All suggestions for amendments were related to the application of 
the ISM Code (as indicated below).
Masters
According to some masters, the safety management systems should be simplified. One 
master complained that the all the excessive “junk” should be weeded out of the 
systems. Another master suggested that the system should be made significantly shorter 
and more concise.
According to some masters, more general instructions for the application and examples 
of good practices are needed. One master wished that there would be model examples 
on how the issues could be described in a more simple way.
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Deck officers
According to the interviewed deck officers, the safety management systems should be 
made more compact and the relevant information should be uncovered. Some deck 
officers felt that, in order to modify the systems into a more simple form, more of the 
ship’s perspective should be used. According to the deck officers, the written system 
does not always correspond with how the tasks are done in reality. They think that 
either the manual or the routine should be updated.
Crew members
According to the crew members, the safety management systems should be simplified 
or re-written completely. They think that the relevant issues are covered with 
unnecessary details.
Management
According to one safety manager, the shipping company management should commit to 
safety management better and more genuinely, not merely formally. He thinks that 
nowadays it is too often enough that the audits are passed and the certificates remain 
valid. No one bothers to strive for actual continuous improvement. According to another 
management representative, the shipping company management should not be satisfied 
with merely making the auditors happy. He sees that the management has a false 
assumption that
“i f  the papers are in order, the ship is in order”.
According to the respondent, this is not the case.
Some management representatives wished that the ISM Code would be developed so 
that models and examples of best practices would be produced. One safety manager 
thought that information about best practices is needed, so that all the shipping 
companies would not have to “reinvent the wheel”. According to one safety manager, 
uniformity is needed for incident reporting, so that the results would be comparable 
with other shipping companies. Administration could make recommendations on that. 
In addition, the administration could produce facts by analysing the incident 
information collected from the shipping companies and, based on that, give out
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recommendations. The industry should have a procedure, with which “peer support” 
regarding safety management could be generated between the shipping companies. One 
safety manager stated that the results of the audits and deviation reports are not 
followed. In his opinion, what should be monitored is how effective the measures are. 
Also information about measures that have been proven to be good should be 
disseminated across the whole industry.
According to some safety managers, the functions should be described in the systems in 
such way that excessive work can be avoided. One respondent said that this is possible 
if you stick to documenting the functions in such a manner that they correspond with the 
actual work done on the ship. Overly meticulous task descriptions should be reduced 
and more room should be given to the seafarers’ professional skills and their own 
thinking. According to some respondents, the manuals of safety management should be 
simplified.
Some respondents saw that the aim should be to reduce bureaucracy, not to increase it. 
According to one respondent, both the personnel on board and the authorities should be 
made to realize that the system is made for the ship’s crews, not for the authorities.
According to one safety manager, the responsibilities regarding safety management 
should be distributed more evenly, so that the tasks are distributed to several people in 
the shipping company management. One respondent said that the responsibility should 
also be distributed to the ship’s officers to a larger extent. The safety organisation on 
shore should be more like a support organisation and the actual tasks and decisions 
should be made on board.
Maritime inspectors
According to the maritime inspectors, the safety management systems should be 
simplified. One maritime inspector suggested that perhaps the administration should 
make a “light version”, which the shipping companies could apply if necessary.
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5.8 The Role of the administration in the implementation of the ISM Code 
Masters
According to some masters, the ISM audits performed by the authorities have been 
useful because during the audits you can get an outside view on what needs to be 
improved.
“Strange eyes always see more as you yourself become blind.”
According to one respondent, the awareness that there is a chance for an ISM audit or 
port state control keeps the personnel alert and in a good level of preparedness when it 
comes to safety. Another respondent felt that the authorities’ ISM audits and port state 
control also ensure that the more poor shipping companies maintain even some sort of a 
safety level as well, as they know that they are being monitored.
According to some masters, there is not much to criticize in the ISM audits performed 
by the authorities. They told that nowadays the authorities act appropriately.
In contrast, some respondents said that the authorities’ perspective is not right. They 
complained that the authorities’ are focused too much on finding mistakes. According to 
them, it would seem that during the inspections the authorities seek out the weaker 
points intentionally. One master said that you can always find individual flaws if you 
seek them out meticulously, but, according to him, the inspectors are not able to see the 
overall safety. Another master noted that the authorities are too focused on scrutinizing 
the papers instead of estimating the practical safety management. Continuous 
improvement is not evaluated during ISM audits or port state control. According to one 
master, the authorities should have a more developing approach and they should 
encourage the shipping company and the ships to continuous improvement in some 
way. He sees that there is too little encouragement and support for development and 
improvement.
Some masters said that the attitudes of Finnish authorities are relatively appropriate. In 
comparison, in many other countries the inspectors that had come to perform port state
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control have been too bureaucratic. According to one respondent, in some countries the 
attitudes are very authoritarian and demeaning. Another respondent told that the 
authorities’ approach is very meticulous. One respondent told the interviewer that the 
interpretation of rules by the authorities of different countries varies greatly and the 
interpretations may be contradictory.
Deck officers
According to some deck officers, audits performed by an outside authority are useful as 
the audits make the personnel review the safety management system in the spirit of 
repetition. One deck officer said that an outsider can bring new perspective to the ship’s 
functions and keep the personnel alert when it comes to safety.
Some deck officers thought that there are too many inspections, since same issues are 
dealt with in different inspections. One mate suggested that there could be only one 
inspection, to which several parties (such as authorities, classification societies and 
vetting inspectors) could participate in. According to some deck officers, there is too 
much variability in the inspections of the authorities of the different countries as the 
rules are not interpreted consistently.
According to some deck officers, the audits are too meticulous or their aim is merely to 
seek out flaws. They think that the authorities should have a more constructive role in 
audits, during which safety should be reviewed more comprehensively and making 
improvements should be encouraged.
Some deck officers stated that the audits made by classification societies have a more 
development-oriented and constructive approach than the audits made by authorities.
Finnish Maritime personnel's conceptions on safety management and safety culture 131
Engineering officers
According to some engineering officers, there is not much benefit in the audits made by 
the authorities. Some of them saw that during the audits, the focus is merely on finding 
flaws and they are too meticulous. According to the respondents, you should be able to 
get such feedback from the audit that helps you to make improvements. The 
respondents saw that the authorities do not give enough encouragement for continuous 
improvement.
One respondent said that the audits can provide more weight to safety improvements. If 
the office does not provide money, then perhaps through the outside audit you can get 
your voice heard.
Some engineering officers thought that the authorities of different countries do not act 
consistently, as the rules are interpreted in different ways.
Management
According to some safety managers, the audits done by authorities are somewhat useful. 
They felt that sometimes an outside auditor can see the cases more clearly and more 
comprehensively than an inside auditor or own personal, because outside auditors have 
experience from several ships and shipping companies.
The safety managers saw it as a defect that there are many different inspections (ISM 
audits, port state control and vetting inspections on tankers). During the inspections, the 
same issues are inspected and the interpretation of rules varies greatly between the 
auditors and between countries.
Some safety managers complained that administration is not manifested in anything else 
than audits. The administration does not, for example, send circular letters or 
recommendations. The administration does not encourage and the administration does 
not have a role in developing safety. According to the respondents, the administration’s 
work is focused too much on details rather than the big picture. Some respondents said 
that the administration merely seeks flaws.
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Maritime inspectors
According to the maritime inspectors, the inspections they perform should be 
developed. The maritime inspectors noted that the inspection procedures vary 
depending on the auditor. The maritime inspectors said that the inspections vary also by 
country and the ships that operate in international traffic suffer from the divergent 
interpretation of rules in different countries. According to them, the same issues are 
inspected during the ISM audits and port state control. If the interpretations vary that 
time also, it causes problems and confusion on the ships and does not improve safety at 
all.
The maritime inspectors thought that there are too many inspections, since several 
authorities (for example the occupational safety authorities and maritime inspectors in 
Finland) and classification societies perform their own inspections in different 
countries. According to the respondents, the issues inspected during the inspections are 
overlapping. One maritime inspector suggested that the inspections should be 
combined, so that the different parties would come on board the ship at the same time to 
observe each other’s inspections.
Some maritime inspectors felt that the audits should be developed into observations 
rather than inspections of details, during which the actual safety cannot really be 
perceived. According to some respondents, auditing training should be offered to both 
authorities and the shipping companies.
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5.9 Summary of the main results
Table 8 provides a summary of the main results organised according to the respective 
research questions.
Table 8. Summary of the results 
Research question_______________ Findings o f the study
1. The current situation of maritime safety culture
Management commitment Both positive and critical reflections on management commitment.
Employee participation
Continuous improvement
The management provided resources and funds for safety investments and safety trainings. 
The management had a visible role regarding safety.
The management was criticised by similar examples. It was seen that sometimes the 
management commitment is merely talk and no action and the management is not always 
able to allocate resources and funds to safety work. In addition, the management’s safety 
work is personalized in the DPA.
Nobody said that the management are indifferent or negligent.
In the light of the results of the research, it seems that the top management are responsible 
and aware of safety, yet they do not always have enough capacity to take care o f the 
improvements and investments.
The employee participation seems to be apparent. The interviews and the observations 
indicated that the maritime personnel are active and initiative and they are encouraged to 
discuss about safety issues. The personnel are participating actively and even enthusiastically 
in the safety trainings.
Not much progress has been achieved. All interviewees admitted that the incident reporting 
does not work properly. The interviews and the observations revealed that very few incidents 
are reported. The audits revealed that the reporting of incidents was neglected, even in 
evident occurrences.
The interviews and the observations revealed that the incident reports are sometimes 
discarded by the management and the remedial actions have been neglected.
2. How do the maritime personnel consider safety management?
Benefits
Deficiencies
Relationship with safety 
management
The implementation of the safety management systems has been regarded beneficial and 
essential among the maritime personnel. The fact that the ISM Code imposes responsibilities 
also to the company is one of the most significant benefits of the ISM Code.
The interviews indicated that the safety management clarifies the different roles and 
responsibilities and it also has unified and systematized the procedures on board.
The procedures related to safety are documented and the necessary instructions are easily 
found. The unified procedures and system documentation maintain the continuity of good 
practices on board.
All the problems and deficiencies were related to the application of the Code. The safety 
management system caused excessive documentation which was considered too complicated, 
too detailed and unpractical. The excessive paper work increases the feeling of unnecessary 
bureaucracy.
The documentation is not applicable and it can be incompatible with the actual on board 
operations. The observations support this finding, deficiencies were found during the audits.
This study indicated rather positive conceptions of safety management. Safety management 
was considered essential and very beneficial among the maritime personnel.
No one said that the ISM Code and safety management are unnecessary and they should be 
abandoned.
Actually, the will to do things better came up more often during the interviews. And the wish 
for improvements and additional resources.
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Research question Findings o f the study
3. Has the ISM Code changed the Safety Culture?
The impact of the ISM Code The ISM Code and the related safety management systems have brought a new kind of
”safety thinking” and a better “safety awareness” into the shipping companies and on board.
The safety issues are on the scene continuously.
Other impacts/factors Changes, which are related to the social relations. The hierarchy has been lowered and the 
management is no longer authoritarian on board.
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6 DISCUSSION
The purpose of this thesis was to explore the Finnish maritime personnel’s conceptions 
regarding safety management and its relationship with the concept of safety culture. 
Thematic interviews were applied as the main research method for this study. The target 
group consisted of seven Finnish shipping companies with their personnel as well as 
other interests groups of the shipping industry, with their officers that were in one way 
or another involved in maritime safety management. Observations were utilised as an 
additional research method. The results of the study were analysed qualitatively.
The study was based on the following research questions:
1. What is the current situation of maritime safety culture from the point of view of 
management commitment, employee participation and continuous improvement 
in the Finnish shipping industry?
2. How do the personnel of Finnish shipping companies see safety management?
Do they consider it useful and beneficial and do they see any deficiencies in it?
3. Do the personnel of Finnish shipping companies feel like the ISM Code has 
changed the Safety Culture in the Finnish shipping companies?
The research approach to the first research question was to evaluate whether there has 
been progress with regard to these three safety culture fundamentals in the opinion of 
the interviewees. The research approach to the second research question was to 
investigate whether the interviewees have gained any benefit, help or support from the 
safety management systems in their daily work. Furthermore, it was investigated what 
types of disadvantages and deficiencies they had faced while utilising the safety 
management systems in day-to-day business and work. The research approach to the 
third research question was to survey the opinions of the interviewees and find out 
whether they feel that the implementation of the ISM Code has changed the safety 
culture.
These three research questions were largely satisfied by the findings presented in 
chapter 5. The overriding finding in this study is that the Finnish maritime personnel 
have rather positive conceptions regarding safety management. Safety management was 
considered essential and very beneficial among the employees. The management of the 
shipping companies have become more responsible and aware of safety. However, the
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study also revealed several problems and deficiencies, which are related to the 
application of the ISM Code. According to the interviewees, the major problems related 
to the application of the ISM Code were excessive documentation, unnecessary 
bureaucracy and poor incident reporting.
This chapter analyses and interprets the findings in relation to the previous studies 
regarding the ISM Code and maritime safety culture. The chapter is organised into the 
following sections based on the three research questions:
1. Current situation of maritime safety culture
2. Maritime personnel’s conceptions on safety management and safety 
culture
3. Impact of the ISM Code on the maritime safety culture
6.1 Current situation of maritime safety culture
The first research question sought to determine what the current situation of maritime 
safety culture from the point of view of management commitment, employee 
participation and continuous improvement is. The first research question was based on 
the findings of the accident investigations, which revealed that the managements were 
not committed to safety and the crew members were not participative regarding safety 
and that the industry had underdeveloped processes for the continuous improvement of 
safety (Department of Transport, 1987; Robinson, 1999; Kristiansen, 2005; Hänninen, 
2007). It could be said that the safety culture was “poor”. The research approach to the 
first research question was to evaluate whether there has been progress in relation to 
these three safety culture fundamentals in the opinion of the interviewees.
6.1.1 Management commitment
The commitment of the management is recognized to play a critical role in safety 
management (Reason, 1997; Collins & Gadd, 2002; Wiegmann et al. 2002; Richter & 
Koch, 2004; Guldenmund, 2010). In practice, the management demonstrates its 
commitment by showing a visible positive attitude towards safety by actively promoting 
safety and by ensuring that the safety activities of the company have sufficient financial
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and other resources (Wiegmann et al. 2002; Anderson, 2003). It has been proved that 
poor management commitment was the major reason for the Herald of Free Enterprise 
accident and the Scandinavian Star accident. The accident investigations revealed that 
the managements of the shipping companies were poorly committed to safety, which 
was manifested by their indifferent and negligent attitude. (Department of Transport, 
1987; Robinson, 1999; Kristiansen, 2005).
Based on that, it was a bit of a surprise that not many studies were targeted to evaluate 
the management commitment in the shipping industry. The literature review showed 
that the previous studies determining the efficacy of the ISM Code have been targeted 
mostly at the ships’ crews (Ek & Akselsson, 2005; Bhattacharya, 2009; Knudsen, 2009; 
Gergoulis & Nikitakos, 2013). For example, Bhattacharya (2009) interviewed the 
management in order to find out their considerations on how well the ship’s crew 
complies with the requirements of the ISM Code on board. Thus, it is important to focus 
on the management and its relationship to safety culture and safety management.
The interviewees of this study indicated both positive and critical reflections on 
management commitment. According to various interviewees, the management of the 
shipping companies have demonstrated their commitment better and better in the course 
of time, which has been manifested in the providing of resources and funds for safety 
investments and safety trainings targeted at the crew. In addition, some interviewees 
have noticed that the management have taken a visible role regarding safety. On the 
other hand, various interviewees highlighted their criticism by similar examples. They 
criticised that the management have refused safety investments or they have been 
passive with regard to safety. The results of the interviews indicated fine distinctions 
between the target groups. The ships’ masters were slightly more positive than the deck 
officers and the engineering officers.
The results showed that safety management is embodied in the DPAs of the shipping 
companies. Particularly the deck officers and the engineering officers highlighted the 
role of the DPA as a representative of the management. In their opinion, the top 
management had no visible role with regard to safety management.
138 Jouni Lappalainen
The management of the shipping companies was criticised due to the fact that they had 
not provided sufficient human resources for the safety management both onshore and on 
board. The results indicate that safety management rests on the DPA, which was 
considered insufficient. Furthermore, the interviewees hoped for more human resources 
on board to take care of the safety management activities.
Every interviewed group shared the view that the top management have indicated their 
interest in safety management and the top management have realized the importance of 
their role and commitment in regard to safety. The interviews revealed no opposite 
reflections. Nobody said that the management are purely indifferent or negligent. In the 
light of the results of this research, it seems that the top management are responsible 
and aware of safety, yet they do not always have enough capacity to take care of the 
improvements and investments.
In comparison to the recent studies (Bhattacharya, 2009; Goulielmos & Gatzoli, 2012; 
Bhattacharya & Tang, 2013; Kongsvik et al. 2014) regarding the communication 
between the shore and the shipboard personnel and the visibility of the management in 
safety related issues, this study indicates that the situation is much more positive. The 
management has paid visits on ships, although in most of the cases it is the DPA, who 
represents the company. Nevertheless, the interviews and observations indicated that the 
communication has improved.
6.1.2 Employee participation
One characteristic of a good safety culture is considered to be the possibility of the 
personnel to participate and the delegation from the upper-level management to act in 
safety related issues (Reason, 1997; Collins & Gadd, 2002; Wiegmann et al. 2002; 
Richter & Koch, 2004; Guldenmund, 2010). Employee empowerment to work actively 
in the field of safety improves the personnel’s attitudes and motivation towards safety 
(Wiegmann et al. 2002).
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The accident investigation of Herald of Free Enterprise revealed that the crew failed to 
carry out their duties and found the crew members to be negligent and irresponsive. The 
Crew members had taken a narrow view on their duties regarding safety. (Department 
of Transport, 1987). According to Hänninen (2007), the seamen were not active in 
making safety related initiatives or suggestions for improvement.
Earlier studies related to the ISM Code or to the maritime safety culture have focused 
on the on board maritime personnel (for example Ek & Akselsson, 2005: Bhattacharya 
2009; 2012; Knudsen, 2009; Gergoulis & Nikitakos, 2013). These studies have 
indicated divergent results regarding employee participation and commitment to safety. 
Ek and Akselsson (2005) indicated that the ships have a generally high level of 
commitment to safety issues. “The safety culture dimensions ‘Attitude towards safety’ 
and ‘Safety-related behaviours’ received especially high scores (Ek & Akselsson, 
2005). ” On the contrary, Bhattacharya (2009) found that the requirements of the safety 
management system were not complied with very well by the onboard maritime 
personnel. The neglect was primarily caused by the incompetence and ignorance of the 
crew members (Bhattacharya, 2009). In his later study, Bhattacharya (2012) indicated 
that the “employee participation in the management o f  shipboard safety were largely 
absent in the maritime context.”
In the light of this study, the employee participation seems to be apparent. Each group 
gave a positive and consistent opinion regarding the employee participation. According 
to the interviewees, the maritime personnel are active and initiative with regard to 
safety. The personnel seek to find out answers independently and seek advice from their 
superiors when necessary. The personnel are encouraged to discuss safety issues and 
they really dare highlight problems and faults.
The representatives of the personnel expressed by themselves that they are active and 
take initiative with regard to safety. They are also encouraged to discuss safety issues 
with their superiors without any fear of being blamed or punished.
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The importance of safety trainings was emphasised during the interviews. Each group 
shared a common opinion that the personnel are participating actively and even 
enthusiastically in the safety trainings.
The observations supported the indications of the interviews. The personnel seemed to 
be keen to take part in the drills and exercises during the observation visits on board the 
ships. In addition, the observations revealed that the personnel were encouraged to 
answer freely and openly to the auditors questions during the safety audits. For 
example, they spoke about the recent errors or problems even though they had neglected 
to make an incident report regarding them.
The representatives of the management and administration and the masters showed 
respect for the personnel during the interviews. The interviews indicated that the 
personnel do not neglect their duties and they comply with the requirements of safety 
management. In addition, the interviews indicated that the personnel know their roles 
and responsibilities regarding safety. This is in strong contrast with Bhattacharya’s 
(2009) views, which indicated that the management considered the crew members 
incompetent and ignorant.
6.1.3 Continuous improvement
Reporting and investigating incidents is an integral component of continuous 
improvement in the safety management system (IMO, 2008). The reporting system 
could be seen as a cornerstone of safety management. With the reporting system, it is 
possible to identify the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the organisations’ safety 
preventively (Wiegmann et al. 2002; Eiff, 1999). According to Anderson (2003), a well- 
functioning reporting system indicates that the roots of the safety culture have been 
established.
According to Hänninen (2007), the sinking of Estonia was a systemic accident, with 
which Hänninen refers to the lack of risk management systems and the undeveloped 
state of the culture, in which different deviations and warning signals and corrective 
measures were not seen as necessary. The investigation of the Herald of Free Enterprise
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accident supports that implication (Department of Transport, 1987). The investigation 
proved that similar incidents had happened earlier, before the accident of Herald of Free 
Enterprise. For example, her sister ships had left the port with the bow door open 
several times. Furthermore, similar bow visor failures had happened earlier, before the 
Estonia accident. Unfortunately, the maritime industry could not resolve these errors 
preventively (Hänninen 2007).
The previous studies with regard to the ISM Code have proven that there are still plenty 
of problems in incident reporting (Anderson, 2003; Ek & Akselsson, 2005; 
Bhattacharya, 2009; Oltedal, 2011; Oltedal & McArthur; 2011).
The results of this study indicate that not much progress has been achieved. Basically, 
all interviewees admitted that the incident reporting does not work properly. They told 
that very few incidents are reported. At first it seemed that the attitudes towards 
reporting were negative. However, the incident reporting was brought to discussion 
more or less spontaneously and the majority of the interviewees liked to discuss the 
issue, which indicates that the interviewees considered that incident reporting is, in any 
case, important.
Furthermore, the interviews indicated that the reports are sometimes discarded by the 
management and the remedial actions have been neglected. Sometimes the personnel 
have not received any feedback on their reports.
The previous studies have indicated that “a blame culture”, which hinders good 
reporting, still exists in the maritime industry (Anderson, 2003; Ek & Akselsson, 2005; 
Bhattacharya, 2009; Oltedal & McArthur, 2011). This study does not support that 
implication strongly. The interviews revealed rather light indications of a blame culture. 
Other reasons were given for the poor reporting to a greater extent. The interviewees 
explained that they are not willing to make reports, because they have not gotten 
sufficient feedback. They don’t believe that reporting would result in any remedial 
actions and that such actions would take too long time. Similarly, Ek and Akselsson 
(2005) found that “the organisation ashore had represented slow bureaucracy, resulting
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in low feedback when a report had been submitted.” In addition, the interviewees told 
that it is too cumbersome to write reports. Even the electronic reporting systems were 
considered too difficult and inflexible.
Although the reporting of incidents has frequently been neglected, the interviewees 
assured that the incidents are discussed on board. In addition to that, improvements are 
made, although written reports of this do not exist. The observations support this 
finding. The personnel discussed the incidents with the auditors quite frankly during the 
safety audits.
6.2 How do the maritime personnel see safety management?
The research approach to the second research question was to investigate whether the 
interviewees have gained any benefit, help or support from the safety management 
systems in their daily work. Furthermore, it was investigated what types of 
disadvantages and deficiencies they have faced while utilising the safety management 
systems in day-to-day business and work.
The second research question was based on the assumption that the maritime personnel 
have a negative attitude towards safety management systems. This assumption was 
based on the premise that safety management has been seen as, for example, 
burdensome bureaucracy and the requirements of safety management have been 
considered to indicate distrust in the competence and professional skills of the maritime 
personnel (Anderson, 2003; Bhattacharya, 2009).
6.2.1 Benefits of the ISM Code
The previous studies have rested on an assumption which is taken for granted and 
according to which the implementation of the safety management system provides 
inevitable benefits for its users, that is, the shipping companies and ships. However, the 
benefits have not been investigated thoroughly from the maritime personnel’s point of 
view. Due to that, it was important to systematically investigate the maritime 
personnel’s opinions regarding the benefits of safety management.
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In general, the study indicated that the implementation of the safety management 
systems has been found beneficial and essential by the maritime personnel. The 
respondent groups were quite consensual about the issue. Moreover, nobody presented 
any arguments against the usefulness of safety management.
The interviewed personnel on board the ships shared a common opinion that the 
responsibility that the ISM Code imposes onto the company and the company 
management is one of the most significant benefits of the ISM Code with regard to 
taking care of safety.
The interviews indicated that one of the advantages of the safety management system is 
that it clarifies the roles and responsibilities on board, as they are defined in the system. 
According to the interviewees, the roles and the responsibilities have been clarified both 
on the ship and between the ship and the shipping company. The clarified roles and 
responsibilities provide several concrete benefits for the personnel: they know who to 
contact and they can rely on the fact that the company has to take a stand on the matter. 
In addition, the interviewees indicated that the clarified roles and responsibilities 
facilitate better communication between the ships and the office.
The interviews indicated that the safety management systems have unified and 
systematized the procedures on board, which has made the maritime personnel’s job 
much easier. According to the interviewees, this makes it easier to orientate new 
employees and also for personnel to transfer from one ship to another. The interviewees 
shared an opinion that it is beneficial that the procedures related to safety are 
documented and the needed instructions are easily found. The users can rely on the fact 
that they are following correct, current and accepted guidelines provided by the 
documentation of the safety management system. According to the interviewees, they 
do not have to learn new things by trial and error. Moreover, the interviewees thought 
that the unified procedures and system documentation maintain the continuity of good 
practices on board, as the crew members are changing.
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6.2.2 Deficiencies of the ISM Code
The interviews did not indicate many deficiencies regarding the content of the ISM 
Code. The Code was considered pertinent and the content of the ISM Code was not 
criticised at all. According to the interviewees, all the problems and deficiencies were 
related to the application of the Code. For example, the requirement of the incident 
reporting was considered important and useful and it was not questioned by any 
interviewee even though its poor application was criticised strongly.
Another contradictory example is the documentation of the safety management system, 
which was considered useful, in general, by the interviewees. The interviewees gave 
several examples regarding the benefits of the documentation of the safety management 
system required by the ISM Code. However, the study indicated a lot of criticism 
towards the implementation of the documentation. According to the interviewees, the 
major problem with the safety management system is excessive documentation. The 
documentation of the safety management system is sometimes written in a manner that 
is too complicated and detailed. Moreover, the documentation was considered 
unpractical and not easy to follow.
The interviews indicated that the safety management systems demand excessive paper 
work due to the updating of the documents as well as due to reporting. According to the 
interviewees, the feeling of unnecessary bureaucracy has increased due the increase of 
paperwork and many overlapping audits and controls focused on the safety management 
system. The study indicated a lack of human resources caused by the bureaucracy. The 
interviewees highlighted that the increasing bureaucracy causes extra workload, 
resulting in the suffering of other duties. In addition, the lack of human resources was 
manifested in the fact that the safety management has been personified in the DPA. The 
personification was considered a problem since the DPA cannot be everywhere, which 
results in the fact that the progress of the safety management system is stagnated in the 
shipping company. One significant aspect that was also manifested in the study was 
that, according to the interviewees, the excessive documentation can actually lead to a 
situation in which the documentation is not applicable and may be incompatible with 
the onboard operations.
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The previous studies have indicated similar findings regarding the feeling of excessive 
paperwork and unnecessary bureaucracy (Batalden and Sydnes, 2014; Kongsvik et al.
2014). For example, Anderson (2003) found that the systems were made too 
burdensome and complex, in which case the adoption of the systems was difficult and 
they were received as bureaucratic paper work. In addition, Oltedal (2011) found many 
examples in which the system documentation was not applicable, was incompatible or 
did not reflect the onboard operations. Both Oltedal (2011) and Anderson (2003) 
concluded that the documentation has been received as burdensome and not applicable 
to practise if the experience and expertise of the maritime personnel have not been 
utilised during the documentation work (see also Kongsvik et al. 2014).
The results of the interviews support the conclusions of Oltedal (2011) and Anderson 
(2003) in that the competence and experience of the crew on board had been ignored 
during the documentation work. In addition, the interviewees believed that the 
personnel would be more committed and compliant with the safety management if they 
had been more engaged in the documentation process. Oltedal (2011) also suggested 
better integration of the operating personnel’s experience and expertise, in order to 
lessen the problems of excessive documentation.
6.2.3 How do the maritime personnel see safety management?
The previous studies indicated that the maritime personnel have had a negative 
conception of safety management. According to Pun et al. (2003), particularly during 
the initial phase of the implementation of the ISM Code, there had existed strong 
resistance towards safety management (see also Hahne et al. 2000). The maritime 
personnel had felt that the requirements of the safety management system were mostly 
unnecessary bureaucracy (Bhattacharya, 2009; Anderson, 2003; see also a more recent 
study of Kongsvik et al. 2014). Bhattacharya (2009) and Antonsen (2009b) indicated 
that the maritime personnel often saw the requirements of the safety management as 
distrust towards their own competence and professional skills. Knudsen (2009) 
described the perceptions of the seamen as follows: safety can be ensured only by
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seamanship that includes the professional touch and professional pride that have 
developed through a long professional hands-on experience. According to Knudsen
(2009), maritime personnel perceived “the demand for written procedures as 
counteracting the use o f  common sense, experience, and professional knowledge 
epitomized in the concept o f  seamanship.”
It was a surprise that, contrary to the previous studies, this study indicated rather 
positive conceptions of safety management based on the ISM Code among the maritime 
personnel at present. According to the interviewees, there had been some resistance to 
change during the introduction phase of the ISM Code, but the interviewees believed 
that the resistance has turned into general approval over time. Moreover, based on the 
results of this study, it could be said that safety management is considered essential and 
very beneficial among the maritime personnel. The interviews gave a fairly unanimous 
picture regarding their conceptions of safety management.
It also came as a surprise that the interviewees mentioned the written documentation as 
a key benefit of the safety management. Contrary to Knudsen (2009), this study 
indicated that the maritime personnel consider the documentation as a foundation - one 
of the cornerstones - of safety work. The interviewees underlined several benefits 
provided by the documentation of the safety management system. Due to the 
documentation, the familiarisation of new personnel and the transfer of personnel from 
one ship to another are much easier. The documentation helps the personnel to find the 
current instructions. The documentation facilitates standardisation and systematisation 
of the working methods. This is consistent with Kongsvik et al. (2014) who found that 
safety management systems have introduced a more systematic approach to safety.
Nevertheless, it seems that maritime personnel have a somewhat complicated opinion 
when it comes to the documentation of the safety management system. Basically, they 
consider written documentation as a benefit, but simultaneously they complain about its 
issues, such as excessive documentation and increasing bureaucracy. According to the 
interviewees, the major problem resulting from excessive documentation is that the 
instructions are not compatible with on board operations. The interviewees stated that
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this undermines their commitment to and compliance with the requirements of the 
safety management. The interviewees indicated that safety management could be more 
acceptable among the maritime personnel if they were better integrated into the 
development process of the safety management system’s documentation. A similar 
phenomenon has been described by Knudsen (2009) and Oltedal (2011). The results are 
in line with Antonsen (2009b), who concluded that incompatible documentation is 
likely to not be followed in real life operations.
It was also unexpected that the interviewees basically considered incident reporting 
beneficial and even indispensable, even though they criticised it and felt that incident 
reporting does not work properly in practise. Incident reporting was dealt with in every 
interview, more or less, and mostly the interviewees brought the issue up spontaneously. 
Incident reporting was introduced as one of the benefits provided by the ISM Code. The 
interviewees hoped that incident reporting would get improved. The interviewees 
pointed out several problems and reasons for poor reporting. According to them, by 
focusing on these reasons, improvements for incident reporting could be found. In 
addition, the study indicated that maritime personnel are willing to do more themselves 
in order to improve reporting.
6.3 Impact of the ISM Code on the maritime safety culture
The third research question was based on the belief of the “founders” of the ISM Code 
that the implementation of the ISM Code should result in a safety culture. The research 
approach to the third research question was to survey the opinions of the interviewees 
and find out if they feel that the implementation of the ISM Code has changed the safety 
culture. It has been suspected that the contribution of the ISM Code to the safety culture 
of the shipping industry has not been very strong. For example, Hänninen (2007) 
questioned the ISM Code as a remedy for the cultural defects that are related to the 
whole shipping industry.
According to the interviewees, the ISM Code has affected safety culture by highlighting 
and focusing on safety issues within the maritime industry. The introduction of the ISM 
Code and the related safety management systems have brought a new kind of ”safety
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thinking” and a better “safety awareness” into the shipping companies and on board. 
The interviewees considered the fact that the ISM Code requires the management of the 
shipping companies to commit to safety a major improvement that has partly influenced 
the safety thinking among the management. In addition, the study indicates that safety 
thinking and safety awareness have been improved among the crew due to the fact that 
the safety issues are discussed continuously due to, for example, regular safety 
trainings. It is remarkable that both the management and the personnel shared the 
opinion that safety thinking and safety awareness have been improved among the other 
group. Moreover, some interviewees literally claimed that safety culture has been 
improved as a result of the implementation of the ISM Code.
Other changes have also happened during the time of the ISM Code. The interviews and 
the observations revealed some of those changes, which are related to the social 
relations among the maritime personnel on board. It was indicated that the hierarchy has 
been lowered and the management is no longer authoritarian on board. According to the 
interviewees, the operation on the bridge is more team work and based on a mutual trust 
between the personnel. The superiors are respected due to their competence, not because 
of fear. The interviews and observations indicated that the open atmosphere among the 
ships’ crew results from, for example, common premises for leisure time i.e. the mess.
Similarly, Antonsen (2009b) has described the change of social relations among the 
ship’s crew. According to him, hierarchy is rarely found in Norwegian crews nowadays. 
This is of course related to general societal changes towards a more democratic working 
life, but is probably also related to the fact that the crew sizes have decreased 
dramatically in recent years. Nowadays, most supply vessel crews are characterized by a 
sense of being on the same boat (Antonsen, 2009b).
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7 CONCLUSIONS
The functional approach has been predominant when defining and studying safety 
culture (Richter & Koch, 2004; Guldenmund, 2010). That also is the fact with regard to 
the ISM Code related studies. The functional theory presumes that an organisation’s 
culture can be changed and manipulated, that the management is able to control and 
change the safety culture and that there is an ideal state that the organisation should 
aspire to (Richter & Koch, 2004; Reiman et al. 2008; Guldenmund, 2010). 
Correspondingly, when establishing the ISM Code, a strong belief existed that 
implementing a safety management system would result in a safety culture. In addition, 
the ISM Code advocates an integrated and idealist model of safety culture by providing 
certain commitment from the top management and certain attitudes and motivation of 
individuals from all levels of the organisation.
The dogma behind the ISM Code has not been challenged at all. The model of an ideal 
and integrated safety culture has been taken as granted and the model has been 
represented strongly in the previous studies regarding the impacts of the ISM Code, 
even though the previous studies have indicated that the implementation of the ISM 
Code has been only partially successful in entrenching safety culture into shipping and 
some disappointment exist when it comes to the impacts of the ISM Code (see for 
example Goulielmos & Gatzoli, 2013; Schroder-Hinrichs et al. 2015). The studies have 
indicated that the safety culture is seemingly differentiated between the shore based 
management and on the ships of the shipping companies (Grabowski et al. 2007; 
Goulielmos & Gatzoli, 2012; Xue at al. 2015).
Nevertheless, the approach to the first research question of this study was also more or 
less functional. It sought to evaluate, whether there has been any progress in relation to 
the three safety culture fundamentals. Based on the interviews and the observations, a 
conclusion can be drawn that the maritime safety culture has advanced in many aspects. 
The maritime personnel and the maritime inspectors did not consider the management 
of the shipping companies indifferent or negligent, and respectively the representatives 
of the management and the maritime inspectors considered that the personnel’s positive
150 Jouni Lappalainen
attitudes and motivation towards safety were evident. Even though on the basis of the 
results of this study, the safety culture seems to be closer to the ideal state, it cannot be 
definitely located to the high end on the continuum from good to poor (cp. Pidgeon, 
1998; Wiegmann et al. 2002; Guldenmund, 2014).
Rather, the results for the first research question cannot be considered unambiguous. 
The results indicated obvious variation and inconsistencies within the three 
fundamentals of safety culture. Although the results indicated improved commitment of 
management and better employee participation, the results indicated some reluctant 
attitudes and negligence with regard to following the requirements of the ISM Code in a 
precise manner. Thus, the results of the first research question support the conclusion of 
Alvesson (2002) that the cultural manifestations are rarely in a neat order. The priority 
order of the values varies and the cultural ideas are unsystematic and inconsistent 
(Alvesson, 2002). This refers to a postmodern or constructivist view of safety culture 
(see for example McAuley et al. 2007 and Guldenmund, 2014), which assumes that an 
organisational culture is more often rather differentiated and fragmented than in 
harmony and sharing common values and norms.
The results for the second research question reinforce the conclusions made based on 
the first research question by uncovering differentiating and ambiguous elements in the 
interviewees’ thoughts about safety management and safety culture (cp. Richter & 
Koch, 2004). The second research question indicated that the maritime personnel have a 
positive attitude towards safety management systems in general and they have gained 
significant benefits from the application of the ISM Code, but, for example, incident 
reporting and the documentation of the safety management systems raised contradictory 
opinions when it comes to their usefulness.
The results of the third research question indicated that the implementation of the ISM 
Code has affected safety culture, although it has occurred alongside changes within the 
social relations. Based on the opinions of the respective interview groups, the 
implementation of the ISM Code has increased safety awareness and safety thinking 
among the management of the shipping companies and among the crews on board. This
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is in agreement with both the functional and the interpretive approaches, which include 
a presumption that the organisational culture can be affected at least to some extent (cp. 
Reiman et al. 2008). However, as claimed in Chapter 3.3, the postmodernist approach to 
organizational culture challenges not only the assumptions of the functional approach, 
but also the interpretive approach, which is based on, in essence, the assumption of a 
uniform culture and is committed to establishing a definitive understanding on the 
nature of organisational reality. In case of the ISM Code, it has been achieved only by a 
certain model of a safety culture. The postmodern approach calls for reconsideration 
when it comes to the dogma of a certain model behind the ISM Code, since the 
postmodern approach does not acknowledge any theory to be better than other theories. 
Due to this it would be appropriate to focus further studies on how the seemingly 
unavoidable differentiated and fragmented features of safety culture should be taken 
into account in the ISM Code related studies and in developing the possible future 
versions of the ISM Code.
The postmodern approach also claims that the organisational reality should be seen as 
contingent and temporary. This should be taken into account while drawing conclusions 
from this study. The results of this study indicate rather unanimous opinions among the 
respective interview groups and it was not easy to distinguish different interview groups 
based on their responses. In addition, it was not easy to distinguish the responses based 
on the ship types or shipping companies. The reason for that might reside in the 
homogenous structure of the interviewed people, who were mostly Finnish and almost 
all had a maritime profession as their background. In addition, most of the ships sailed 
under the Finnish flag during the time period when the interviews and the observations 
were carried out. Later on, some significant changes have happened in the shipping 
companies. For example, in the companies involved in this study the trend has been 
towards more multinational crews. In addition, Kristina Cruises has totally abandoned 
the shipping business. And in Neste Shipping particularly, the multiple geographies of 
shipping have emerged more strongly after the field survey. Neste Shipping also 
abandoned its shipping business. During the period from 2013 to 2015, some of the 
tankers were sold to a joint venture company founded by Neste, The National 
Emergency Supply Agency and Ilmarinen Mutual Pension Insurance Company
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(Helsingin Sanomat 20.9.2013). Other tankers were out flagged to international 
shipping companies. At the same time, the crew members were outsourced to a 
Norwegian ship management company (OSM Ship Management). Thus, the results of 
this study could be totally different in that respect if it was renewed nowadays. Since 
then, there have been worries that safety could be compromised due to, for example, the 
fact that the crew members could be changed to international crew members, who are 
not familiar with the difficult navigational circumstances of the Baltic Sea (Merimies 
3/2013). The worst scenario has been that an oil catastrophe could occur within the 
Finnish sea area (Merimies 3/2013). Nevertheless, the OSM Ship Management 
Company claims to be responsible for safety and it is aiming for zero incidents and zero 
spills (OSM, 2015). Thus one cannot automatically claim that the safety culture will be 
deteriorated and safety will be compromised. Because of that, it would be appropriate to 
focus further studies regarding the impacts of the ISM Code on the features of the 
multiple geographies in shipping.
Another important conclusion of this study relates to the scope of the ISM Code, which 
is a company. Based on the results of this study, a conclusion can be drawn that the 
implementation of the ISM Code has been somewhat successful in the Finnish shipping 
business. Yet, the reason for that may reside in the fact that the organisational 
environment was rather closed in the studied shipping companies during the period of 
the field study. One can suppose that the implementation of the ISM Code is much 
easier in that kind of a business environment than in an environment that is 
characterized by multiple geographies including management from a distance, 
multinational crews, diversified ownership and flag states of the ships. In addition to 
that, the ships may also sail all over the world. Hence, the question for the policy 
makers is: should the scope of the ISM Code be reconsidered? This raises also an 
additional new research question for further studies: how can the overall responsibility 
for safety that is set to a single company in the ISM Code be borne, and how should the 
ISM Code be modified in order to be more applicable in the diversified business 
environment?
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Finally, one conclusion to be drawn from this study, which relates to the constructivist 
or postmodern approach, is the subjective nature of this study. The researcher’s 
subjective premises can have an effect on how safety culture is understood. The 
researcher’s premises might be politically biased and not be neutral. There is no single 
truth, when it comes to safety culture as a concept, and it has also been debated whether 
safety culture can even be studied or assessed. The reliability and validity rest on how 
well the researcher’s conceptualisations and interpretations correspond with the 
conceptions of the study subjects, that is the interviewees, how thoroughly the research 
has been done and whether the results found and conclusions drawn are correct.
In order to understand the multiple perspectives of safety culture more 
comprehensively, multiple theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches are 
needed. This study indicates that safety culture and the impacts of the ISM Code should 
not be unambiguously studied using only quantitative or qualitative methods. Moreover, 
it is recommendable to study safety culture from several methodological and theoretical 
perspectives, in which way one may gain a more versatile and holistic picture of safety 
culture.
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APPENDIX 1 Definitions of key terminology used in this study
Accident: In incident reporting investigations and in literature, the most essential terms 
are accident and incident. According to Vepsäläinen and Lappalainen (2010), it does not 
seem that IMO, in its guidelines or codes, defines the term accident. Despite the lack of 
definition, this term can be found in IMO’s own texts, for example in the ISM Code 
(IMO, 1993).
Administration means the Government of the State whose flag the ship is entitled to 
fly (IMO, 1993).
Classification Society is a non-governmental organization that establishes and 
maintains technical standards for the construction and operation of ships and offshore 
structures. The society validates that construction has been performed according to these 
standards and carries out regular surveys in order to ensure compliance with the 
standards. (Kristiansen, 2005).
(DP), DPA: A company should designate a person ashore to be responsible of the 
company’s safety issues, in order to ensure the safe operation of ships and to provide a 
direct link between the company and those on board. The responsibility and authority of 
the designated person or persons should include monitoring the safety and pollution 
prevention aspects of the operation on each ship and ensuring that adequate resources 
and shore based support are provided as required. (IMO, 1993).
FMA: The Finnish Maritime Administration (Finnish Transport Safety Agency since 
the beginning of 2010).
Hazardous occurrence: The ISM Code urges to report and analyse non-conformities, 
accidents and hazardous occurrences (IMO 2002). In its publication Guidance on near- 
miss reporting, IMO specifies that hazardous occurrence is the same as a near-miss 
(IMO, 2008).
Incident Reporting: In this study, we consider that incident reporting procedures 
cover reports and analyses of non-conformities, accidents and hazardous situations as 
required by section 9 of the ISM Code (IMO 2010).
The ISM Code refers to the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of 
Ships and for Pollution Prevention
Safety management: the objective of safety management is to ensure that activities 
such as ship operations are carried out safely and efficiently (Kristiansen, 2005)
Non-conformity refers to a detected situation, in which the objective evidence shows 
that specified requirements (of the ISM Code) have not been fulfilled (IMO 2002).
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Major non-conformity refers to a deviation which posesa threat to the safety of the 
employees or the vessel, or a severe risk to the environment, and requires immediate 
remedial action. Major non-conformity also includes the lack of systematic and 
effective enforcement of the ISM Code. (IMO 2002).
A near-miss case is defined as a chain of events which could have led to a loss. An 
actual loss is prevented only by a fortunate break in the chain of events. The unrealized 
loss might be, for example, an injury, environmental harm or a negative impact to 
business. (IMO 2008).
